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# NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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**Our Cover:** Ian Marshall's watercolor "USS *Lehigh* and USS *Sangamon* on the James River, Virginia, 1863" pictures two ironclads in a littoral role analogous to that performed the same year by other ironclads in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina. See Robert Schneller's "A Littoral Frustration," beginning on page 38. For a notice on the artist's work, see p. 37.

The Secretary of the Navy has determined that this publication is necessary in the transaction of business required by law of the Department of the Navy. Funds for printing this publication have been approved by the Navy Publications and Printing Policy Committee.

*"A true learned journal can be an important source of information for those who have heavy demands on their time. From my experience, such a journal is no better than its reviews; and institutions are no better than their journals."*

*Hyman G. Rickover*

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*But first and foremost, we teach. The professional education of our officer corps . . . is the essence of the Naval War College experience. Everything else we do here exists to support that goal.*

# President's Notes

AS THE NEW PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, I have found the past several months to be an exciting mixture of hard work to catch up on all the activities here and profound admiration for the accomplishments of this wonderful institution. Previous to this new assignment, I spent an extremely rewarding year as Commander of Nato's Standing Naval Force Atlantic. In a radical departure from much of that force's previous experience, we spent our entire time in the Adriatic Sea enforcing the UN embargo of arms against the warring parties of what used to be known as Yugoslavia. Those twelve months gave me a better understanding of the complexity of the international military effort in the region, as well as a tremendous appreciation of the superb

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Rear Admiral Stark was commissioned in 1965 at the U.S. Naval Academy, studied at the University of Vienna as a Fulbright Scholar, and earned a doctorate in political science at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has served on the Navy Staff, the National Security Council staff, and as Executive Director of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel. His sea service has included command of USS *Julius A. Furer* (FFG 6), USS *Leahy* (CG 20), and, from 1994 to 1995, the Nato Standing Naval Force Atlantic, deployed in the Adriatic Sea. He assumed the duties of President of the Naval War College in June 1995.

professionalism of all the forces involved. The recent offensive strikes by Nato air and surface forces, and the resulting progress in the negotiations there, only reinforce my admiration for all the men and women who remain behind. It is against that background of recent operational experience that I view my new job here in Newport.

Since arriving at the Naval War College, I have been especially impressed with three particular aspects of this institution. The first is the continuing rigor and relevance of the curriculum. Many of you may remember that the current academic structure—three trimesters, concentrating on strategy, management, and tactics—was established almost a quarter-century ago by Admiral Stansfield Turner. That "revolution" was by no means an easy task. So it is a great testament to the farsightedness of Admiral Turner and the academic team which supported him that his legacy remains in place today. To be sure, the names have changed slightly. We now speak of Strategy and Policy, National Security Decision Making, and Joint Military Operations. But the essence of those ideas and the intellectual breadth of that revolution are still clearly at the fore. Within that structure, however, there have been enormous changes. Naval strategy and doctrine have evolved to keep pace with our dynamic security environment. Joint operations—ensuring that the various instruments of military force are orchestrated to create a symphony of national assets rather than a cacophony of individual policies—have become the cornerstone of the operations course. Strategy and management case studies to challenge our students have been constantly updated to reflect the latest in defense thinking. This is truly an outstanding professional education.

Second, I have been impressed with the superb quality of the faculty and staff, as well as their wholehearted dedication to excellence. Sitting in on their lectures and seminars, reading their many published works, and seeing daily their enthusiasm for their work makes me immensely proud to be part of their team.

And, finally, I have been impressed with the multitude of activities that are in progress here. Certainly, teaching officers and civilians from all branches of the military and government is our primary focus; but hardly a day goes by that a team from the Naval War College is not traveling to another location to put on a seminar, hold a conference, or give a lecture. The War Gaming Department continually is conducting one or more games while simultaneously preparing future games to be held here in Newport, in Washington, or elsewhere as needed. Also, we regularly bring in civilian scholars, conduct evening lectures on issues of current civilization, hold seminars for high-ranking officers from Eastern Europe and other regions, publish books and monographs, and stand preeminent in research on a whole host of naval and maritime topics.

But first and foremost, we teach. The professional education of our officer corps—preparing them to deal with a rapidly changing environment, expanding

their intellectual horizons, and giving them the tools to master unexpected and unusual issues—is the essence of the Naval War College experience. Everything else we do here exists to support that goal. That has remained constant since we were founded more than a century ago.

I welcome you to another issue of the *Naval War College Review*. I hope you enjoy the wide range of professional and thought-provoking articles presented here. They reflect just a portion of the work that goes on here in Newport and of the interests of the College. I look forward to your comments and to working together with you to expand our knowledge of our demanding profession.

J. R. STARK
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

# Nuclear-Armed Adversaries and the Joint Commander

Colonel C. Robert Kehler, U.S. Air Force

THE END OF THE COLD WAR CHANGED the nuclear challenge facing the United States: the predominant threat has become a small number of nuclear weapons in the hands of regional belligerents.[1] Although such adversaries cannot directly threaten U.S. national survival, they could seriously threaten American interests and allies, undermine regional stability, and greatly complicate U.S. military action if conflict were to erupt. High-priority initiatives are underway to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.[2] Nevertheless, several potential opponents remain intent on acquiring a nuclear capability.[3] Recognizing the intensity with which some of these states are seeking nuclear weapons, the president has directed the Department of Defense to be prepared to "deter, prevent, and defend against" the use of regional nuclear weapons if nonproliferation efforts fail.[4]

Unlike conventional conflicts, of which U.S. military commanders have direct experience and for which the armed forces have planned and trained, operations against a regional adversary either having or presumed to have nuclear weapons would present problems that have never been directly faced and are not yet fully understood.[5] At the operational level, these problems can be grouped into three general areas: initial campaign planning, development and selection of courses of action, and combat doctrine and operations.

The destructive potential and extraordinary political aspect of nuclear weapons make them unique among weapons of mass destruction. Therefore it is critical that the joint commander view a prospective regional contingency potentially involving nuclear weapons as far more than a standard planning

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Naval War College Review, Winter 1996, Vol. XLIX, No. 1

problem. Joint and service warfare doctrines and the joint operation planning process all provide important guidelines, yet these sources (some of which still have a Cold War flavor) are general in nature and insufficient to ensure success. Only by contemplating, debating, and exercising for regional nuclear contingencies will joint commanders begin to appreciate the nature of this threat.

## Campaign Planning Complications

Nuclear weapons will complicate a regional planning and operating environment already filled with formidable problems. Civil-military relations, coalition and alliance concerns, the information warfare environment, and the possible reactions of other regional nuclear powers are the foremost issues that commanders will confront as they begin the planning process.[6]

***Civil-Military Relations.*** Political considerations of course will shape any American decision about whether and how to use nuclear weapons.[7] Accordingly, civil-military relations are likely to be far different in this setting than the U.S. military has come to expect. Although U.S. commanders always look for civilian involvement and direction, the possibility of a regional nuclear exchange will cause far more direct political involvement in the details of the planning process than has been seen since the end of the Vietnam War, certainly far more than in Desert Storm.[8]

The joint commander can also expect much greater political direction in such matters as operational objectives, target selection, constraints, rules of engagement, preemption, retaliation, collateral damage, and also lesser issues that in a non-nuclear environment are routinely left to theater authorities.[9] Joint doctrine acknowledges this possibility and cautions that commanders "must fully appreciate the numerous and often complex factors that influence the U.S. nuclear planning process, and would likely shape U.S. decisions on the possible use of nuclear weapons."[10]

As a closely related matter, the extreme consequences of nuclear use will also cause the decision-making process to slow considerably as the National Command Authority (i.e., the president and the Secretary of Defense collectively) seeks to retain tight political control of the conflict. Nuclear release procedures aside, certain decisions that would in a conventional contingency normally be made by the joint commander are likely to be reserved to higher levels; transition to successive campaign phases may be delayed until approval is granted by higher authority; restriking certain targets may not be allowed without permission; and many other matters may be scrutinized by senior officials. Joint commanders should also expect greatly increased requests for information, progress reports, updates, and assessments. In the final analysis, commanders will have to adjust

their own planning and decision-making processes to accommodate these requirements.

***Coalition and Alliance Concerns.*** One reason an adversary would have nuclear weapons at all is to prevent the formation of an opposing coalition or to fracture it; the joint commander must carefully consider the ultimate operational impact of these political and strategic issues. Potential coalition members and alliance partners alike will be influenced by the possibility of nuclear use, which is also likely to make United Nations mandates far harder to obtain. The U.S. may choose to intervene unilaterally if nations who view nuclear use as a greater danger than succumbing to regional aggression refuse to enter the conflict.

Each scenario, then, will produce its own pressures on potential coalition members. The joint commander must be prepared for reluctance to join a coalition and for conditional commitment from those who do. The importance of the interests at stake, the opponent's specific nuclear capabilities, and the strength of international feelings against that adversary are among the factors that will bear upon coalition efforts.[11]

Formal alliance partners are no more immune than ad hoc coalition members from the influence of nuclear weapons. The joint commander need only recall Cold War debates to anticipate the likely problems: "Countless NATO policy debates were sparked by the threat of Soviet nuclear use in Western Europe and fueled by the perception that alliance members on the opposite sides of the Atlantic faced markedly different levels of nuclear risk. Similar concerns and dynamics might have come into play during the Gulf War if the United States and its allies had faced a nuclear-armed Iraq with missiles capable of striking neighboring states and Europe but not the continental United States."[12]

Coalition and alliance issues will have a practical as well as a symbolic effect on campaign planning and execution. For example, U.S. power projection will be critical, but it may be far more difficult than in a conventional scenario to obtain basing rights, overflight authorization, sealift (some countries may not allow their merchant ships to transport military materiel to the theater), logistical and financial support, and of course force and troop commitments. The last-named factor could particularly stress U.S. forces as they become fewer.

Joint commanders must attentively consider the concerns of those who do commit themselves against the regional adversary.[13] To allay them, the commander may have to defend coalition or allied partners against nuclear attack, even when the resources required would, from an operational viewpoint, be better used elsewhere. In this connection, joint doctrine recognizes that it may be essential to establish an effective attack warning system that can "transcend communications interoperability and language barriers in real time."[14]

***Public Opinion, the Media, and Information Warfare.*** The possibility of nuclear weapon use will ignite intense political debate and cause extreme public concern in the democratic nations. Reflecting that debate and concern, the world press will subject both commanders and their forces to close scrutiny. The situation will certainly arouse the traditional anti-nuclear and anti-war groups, who have been relatively quiet since the end of the Cold War. Many of these groups can marshal prominent public personalities who can virtually guarantee wide press coverage. Activists will closely monitor and report on the movement of military forces, both in the United States and in the theater, and extremists may attempt to interfere with the movement of critical units (particularly nuclear-capable forces) and supplies. Strong anti-war sentiments are likely to be aroused in many nations, causing coalition troops to sense divided support from home.

This international background of extreme concern and divisive debate will prove attractive for information warfare by astute adversaries. Given that the opponent probably means to take advantage of his nuclear capability to deter or limit any U.S. or coalition response, the joint commander should expect him to do everything possible to create the impression that the risks of intervention far outweigh prospective gains.[15]

***Other States with Weapons of Mass Destruction.*** Although a regional nuclear contingency poses little threat of escalation to a global exchange, it is not clear how declared or de facto nuclear states might react to U.S. intervention against a nuclear-capable state. Even less clear is how other nations that possess chemical or biological weapons will react if nuclear weapons are employed in their region. Joint commanders must also address the possibility of inadvertent or serendipitous nuclear "use" (i.e., the accidental or ill-advised destruction of nuclear facilities resulting in the release of radiation).

The joint commander must carefully consider the effect that overall campaign design and nuclear weapon use by one or both sides could have on other regional nuclear-capable powers. Some may threaten involvement, conventional or nuclear, if subjected even indirectly to weapon effects (e.g., radiation or electromagnetic pulse); others may react only if directly attacked; some may see the conflict as justification for completing their own nuclear weapons programs; and others may ally themselves with the adversary (especially if the U.S. itself uses nuclear weapons). All will express alarm at the possibility of nuclear use near their territory, particularly since nuclear weapons effects harm allies and potential adversaries alike, and well beyond the theater of operations. Public and diplomatic campaigns against any use, threat of use, or even preparation for use of nuclear weapons will develop quickly and build rapidly.

## Developing and Selecting Courses of Action

Regardless of whether the mission is to intervene in a conventional conflict where the possibility of nuclear use exists (a new Desert Storm against a nuclear-armed Iraq) or to eliminate a regional nuclear threat (preemptive attack against an adversary's nuclear capability), choosing a course of action, a COA, will be difficult. Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1 provides insight on this issue: "Because the use of nuclear weapons . . . would be so influential, there is a temptation to make one of two tacit assumptions during planning: nuclear weapons will not be used at all or nuclear weapons can be quickly employed by friendly forces if the need arises. Either assumption can be dangerous. The joint planner must work with a realistic appreciation of both the possibility of the employment of nuclear weapons and the CINC's lack of effective control over the decision for their initial use."[16]

To begin with, nuclear weapons will present the commander with a quantum increase in risk. Since "ends, ways, means, and risks are all closely interrelated, a great increase in risk wrought by the introduction of nuclear weapons into the equation requires a reassessment of ends, ways, and means."[17] Commanders (who address the "ends-ways-means-risks" balance at this stage) may propose either to restrict or expand ways and means so as to accomplish their assigned objectives with the lowest risk. These proposals will be subjected to analysis at higher levels of authority, which may result in different limitations than had been envisioned.

A second inherent difficulty involves intelligence assessments. Accurate intelligence of adversary capability and intent is vital; however, the joint commander must view estimates of intent in light of the grave consequences of error. "The massive penalty for incorrectly judging the adversary's intentions would require a worst case assumption even if intelligence information suggested the adversary would not employ nuclear weapons."[18]

***COA Development.*** Joint commanders must ensure that all issues pertinent to the particular scenario are thoroughly considered at this stage and that, as far as possible, agreement is reached at all appropriate levels prior to the campaign. In general, regional nuclear planning comprises two theoretical possibilities: where use by the U.S. is planned, and in which nuclear use by either side is possible but not intended.[19] The second category, the more likely planning case, will necessitate creating a basic conventional plan, with alternatives for a nuclear contingency.[20] The possibility of nuclear use will affect COA development in many ways. Objectives, design, and execution may all be altered (either limited or expanded) in an attempt to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons or to control escalation if he does. The joint commander must expect that political

requirements will drive the planning process but that these may prove extremely difficult to determine in advance.

Escalation control will be a key objective when hostilities commence, and it may result in the imposition of constraints. For example, permission to strike certain classes of targets—like headquarters, command and control nodes, communications systems, early warning sites, nuclear forces, nuclear production and storage locations, airfields with nuclear-capable forces, and industrial facilities—may be withheld because of their escalatory potential. On the other hand, some such target types may be permissible, depending on the degree of escalation control the commander believes realistic. These assessments are imprecise and at best are likely to be based on problematic assumptions.

Some of the most vexing issues will surround the question of whether a course of action is to be employed before or after enemy nuclear use. Planners must design COAs intended for implementation *before* nuclear use in such a way that they do not trigger that very thing. For courses planned in the event of nuclear attacks, damage limitation and the choice between conventional or nuclear retaliation are the key concerns.

Of course, the complex issue of employment of nuclear weapons by the United States itself will present the biggest challenge to the entire chain of command. The ultimate decision by the National Command Authority will be based on a myriad of strategic factors (many of which lie beyond the scope of the immediate military situation), and accordingly the commander should be prepared for a range of possible orders or responses to recommendations: the use of nuclear weapons may be denied, or approved, or approved with specific restrictions—or *directed*, perhaps without, or even against, the commander's recommendation. For their part, joint commanders should form recommendations from the standpoint of whether or not conventional weapons are adequate to achieve the military objectives and, if the adversary employs nuclear weapons, to limit damage and prevent further nuclear use.

***Possible COAs.*** Unclassified sources suggest a number of possible approaches for dealing with a nuclear-armed regional opponent.[21] The most plausible fall in six categories.[22]

*Deter the adversary from using nuclear weapons.* In a regional contingency involving a nuclear adversary, deterrence is both the first priority and an objective that will continue throughout the conflict.[23] Several options are available: forward-basing or forward-deploying nuclear forces (bombers, dual-capable aircraft, attack submarines); increasing strategic nuclear readiness; increasing the frequency of reconnaissance over enemy nuclear facilities; threatening with conventional attack assets the enemy values most; and deploying defensive forces—all in conjunction with strong warnings of the consequences if the

enemy uses nuclear weapons.[24] The purpose of taking such steps is to signal U.S. capability and resolve. However, credibility is a major question that the joint commander must address; regional nuclear deterrence may not be the same as in the Cold War. As was true then, however, deterrent signals must be "sent, received, understood, and considered to be of sufficient magnitude by the challenger to be effective."[25] Some argue that the U.S. now has advantages enhancing its credibility in a regional context: it no longer needs to threaten to use nuclear weapons; its resolve may be very strong in regions where vital national interests are at stake; and it has tremendous conventional and nuclear superiority.[26] Others reply that "signalling" may be "particularly difficult across cultural lines or between adversaries who lack a shared frame of reference."[27] Ultimately, deterrent effectiveness is directly related to the characteristics of the opponent and specifics of the scenario (i.e., the nature of the crisis, the adversary's motivations and resolve, and the relative military balance).[28] A combination of offensive forces (nuclear and conventional) and defensive actions may be the most credible way to deter a nuclear-armed adversary throughout the conflict.

*Destroy enemy nuclear weapons before they are launched.* This is an extremely high-risk option, but it has a high payoff if successful. The probability of success will depend on the size, sophistication, and deployment of the adversary's nuclear assets. As evidenced by the low effectiveness of coalition air forces against Iraqi Scuds in 1991, preemption may not completely eliminate the enemy's capability.[29] (International inspection teams in Iraq after the war announced that most of the nation's nuclear facilities had been neither discovered nor targeted; the success of both the hunt for Scuds and the Patriot defenses against them are still being debated.)[30] Nuclear-capable potential aggressors surely view Desert Storm as proof of the need to hide and disperse their arsenals. Not only may the complete elimination of the nuclear capability be impossible, but an unsuccessful attempt itself—confronting the opponent with a "use or lose" decision—could trigger nuclear use or increase the threat against friendly countries. The commander may consider it imprudent to place the adversary in that position.

*Protect U.S. forces and other potential targets.* Defenses would enhance deterrence by creating uncertainty in the mind of the enemy as to whether nuclear use would be effective. Active defenses (e.g., theater early warning, ballistic missile intercept systems, air defenses) and passive measures (hardening against electromagnetic pulse, shelters, dispersal, civil defense) are both components of this COA. Active defenses are potentially the more effective, but they cannot be perfect, and unless complemented by a nuclear offensive element they may seem insufficiently threatening to deter. Similarly, active air and missile defenses will probably not prevent the delivery by unusual means of a small number of weapons or the detonation of "stay behind" weapons left in areas overrun by friendly forces.[31] The joint commander must carefully gauge the entire range of

plausible adversary capabilities and the likely deterrent effect of defenses combined with purely conventional offensive capability.

*Defeat the adversary's military conventionally.* This COA is essentially the Desert Storm model—high-intensity conventional warfare against the full range of enemy military power.[32] Because this option could elicit a nuclear response, target selection is particularly critical; commanders must clearly signal the intent to leave intact the adversary's nuclear capability—unless, that is, they have high confidence of being able to preempt it. If the adversary employs nuclear weapons in the face of conventional attack, the joint commander will have to assess the effectiveness of the nuclear strike and recommend whether or not the conventional assault should be continued.

*Limit further damage after the enemy has used nuclear weapons.* The nature and scope of the response are the key issues here. Damage limitation may involve either conventional or nuclear weapons employment against the adversary's nuclear capability, coupled with active and passive defense. It may be hard to achieve with high confidence for the same reason that preemption is a problem: the difficulty of finding and destroying (all) the right targets.

*Punish the adversary for nuclear use.* This COA envisions retaliatory attack upon the adversary's infrastructure, leadership, or urban-industrial centers. Conventional or nuclear weapons, or a combination, could be used.

Clearly, none of these courses of action is without drawbacks, so no universal prescription can be offered in advance to joint commanders. The specific situation will have to be assessed—and continually reassessed—by all levels in the chain of command in order to select the optimum COA for the enemy's estimated situation and the objectives of U.S. or coalition leaders.

***Post-war Considerations.*** The joint commander must address two primary issues when contemplating the post-war phase of the conflict: termination difficulties, and mitigating nuclear effects.

Joint doctrine addresses the potential problems of terminating a nuclear conflict: "Depending on the scope and intensity of a nuclear war, how and under what conditions it is brought to conclusion may be very different from previous wars."[33] Because there is but one historical precedent, and because it would be impossible to return to the *status quo ante*, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds this issue. As with every other aspect of a nuclear contingency, it is highly likely that military considerations will not dominate the concluding phase. If nuclear weapons have not been used, the end may come before the adversary's nuclear capabilities are even damaged; if they have, world opinion may force termination before the joint commander's military objectives are achieved. It is also possible that the passions unleashed as a result of nuclear use will create pressure to subdue the adversary completely. Joint commanders must clearly understand the desired

political end-condition prior to starting the campaign and thereafter participate in the debate that will certainly arise. They should foresee that termination decisions will require detailed, accurate, and frequently updated information on military and civil conditions in the theater of operations, and plan to provide such information notwithstanding the likely degree of chaos following nuclear weapons use.

Mitigating the effects of a regional nuclear conflict will be very difficult. The joint commander need only recall the clean-up required after the Chernobyl accident or in Kuwait following the Gulf war to begin to see the kinds of concerns that must be addressed if nuclear weapons are employed—mass casualties, environmental and ecological damage, and so forth.

## Combat Doctrine and Operations

The possibility of nuclear employment in a regional conflict will affect "deployment, the scheme of maneuver, the tasks assigned to subordinate commanders, the logistics support concept, command, control, and communications arrangements—in short, the entire concept of operations."[34] Although many of these factors are obvious and joint doctrine broadly addresses most of them, there is little if any detailed information available as to how they might operate and, most importantly, what their effect would be on the overall conduct of the campaign. The key question is: Will the possibility of nuclear use substantially affect the way in which the U.S. prepares to conduct regional contingencies, and if so, how? Changes are likely in three fundamental arenas.

The first comprises strategic deployment and logistics. "Overseas projection capability is a critical element of [American] post–Cold War military strategy."[35] Today's concept of operations for a regional contingency is based on the premise that U.S. forces will deploy to a theater using amphibious ships, prepositioned vessels, and massive airlift, and establish a reliable flow of logistic support once there. U.S. forces rely heavily on massive external supply, especially in this era of reduced forward basing. However, major logistical concentrations present lucrative targets for nuclear attack; therefore, the joint commander must consider how forces will operate if these assets must be dispersed, if supplies must be distributed piecemeal to widely separated bases, or if forces arrive, for such reasons, far more slowly than currently planned.

A second and related point is force posture. Dispersal of combat power is essential in a possible nuclear environment, yet it can weaken capability and flexibility. A nuclear environment could negate American force projection advantages if key assets (e.g., tactical air power, aircraft carriers, or amphibious ships) must remain out of range. Similarly, the joint commander may find it difficult to concentrate forces as early as necessary to halt an advance, or to

achieve at all a concentration of the scale and density of Desert Shield. Further, anything that hinders force projection or concentration has implications for deterrence.

The posture of one's own theater nuclear force is a specific area of concern. Because strategic bombers are no longer on nuclear alert and only in Europe do theater nuclear weapons remain forward-deployed with dual-capable aircraft, to assign nuclear weapons to forward forces entering a regional contingency may prove problematic.[36] Some dual-capable aircraft, strategic bombers, tankers, and attack submarines, once loaded for the nuclear strike mission, will be unavailable for conventional uses throughout the contingency, adding to the burden on other arms at a time when the overall pool of available forces is declining and coalition partners are likely to be few.

A third concern is defense, active and passive. Depending on the nature of the threat, the joint commander may need to devote substantial resources to active defense, which reduces the ability to employ them where they are needed to influence conventional operations early in a conflict; Air Force and naval aviation assets, for example, might have to be assigned to air or fleet defense rather than offensive missions. Protecting one's own headquarters facilities and command, control, and communications assets will be of particular concern to the joint commander, since their disruption or destruction could have a devastating impact. Active defense assets may need to be permanently provided as well to friendly nations in order to satisfy coalition concerns. Passive defensive measures will also "inhibit the effectiveness of offensive forces by reducing flexibility, increasing weight, and requiring specialized training."[37] Finally, the overall operational tempo can also be slowed by defensive measures.

Since the U.S. military is charged with being prepared to deal with a nuclear-armed regional adversary, joint commanders must carefully consider the implications of such an eventuality on campaign planning and operations. The possibility of nuclear use in a regional contingency will complicate initial planning, selection of a course of action, and combat operations in both predictable and unexpected ways. Although the operational-level implications reviewed here are not new to U.S. commanders (virtually all are present in some form in every contingency), the tremendous military and political consequences of nuclear use magnify their importance, with unprecedented effects upon the campaign itself. The U.S. military successfully faced a nuclear adversary during the Cold War, yet the strategic and operational planning precepts guiding that confrontation took many years to evolve. There has been much analytic study of the strategic aspects of the regional nuclear threat (proliferation, deterrence, political strategies, etc.), but little detailed attention has yet been paid to the campaign level. While from the operational viewpoint none of the problems

caused by the possibility of nuclear use appear insurmountable, only thorough and detailed planning and exercising will allow the joint commander to understand adequately and address comprehensively regional nuclear contingencies. Now is the time to proceed; national requirements and international deterrence credibility demand it.

## Notes

1. The author is not suggesting that the residual Cold War nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union pose no threat to U.S. security. Certainly the U.S. must closely monitor remaining Cold War nuclear forces and maintain a strong (although smaller) strategic deterrent force for the foreseeable future.

Further, the author does not imply by use of the future tense in this article a certainty that all of this will come to pass. Although the author believes the issues raised warrant serious attention now, the future tense (rather than the future conditional) was employed solely for clarity.

2. See U.S. President, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington: February 1995), pp. 13–4; and Les Aspin, "The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative Created," *Defense News*, 7 December 1993, pp. 1–3. Similarly, this is why the United States pressed for and achieved extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

3. In 1993 the Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus categorized potential Third World proliferators as follows: "de facto nuclear weapons states" (i.e., who own weapons covertly—India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa); "threshold nuclear weapons states" (on the verge of acquiring them—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Brazil, Argentina); and "other countries of concern" (Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Korea). According to the Caucus, North Korea and Iran are aggressively pursuing nuclear capability. Iraq's interest in nuclear weapons is well documented in many sources. Other so-called "threshold" states, like Brazil and Argentina, have rolled back their programs, and South Africa claims to have dismantled its weapons. See Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, *The Neglected Arms Race: Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s* (Washington: Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, U.S. Congress, April 1993), pp. 8–11; and Jerome H. Kahan, *Nuclear Threats from Small States* (Carlisle Barracks, Penna.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 13 June 1994), pp. 2–3.

4. *A National Security Strategy*, p. 14.

5. Years of Cold War nuclear planning (which emphasized nuclear weapons in a strategic, not a theater, setting) may not be directly applicable to the regional contingency environment. Key differences exist in the strategic environment and in the nature (including motivations) and capability of the potential adversary. In 1994, the Secretary of Defense stated that nuclear-capable regional states may have different "doctrines, histories, organizations, command and control systems, and purposes for their unconventional military forces" than did the Soviets. See for example U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington: 1994), p. 35; and Michele A. Flournoy, "Implications for U.S. Military Strategy," Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds., *New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp. 140–1.

6. Two brief explanations are necessary. First, the matter of nuclear first-use by the U.S. arises; it, however, is a contentious issue, beyond the scope of this article. Second, as used here, "information warfare" refers to an adversary's use of communications media (e.g., radio, television, computer nets, etc.) to manipulate public opinion and thereby influence events in his favor.

7. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations*, Joint Publication [Pub] 3-12, 29 April 1993, p. II-1.

8. General Norman Schwarzkopf has described General Colin Powell as virtually his "sole point of contact within the Administration" during the Gulf war, though the decision process was "tortuous and was sometimes filled with emotional strain and debate." See H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, *General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), pp. xi, 325. Additionally, most accounts of the decision process by the senior military officers involved in the Gulf war praise the fact that the politicians gave broad guidance and allowed the military to take care of the details. For additional information, see Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), pp. vii–viii, x, 326, 468–9.

9. Kahan, p. 12.

10. Joint Pub 3-12, p. II-1.

11. Flournoy, p. 156.

12. Ibid., p. 155.

13. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense*, Joint Publication [Pub] 3-11, p. III-11.

14. Ibid.

15. Thomas G. Mahnken, "America's Next War," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1993, p. 177.

16. Armed Forces Staff College, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993*, AFSC Publication [Pub] 1, p. 6-52. "CINC" refers to any of the unified commanders in chief (e.g., Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command), who, under the U.S. Unified Command Plan, actually employ forces in operations and in combat.

17. Memorandum, Professor Roger W. Barnett, Senior Secretary of the Navy Research Fellow, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., to the author, 4 May 1995.

18. Ian B. Bryan, "U.S. Policy and Doctrine Regarding Nuclear Force in Regional Contingencies: Tactical Expediency Could Threaten Strategic Aims," Technical Report (Alexandria, Va.: Defense Technical Information Center, 20 July 1994), p. 43.

19. AFSC Pub 1, pp. 6-52, 6-53.

20. Ibid., p. 6-53.

21. See Flournoy, pp. 140–57; Kahan, pp. 13–8; Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening, *Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Conflict* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 1995), pp. 53–62; and Philip Zelikow, "Offensive Military Options," Blackwill and Carnesale, eds., pp. 162–95.

22. COAs in this section are broadly based on the military options contained in Kahan, pp. 13–8.

23. Joint Pub 3-12, p. I-3.

24. Kahan, p. 14.

25. Watman and Wilkening, p. 12.

26. See Watman and Wilkening, p. x; and Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Ricky L. Waddell, "The Future of Regional Deterrence," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1992, pp. 78–88.

27. Flournoy, p. 144.

28. Watman and Wilkening, p. 8; and Flournoy, pp. 145–6.

29. Bryan, p. 41.

30. See Martin van Creveld, *Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1993), p. 117; and Lewis A. Dunn, "New Nuclear Threats to U.S. Security," Blackwill and Carnesale, eds., p. 23.

31. For a thought-provoking scenario involving "stay behind" weapons, see Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, "Introduction: Understanding the Problem," Blackwill and Carnesale, eds., pp. 3–19.

32. The distinction between military and non-military targets is becoming increasingly blurred. As adversaries use deception and camouflage to mask the purpose and scope of nuclear programs, and as militaries around the world increasingly exploit traditionally "civilian" communications capabilities, U.S. intelligence will be hard pressed clearly to identify military targets. During Desert Storm, where precautions were taken to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage, some targets (e.g., communications facilities, transportation nodes, power grids, etc.) were not exclusively military. See Gordon and Trainor, p. 474.

33. Joint Pub 3-12, p. I-6.

34. AFSC Pub 1, pp. 6-52, 6-53.

35. Gary H. Mears and Ted Kim, "Logistics: The Way Ahead," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1994, p. 40.

36. Problems may range from obtaining a decision to load nuclear weapons (a matter for which timing may be a crucial signalling issue) to reestablishing the logistics, security, and handling support network for tactical nuclear systems that have been removed from operational forces.

37. Kahan, pp. 18–9.

Ψ

# The Role of Strategy in Great Power Decline

Peter J. Woolley

> In former times, military power was isolated, with the consequence that victory or defeat appeared to depend upon the accidental qualities of the commanders. In our day, it is common to treat economic power as the source from which all other kinds are derived; this, I shall contend, is just as great an error. . . .
>
> Bertrand Russell,
> *Power, a New Social Analysis*, 1938

THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORLD ORDER is commonly linked to the decline of one or more great powers and the rise of others. The cause of the decline of great powers and the rise of their successors is of special interest to social scientists and others who seek to identify patterns in history. It is also of interest to attentive citizens and to policy makers who wish to avoid what are perceived to be the mistakes of the past. Therefore, analyses of great-power decline must eventually focus on more than economic mega-trends, abstract models, or mere correlations as explanations for decline, else there be scant room for policy prescription and little to be harvested for the use of either statesmen or citizens.

This article argues that at the root of at least some transformations of world order lies politico-military strategy, and that faulty strategy contributed greatly to the decline of certain great powers and consequently transformed world orders. It argues generally that there is a great deal more to be learned from the

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study of comparative strategy than from the invention of models, and, more specifically, that human choice is more relevant than historical inevitability to present-day concerns of the United States.

## Contending Theories of Decline and Transformation

Political scientists have made heroic attempts to explain the decline of great powers and the transformation of world order. However, many of these focus less on politico-military strategy than on general, sometimes inexorable and uncontrollable, trends that seem simply to inundate or undermine a great power. A brief review and critique of two such "declinist" works will highlight the difference between analysis based on such broad trends and that which emphasizes strategy.

Among the best known declinist works are Paul Kennedy's *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* and Robert Gilpin's *War and Change*.[1] There are other persuasive theories of decline, but these two are especially worth examining because they illuminate fundamental problems in the search for the causal links of decline.

Much of the debate generated in 1987 by Paul Kennedy's thesis centered on the idea of "imperial overreach."[2] Kennedy's observation, which he emphasized was very general, was that great powers can expect to suffer an erosion of their economic base, resulting in a telling disadvantage in wartime.[3] The problem might arise from uneven benefits of technological breakthroughs, overinvestment in security at the expense of more productive enterprise, sheer serendipity, or poor planning; but the pattern has always been the same—a relative decline in economic power leading eventually to real decline in military and political strength. Great nations accumulate more defense commitments than their economic bases can sustain, and they lose.

Robert Gilpin had earlier presented a somewhat similar explanation, in his 1982 book. Gilpin suggested that a profound imbalance between ends and means was the hallmark of a state's decline; to explain this imbalance and its consequences, Gilpin proposed a somewhat organic approach. That is, dominant states necessarily "attempt to extend their dominion to the limits of their economic, military, and other capabilities";[4] eventually, these hegemonic states overextend themselves, placing their empire and resources in "disequilibrium." Conflict results as a dominant state attempts to maintain its position against new challengers. Thus "hegemonic conflict . . . leads to the creation of a new international order," and the cycle of extension, overextension, decline, war, and transformation begins anew.[5]

***Underlying Assumptions.*** Embedded and implicit in the work of the declinist theorists are fundamental assumptions, postulates that lead specifically away from the comparative study of strategy.

Kennedy apparently assumes, as many of his reviewers have pointed out, that all great powers can reasonably be placed in a single category.[6] Putting the question "How do great powers decline as great powers?," he examines the historical record—an approach that, given this preconception, naturally inclines one to find a common factor. Autocratic, despotic, and authoritarian powers are considered alongside democratic, constitutional, and republican polities. Ming China, the Ottoman Empire, Tokugawa Japan, the Soviet Union, and the Spanish, French, and Hapsburg empires are lumped together with Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. Such vastly different countries and situations can have only a rather low common denominator. Indeed, Kennedy insists in his preface that he did not intend to offer "rules" governing world systems, stating his thesis with utmost caution: "The historical record suggests that there is a . . . correlation *in the long run.*"[7] The result—necessarily very broad and applicable only over long sweeps of time—may well be of little use to a strategist who has near-term choices to make and their consequences to live with.

In Gilpin's analysis, the "given" is historical inevitability: hegemonic war is the final manifestation of a change in the world order. The dominant power, progressively undermined by factors that, conversely, strengthen its rivals, attempts to maintain its position by violence; eventually this aggressive policy, meant to maintain the status quo, leads to general war. The adverse trends that have effectively brought on the war now ineluctably cause the collapse of the hegemonic power. In this schema the dominant power goes to war precisely to halt the erosion of its stature, only to find that its strength is too diminished and the burden of war too great; it cannot win. In effect, it is the transformation of the world system that brings on the war: the war ratifies the change.

Here again, there is little to learn of possible choices and their implications. War in Gilpin's view is born of a decline already well advanced; the hegemonic power inevitably goes to war and must lose. The process is almost mechanical, and the outcome unavoidable.

***Alternative Assumptions.*** We may, however, consciously essay different postulates. By contrast to Kennedy's work, let us posit that great powers are not in every important way alike and that the reasons for their declines vary. *Pace* Gilpin, let us assume that war and—if war comes—its outcome are not inevitable. New worlds for exploration now open up, particularly in comparative strategy, which is the side-by-side study of states' political choices in selecting and matching ends to resources, abilities, and military means in the international arenas of their time.

Let us begin by distinguishing among types of great powers. For example, to describe the United States so as to be able to identify comparable historical cases, we would give its fundamental characteristics as democratic governance, an extraordinary volume of internal and external trade, an economy highly developed compared to other nations, a first-rate military establishment, and a maritime orientation (long warm-water littorals, a great navy capable of projecting power, emphasis on freedom of the seas, and a large volume of seaborne trade). Great powers essentially *dis*similar (for some purposes) to the United States would have as few as *one* of the following: an authoritarian government, a centrally controlled or poorly functioning economy, or a primary reliance upon land power. Such distinctions put a great many polities in a category other than that of the United States; they narrow down the cases that might be usefully compared, and they help sharpen our focus as we search for shared reasons for decline.

We further assume, in contrast to Gilpin, that a major war marking the end of a power's dominance is not inevitable, and that its outcome, if it occurs, is not simply a function of an insuperable imbalance between the unrealistic goals and declining capabilities of that power. Instead, the avoidance, or outbreak and conduct, of war may be seen as resulting from choices—choices with consequences that we can examine and learn from. These alternative assumptions put us in the realm of comparative strategy, the value of which can be suggested by a series of brief case studies.

Three great powers similar in fundamental ways to the United States were Periclean Athens, the Venetian Republic before the discovery of the New World, and nineteenth-century Britain. They, like the United States, were first-rate military powers, commercial and politically open entities that relied heavily upon their navies and seaborne trade. They were *commercial* powers in that they nurtured prosperous, largely decentralized domestic markets and depended heavily on trade; *maritime* powers, maintaining first-class navies and looking overseas for prosperity and security; *military* powers by virtue of armed forces drawing upon great wealth and exerting direct or indirect influence over foreign countries; and, finally, they were *open* (even if not, by the most exacting modern definition, democratic)—open to public debate, to organized public pressure, to meritorious advancement, to alternations in ruling elites, and to new ideas. The dominance of each of the three came to an end in a major war fought against a land power; an examination of their strategic choices reveals important insights for others in their class, including, most notably, the United States.

## The Dénouement of Periclean Athens

Four factors stand out in the failure of Athenian strategy in the fifth century B.C.: mistreatment of allies; an imprudent and disastrous campaign in Sicily; a chronic lack of adequate ground forces; and diplomatic policies that brought the Persians, expelled from Greece in 479, back into Hellenic politics.

This is not to say that no adverse trends impinged on Athenian power and on the decisional latitude of its leadership in the Periclean Age. Many factors contributed to the end of Athenian hegemony in Greece, among them a poor endowment of natural resources (with the notable exceptions of silver and marble); over-reliance on imports of foreign grain and other raw materials; enormous pressure for public spending; and all against the background of an earlier debilitating defeat in Egypt in 454 B.C. Those inclined to focus on the damaging consequences of these influences find support in a number of persuasive historical narratives. Donald Kagan, for example, writes that "before the Egyptian disaster, the return of Megara to the Spartan alliance, and the oligarchic rebellions in central Greece, Athens had the prospect of an inexhaustible grain supply, enormous wealth, control of central Greece, and absolute security against invasion. All of that was lost by 445, and Athens was incomparably weaker on the eve of the Peloponnesian War than she had been at her acme in the early 450's."[8]

We might easily conclude from this passage that Athens overextended itself, that the end of its empire had been plainly in sight before the Peloponnesian War, itself the last gasp of a failing hegemony. But in that case how could Athenian strategists have ignored these signs? What did they intend to accomplish? Let us focus on some specific failures of Athenian leadership.

***Athens and the Allies.*** Among the most serious failures was the treatment of allies. The Delian League, which Athens headed, started out well enough; it was a voluntary organization, its members invited Athens to be the leader, and the alliance was quite effective against the threat of Persian hegemony.[9] But it gradually became less a collective security coalition than a vehicle of Athenian domination. When member states attempted to dissolve their ties to the League, Athens responded with brutal force. Many allies were eventually forbidden to have fortifications, because walls would neutralize the power of the Athenian fleet and make it possible for recalcitrant members to withstand a siege. The League's treasury, originally on the island of Delos, was moved to Athens in 453. The move made the treasury safe from Persian attack but also, of course, gave Athens complete control of the League's finances.

Certainly, some of the Greek allies found Athenian democracy attractive or considered Athenian power necessary to peace and stability. Some recognized

the fairness of Athens' judicial system and the economic advantages of a single monetary standard, and some found tribute a small price for Athenian protection. But for others, "the carrying of the tribute and first fruits to Athens each spring, the forced appearances before a foreign court, the prohibition against coining silver, and the presence of Athenian garrisons and overseers were all signs of their loss of freedom and autonomy."[10] Thucydides, for one, spoke out against Athens' "insolence" and "tyranny," to no avail.[11] In the words of a modern historian, the Athenians "did not doubt that [they] had earned the right to rule both Greeks and barbarians."[12] In consequence of this arrogance, Athens constantly faced the threat of the defection of allies.

Pericles might have made amends by reducing the tribute, but his own populace was demanding expenditures (on the fleet, public buildings and works, pensions, etc.) that the tributes supported.[13] He might have reduced the size of the fleet to make both friends and enemies more comfortable, but he did not want to suggest to the allies that Athens might modify its commitment to the existing order and thereby encourage its disintegration. In sum, Athens' allies were not only a source of strength but also an Achilles' heel: as things developed, Athens needed them to fill its treasury and complement its army and navy, but the allies did not necessarily need Athens—at least they did not see things that way.[14] Their stake in the international order was considerably less than that of Athens. Thus the city had not only to fight the enemy but to keep many of its own allies in line by force. As long as Athens could do both, it would survive; but any misstep that might seriously, even if temporarily, damage the fleet or the army would invite the allies to break away, leaving Athens alone and vulnerable.[15] Indeed, this was to be the consequence of the Sicilian expedition during the Peloponnesian War, fought intermittently from 431 until 404 against a Spartan-led alliance.

***Overextension at Syracuse.*** The policy of Pericles as that long conflict began was one of patience and consolidation. He stressed Athens' advantage in seapower and chose not to engage the enemy in pitched land battles. "We must not, through anger at losing land and home, join battle with the greatly superior forces of the Peloponnesians."[16] Pericles knew too that an Athenian defeat would encourage allies to defect, with Athens powerless to stop them;[17] the risk was too great. Neither would Pericles support daring exploits far from home that might siphon off forces necessary for defense while increasing commitments and vulnerabilities elsewhere.[18]

His strategy, then, was to exhaust the enemy. Let them strike, even at Attica, and let them expend their resources, manpower, and enthusiasm; Athens would maintain its empire, treasury, tributes, and trade, attacking the Peloponnesian allies by sea. When the Spartan army, predictably, came at harvest time to lay

waste to the Athenian hinterland, it would find the residents gone and no army to meet it; but the enemy would see, from time to time, his own countryside ravaged and ports damaged. Eventually he would tire of the war and its costs, and seek peace.[19]

The strategy worked, but Pericles himself could not see it through; he died in 429. It was left to the politician and general Nicias to counsel prudence and cement the temporary peace of 421, which bears his name. Yet when the opportunity arose to launch a daring attack on Syracuse, the volatile and ambitious leader Alcibiades persuaded the Athenians to support it, over the protestations of Nicias. The expedition, which sailed in 415, required an enormous commitment of money, ships, and men, but it promised, if all went well, to secure a major source of grain supplies and deny the same to the Peloponnesians.

All did not go well. Arguments among the leaders of the expedition, which included both Nicias and Alcibiades, gave the Syracusans ample warning. Alcibiades himself defected to the Spartans and convinced them to support a Corinthian force then sailing to raise the siege. The Syracusans did not surrender, and when Nicias, on the point of withdrawal in September 413, delayed his departure, Syracusan cavalry destroyed his force. Thucydides comments that the battle was "the greatest action we know of in Hellenic history—to the victors the most brilliant of successes, to the vanquished the most calamitous of defeats; for they were utterly and entirely defeated; their sufferings were on an enormous scale; their losses were, as they say, total; army, navy, everything was destroyed and out of many, only few returned."[20]

Having violated the peace, Athens had suffered the worst. The delicate equilibrium of its empire was irreparably damaged. Allies rebelled and defected and, as Pericles had said, Athens was helpless to prevent them. Sparta renewed the offensive, and victory over the Spartans would be impossible.

***The Weakness of Ground Forces, and Persian Intervention.*** If it had maintained a better army, Athens may well have been able to prosecute a more aggressive war against Sparta from 431 to 421, avert the disaster in Sicily, and survive its aftermath. But the Athenian army in fact was poorly disciplined, and morale was often low; Xenophon says the Athenians took no pride in it.[21] It consisted primarily of heavily armored men. Athenian leaders did not understand the value of light-armed forces or of cavalry, and hence both were used ineffectively.[22]

On the other hand, Athenian statesmen believed that no other city-state would ever, could ever, match Athens' naval prowess. Pericles himself discounted the notion that Sparta could rival Athens at sea: "We have nothing to fear from their navy. . . . They are farmers, not sailors. . . . Seamanship is an art. It is not something that can be picked up and studied in one's spare time; indeed,

it allows one no spare time for anything else."[23] Persia, however, decided to subsidize the building of a Spartan navy, perhaps because Athens had been supporting two Persian satraps who were in rebellion. Money flowed into Sparta, and though naval success did not come immediately to the Peloponnesians, the balance at sea swung their way. The Spartans eventually destroyed the Athenian navy at the battle of Aegospotami in 405, and thereupon from land and sea laid siege to Athens itself. The city surrendered in the spring of 404 B.C.

Thus when the end of Athenian hegemony came, it was not solely or even primarily the result of pervasive trends that sapped the city's strength. Nor would it be accurate to say that the Peloponnesian War was the result of a transformation in the ancient equivalent of a world order. The war produced the decline of Athens and a new order, not vice versa. The conflict was an intolerable strain, and the strategic—in some cases, even tactical—mistakes committed by the Athenians brought disaster. Unless one holds that the Fates rule human existence, one must see the city-state's downfall as an outcome, a consequence, of many factors, including strategic folly. Many of Athens' mistakes would be repeated by the Venetian Republic.

## The Most Serene Republic of Venice

It is tempting to explain the decline of Venice with sweeping generalizations about trends and influences beyond the Republic's control. There was, for example, the discovery in 1492 of the New World, which suddenly gave new latitude to the aspirations and capacities of Spain and Portugal, England, France, and the Netherlands. There was also the steady erosion, as other countries modernized and capitalized upon opportunities, of Venice's structural advantages in industry, trade, and finance. William McNeill explains, "As northwestern Europe developed—and it did so rapidly—skills and resources that once had to be imported from the east and the south could be supplied locally. In proportion as this happened, Italian capitalists, artisans, and shippers were liable to lose their strategic advantage."[24] But the decline of Venice cannot be fully grasped without tracing a succession of strategical failures in the fifteenth century that removed Venice from the front rank of European powers. Four errors contributed much to its decline: exhausting mainland wars and concomitant inattention to the Eastern threat, a lack of useful allies, poor generalship, and an inadequate army.

***The Mainland Wars.*** Until Francesco Foscare was elected doge in 1423, Venetian foreign policy had aimed at keeping peace with even the most hostile of the mainland despots. Foscare changed this approach and with it the direction of Venetian history. His predecessor had described the new doge as "vapid and

light-headed, snatching at everything and achieving little"—a characterization that turned out to be prophetic.[25]

A year after Foscare was invested, Venice went to war against Milan. It was perhaps "the most ambitious war on which Venice had ever embarked," yet the results were most disappointing.[26] After seven years of fighting the Venetians had won no victories of lasting importance, had spent millions of ducats to support their field army, and still had failed to curb the Milanese appetite for intrigue and battle.

The Republic did indeed gain territory on the *terra firma* surrounding its 118 islands in the Lagoon of Venice, but the cost of obtaining and protecting these new lands proved a crippling burden. Fighting continued sporadically for twenty-five years, with no further conquests, while the treasury continued to dwindle. Venice could neither come to acceptable terms with Milan nor win a decisive victory. Peace was not made until 1455. By that time, however, the strategic equation had been fundamentally changed, by the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans two years before.

The Byzantine Empire had been moribund for centuries, and its fall was no surprise. The Venetians, however, had been too absorbed by the fighting in Italy to consider plans for the defense of their Aegean empire, which was now threatened. Also, they had been too complacent after their acquisition of Greek and Balkan coastal cities (which had begged for Venetian protection as the Ottomans advanced into Europe) to foresee that these gains would soon be for nothing; most of the Balkan Peninsula would be in Turkish hands by 1463. Venice, in fact, could now do little to recoup its prior strategic control of the northern Aegean and, effectively, of Constantinople.

***Venice Stands Alone.*** Even if the city had wanted to respond to the Turkish savagery against Venetian merchant seamen caught in the siege of Constantinople, or to reinforce its posts in the Aegean Sea, it was in no position to do so. After thirty years of fighting in Italy, money and manpower were both in short supply. Foscare's successor, Pasquale Malipiero, attempted to keep peace with the Ottomans even as he sought allies to help retake Constantinople, but no firm support was forthcoming from any Western power. Malipiero decided to bide his time; business continued as usual until his death in 1462.

The new doge, Christoforo Moro, reversed course and, with the Great Council, impetuously approved an alliance with Pope Pius II, the Duke of Burgundy, and the King of Hungary. These allies were worth little; Burgundy did not deliver the money or the troops promised, the pope's coffers were nearly empty, and the Hungarian army, hundreds of miles to the north of the Aegean, was already exhausted by campaigning against the Turks. Venice was alone. Just as the Venetians had earlier reversed their policy of cautious detachment from

mainland wars, entangling themselves in an endless war with Milan, they now discarded allied action against the Ottomans and continued by themselves. To take on the Turks was difficult enough; to do so without allies was nearly hopeless; and to enter this contest after decades of mainland war was fateful indeed.

Several years went by without either a significant victory or a significant defeat for the Turks or the Venetians. Finally, however, the Ottoman sultan decided to concentrate on expansion in the Aegean Sea. He set his sights on the large island of Negroponte (Euboea), the Venetian stronghold near Athens, and in 1470 seized it in a campaign lasting just four weeks.

***Poor Decisions and Inferior Numbers.*** The Turks might have been held at bay had the Venetian commander, a career diplomat, been less timid. He was one of a succession of poor generals hired by the Venetians. (His dismal performance was overshadowed only by that of Francesco Bussone, who, after leading the Venetian armies against Milan for seven years, had been tried and executed in 1431 for treason.) However, on the ground the Venetians were simply no match for the Ottomans, who could muster tens of thousands of well trained soldiers for coordinated attacks on the Aegean coasts by sea and land. While Venice could overmatch anyone at sea, it could not face the Sultan by land. Problems of logistics, corruption, and personal feuding went unsolved; experienced soldiers were in short supply after thirty years of fighting; and the new recruits were "a heterogenous collection of Italian mercenaries," hired only for short periods.[27] In addition, the Venetian army was distracted by a dispute with Austria that led to an assault on Trieste. The Venetian Senate would not send troops farther east, with the result that throughout the war its Aegean forces were inferior in number to the Turks.[28] The troops that did go to the Aegean did so by sea, travelling a thousand miles, facing northerly winds as well as eighty thousand Turks—who had the wind at their backs and were easily resupplied.

After Negroponte fell, Venice carried on the fruitless war for another nine years before the Great Council reluctantly agreed to settle for peace. Venice, though relatively prosperous at the outset, had by 1479 unwisely spent its treasure and strength and had thus lost its place in the front ranks of power. Its wars, however, had not been inevitable; Venetian decline was not some long, fated process merely punctuated by a final struggle. Rather, specific errors in politico-military strategy directly contributed to its loss of stature.

## Edwardian Britain: Hollow Victory

Much has been written suggesting that Britain's weakened position in the twentieth century was the result of macro-economic trends traceable from the

mid-nineteenth century, or that it was the product of such developments, far beyond Britain's borders and control, as the rise of the United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union.[29] But an argument can be made that Britain's decline was the immediate and direct result of a war that was both avoidable and badly prosecuted.

Among Britain's strategical mistakes in the Great War of 1914–1918, four are prominent: lack of an explicit and convincing commitment to France; failure to construct and deploy a larger and more concentrated army, because of an overestimation of the effectiveness of blockade; continuance of the war even after its horrible dimensions had become clear; and the weakness of the peace settlement that followed. Even recognizing that many economic and political trends were largely beyond the control of the British government, one can agree that the unbearable burden of the war was the immediate cause of Britain's decline and that the nation's strategic decisions affected its outbreak, nature, and course.

***Commitment to France, and Army Reform.*** The German concept for a two-front war against France and Russia rested on two crucial assumptions that proved to be false. The stewards of the famed Schlieffen Plan postulated, first, that Britain would intervene neither to save Belgium from occupation nor France from defeat, and second that if Britain did intervene, it could not do so quickly enough or with enough force to frustrate the intended German advance. Berlin was wrong on both counts, but it had been led to these errors by British policy.[30]

For many years, British statesmen had contemplated an explicit alliance with France and, accordingly, had advocated both army reform and contingency plans to send troops quickly and in substantial numbers to the continent. A 1905 memorandum outlined what was needed: "An efficient army of 120,000 British Troops might just have the effect of preventing any important German successes on the Franco-German frontier. . . . That would almost certainly bring about a speedy, and from the British and French points of view, a satisfactory peace."[31]

Yet public sentiment and bureaucratic infighting prevented any such formal alliance or any open commitment to send troops abroad, however necessary military planners thought at least the latter to be. The policy implications of an expeditionary force were attacked on every side. The radicals in the ruling Liberal party would not hear of it and would probably have split the party over the issue. A coalition of "navalists" had no inclination whatsoever to contemplate any but a "blue water" strategy.[32] Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey had, as a result, the awkward task of deterring Germany without explicitly committing Britain to the defense of France. When the Cabinet learned of military consultation between the British and French general staffs, Grey was forced to write to the French ambassador that "consultation between [military] experts is not,

and ought not to be, regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise."[33]

In the area of army reform there was more progress, and a professional expeditionary force eighty thousand strong was created. Nonetheless, in 1914 the German naval attaché in London could write that "the weight of England's land forces is inconsiderable. . . . Besides this it must be held to be very doubtful whether England would transfer her expeditionary force to the Continent."[34] The estimate was not far off the mark. Even as the Schlieffen Plan was set into motion in the first days of August, Whitehall still debated what to do with the British Expeditionary Force, the BEF. The French ambassador begged, British commanders pleaded and fumed, but in the end perhaps only the lack of an alternative plan got the BEF on its way to France.[35] Two months later it was sacrificed in a heroic attempt to turn the German right flank and thereby prevent the enemy from turning the French left and reaching the Channel ports. Had Germany won this first battle of Ypres, the Western Front would have crumbled. As it was, the German army could advance no further and was obliged to entrench.

***The Navalists, a Long War, and a Weak Peace.*** In part, Britain's confusion over whether and how to use the BEF stemmed from the long years of stubborn resistance by the navalists to any new approaches. The Admiralty wanted no part of fighting on the continent, believing rather in the ultimate effectiveness of naval blockade and engagements on the high seas; in its view, the best way to counteract Germany was simply to build more ships.[36] Captain Herbert Richmond, a theorist not in sympathy with the Admiralty's Mahanian convictions, could not fathom its lack of vision: "The Admiralty plans are to my mind the vaguest amateur stuff I have ever seen. I cannot conceive how they were discussed or what ideas governed the framers of them."[37] Many both within the Admiralty and outside it were bent on comparing strengths by counting dreadnoughts, while those who advocated blockades as a primary means of naval action overestimated their efficacy. The arguments of both always emphasized naval over army spending and capital ships over minelayers, minesweepers, torpedo boats or torpedo boat destroyers, and showed little concern for antisubmarine warfare or tactical doctrine.[38]

The idea that seapower could counterbalance German strength on land or determine the outcome of the war proved false. In the event, blockade had an effect but did not, alone, bring Germany to its knees, much less force a quick end to the fighting. The German navy refused battle, the Triple Alliance found foodstuffs and raw materials in Eastern Europe, Germany continued to trade overland with neutral countries and, with its strong chemical industry, synthesized many blockaded goods. The starvation that occurred near the end of

the war was due more to the ruination of German agriculture than to the blockade. Grey later recalled that "we did not sufficiently concentrate attention on the one cardinal point: that it was the German army which had to be beaten, and that this could be done only on the Western front. . . . Had this been grasped continuously as the central fact of the war, the side shows—Gallipoli, Baghdad, Salonika—would either never have been undertaken or would have been kept within smaller dimensions."[39]

The cost of this miscalculation was not measured in human casualties alone—three-quarters of a million British soldiers killed, twice as many maimed. The very length and intensity of a war that might have been avoided or shortened denuded Britain of hard-earned advantages; waging total war on Germany for four years exacted an enormous price. It forever disrupted British trade, brought rampant inflation, and exhausted national savings; huge loans were incurred; and 40 percent of the merchant fleet was lost. Widespread unemployment, heavy taxation, and economic dislocation followed the war.[40] Britain could not fight that war *and* maintain its previous advantages in international politics afterwards, unless by the forbearance and anemia of others. These were not to last much more than a decade.

If the costs of the First World War proved burdensome, it was well understood at the time that a second would be intolerable. Yet Britain was unable to construct a stable and peaceful international order following the great struggle of 1914–1918. Instead, however good their intentions, British leaders contributed to a situation that some twenty years later required the country to make all the same sacrifices, from a position much weaker than it had occupied before the first terrible conflict. Perhaps the only benefit of the interwar years with respect to lasting peace was an example of failure that would be vivid in the minds of those responsible for ending the Second World War.

## Learning from Comparative Strategy

Comparing the United States to Athens, Venice, and Britain can, if not illuminate specific American strategic strengths or missteps, at least offer a reasonable basis for evaluating its grand strategy. The United States has not suffered the precipitous decline of other great powers; it has, consciously or unconsciously, repeated some and avoided others of the strategic choices of other great, democratic, commercial, and maritime powers. What can be learned?

***The Role of War.*** The most obvious difference between the experience of the United States and those of the great powers examined above is that the United States has not engaged in a prolonged and intense conflict of the kind that was, in other cases, the immediate cause of decline. But from here we must go in one

of two directions. There are those who argue that the United States has in fact suffered some degree of decline and that faulty post-war leadership accounts for that decline. Alternatively, there are those who contend that U.S. politico-military strategy since the Second World War, when the United States matured as a great power, has been essentially successful and that the elements of that success can be identified.

In the first instance, those who maintain that the United States has in fact declined are likely to name as the primary cause of that decline either the Cold War *in toto* or one of its derivative wars, Vietnam. The Cold War, they argue, was itself a costly conflict, whether fought openly on the geographical margins of the superpowers or vicariously at home—through huge expenditures on both nuclear and conventional arms, aid programs, diplomacy, and clandestine operations. They assert as well that Cold War policies facilitated the rise of Germany and Japan as economic superpowers and undermined the American economy through inflation and federal debt. But these views ultimately rest upon the notion that war itself, albeit a Cold War, is the immediate and direct cause of decline and the transformation of world order. If so, the study of great power decline must still focus on politico-military strategy. Such has been the argument here.

With respect to the contrary view that U.S. foreign policy in the postwar era has been essentially successful, comparison between the United States and its democratic, commercial, and maritime predecessors yields several supportive observations. The most important is that the United States has in fact avoided a prolonged and intense war—no small point. The Athenian dénouement was a consequence of a prolonged struggle; Athenians believed they could outlast their enemies, but because of their errors and the resulting disasters, it was they who wearied first and were defeated. The Venetians too squandered their strength, first on mainland wars that yielded little gain and then on a futile, belated attempt to recover control of the Aegean. Britain entered a struggle for which it was not prepared, and its hollow victory required the sacrifice of the empire. Not only has the United States been spared such tragedies, but following World War II it contributed largely to an international order that consciously avoided many of the failures of its predecessors.

***The Role of Allies.*** The second and most remarkable difference between the strategic conduct of the United States and that of the case studies above is the American cultivation of reliable allies. Following the Second World War, the United States deliberately pursued the political and economic well-being of friendly nations and former enemies, particularly in Europe. The strength, commitment, and reliability of Nato members (and Japan) can reasonably be considered an indispensable element of the successful deterrence of full-scale war

and breakdown in the international order. Despite occasional internal strains over disunity or disproportionate burdens, Nato has been a truly remarkable phenomenon; its success stands in sharp and flattering contrast to the Athenian and Venetian experiences.

Further, the members of that alliance have shared the fundamental interests of the United States. Many of Athens' allies in the Delian League did their part only under threat of violence or from the lack of a reasonable alternative. Athens controlled the League treasury, forbade many of its members to erect fortifications, and intervened in their internal affairs in order to enforce tributes. Venice's sometime allies professed the need to unite and defend Christendom against the infidel but were much more interested (Hungary aside, though it was of little help) in preserving or enhancing their power positions relative to their Christian brethren. Edwardian Britain, for its part, disdained the very notion of commitment to an ally; it too much enjoyed standing alone and playing the balancer. In contrast, the most important of the American allies have themselves been industrialized, secular, democratic states committed to the free exchange of goods and ideas and to warding off the claims and threats of illiberal ideologies. The United States, unlike its predecessors, has not only been able to rely upon allies in its defense but has found in these allies partners deeply committed to the international order.

***The Difficulty of Democracy.*** The effects of democratic practices on politico-military strategy offer another revealing comparison between the United States and other great maritime powers of history. The American system of government is a good deal more fragmented than those of Athens, Venice, or Britain; a commonplace holds that it tends to subordinate grand strategy to more immediate and provincial political goals.

In open political systems, where interests are freely articulated and interested citizens agitate the processes of government, the status quo has so many "children" that change is made difficult.[41] Pericles' discretion was narrowed by inflexible demands on public spending that, in turn, depended a great deal on tribute from allies. Athens had constantly to demonstrate its resolve to enforce these payments, with the result that the allies became increasingly disenchanted with its domination. In turn, Athens' military requirements reinforced vested interests in high public spending, beginning the cycle anew. In Venice it was an elite class of landowners, not the merchants or guildsmen, who pushed the government to engage in fruitless wars for more territories on the *terra firma* of northern Italy, eventually draining material and human resources from the more important and longer-range goal of maintaining the eastern empire and its lucrative trade. In Britain the discretion of the Liberal cabinet was narrowed by

the popular attachment to splendid isolation, the industrialists' financial interest in the "blue water" strategy, and by public outcry for social expenditures.

American political leaders are familiar with such pressures. It is clear that an enormous task lies before the grand-strategy makers of the United States—a task at least as difficult as Britain's following its victory in the First World War. A new American politico-military strategy for the post–Cold War era will be difficult to conceive and difficult to carry out. Analysts of foreign policy have already begun to note that failure here may doom the United States, like Britain before, to repeat its sacrifices in a second confrontation in years to come.

If the strategic comparisons made here have value, it is that in categorizing the great powers by appropriate characteristics, similarity among causes becomes clearer. Such comparisons, however, should restrict themselves to the realm of grand strategy, not indulging the temptation to address tactics, doctrine, logistics, technologies, economic statistics, or social trends. Categorizing great powers is a method of discovering cause and effect in national politico-military strategy making, an approach that may in addition provide grounds for more detailed policy prescription. Understanding that neither decline nor catastrophic wars are inevitable and that national leaders have important choices to make, analysts of decline can better address present-day concerns.

The case studies above suggest that war contributes a great deal to the decline of great powers but that leaders by their strategic decisions affect fundamentally the nature and course of conflicts. In each of the cases, political leaders made choices with identifiable and important consequences. Neither the outbreak of the transforming wars nor the manner in which they were waged seems to have been inevitable. None of these great powers was absolutely obliged to go to war, or to do so when it did; each also chose how to fight its transforming (and fatal) conflict.

These parallels bring to light as well the crucial role of allies. Athenian allies participated under duress and were therefore less valuable than they might have been; the Venetian allies were too few, too fickle, or too weary to contribute much; and turn-of-the-century Britain disdained commitments to would-be allies. In each instance of decline examined here, the land forces of the great maritime power involved were poorly placed, inadequate to the task, or both. The Athenian army was simply mediocre, while the Venetian was mercenary, weary, and unable to concentrate its strength. The British Expeditionary Force was superb, but its plans were hampered by bureaucratic rivals, and its prospective commitment failed to deter the probable opponent from attacking Belgium and France.

In each case too, the complex influences of democratic governance on the making of strategy became apparent. National leaders attempt, with whatever success, to reconcile vested interests, public opinion, and their own political needs with the requirements of foreign policy. Some are able to solve this difficult equation and act prudently, some are not. Yet however constrained strategy makers may be by domestic or external circumstances, the choices they make do greatly influence their country's destiny.

## Notes

1. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987); and Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981).

2. Kennedy, passim. In fairness, Professor Kennedy was not in agreement with many of the interpretations of his book that his critics argued against. See, e.g., his response to Walt Rostow in *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1988, pp. 1108–11, and note 6 below.

3. Kennedy, pp. xv–xxiv.

4. Gilpin, p. 210.

5. Ibid., pp. 209–10.

6. Walt Rostow criticized Kennedy's work for false analogies between the United States and fundamentally dissimilar great powers, contending that the United States was in fact distinct from the other great powers (except Britain) examined by Kennedy in that it has never been the hegemonic power that Kennedy represented. See W.W. Rostow, "Beware of Historians Bearing False Analogies," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1988, pp. 863–8. Other reviewers also found the United States dissimilar to the other cases presented in the book; see, *inter alia*, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Before the Fall," *New Republic*, 13 February 1989, pp. 37–9, and Samuel Huntington, "The U.S.: Decline or Renewal?" *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1988–1989, pp. 76–96.

7. Kennedy, pp. xxi–xxii. (Emphasis original.)

8. Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1969), p. 189.

9. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, I.96–7 and III.10–1 (citing chapter, verse); and J.O.A. Larsen, "The Constitution and the Original Purpose of the Delian League," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philosophy*, vol. 51 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1940).

10. D.W. Bradeen, "The Popularity of the Athenian Empire," *Historia*, vol. 9 (1960), p. 257; and see T.J. Quinn, "Thucydides and the Unpopularity of the Athenian Empire," *Historia*, vol. 13, 1964, p. 266.

11. Plutarch, *Life of Pericles*, xii.2.

12. William Scott Ferguson, *Greek Imperialism* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1913).

13. See G.B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of His Age*, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1948), pp. 141–4. Grundy claimed (pp. 176–7) that "out of the proceeds of the tribute and taxes . . . more than 20,000 persons were maintained" by the state.

14. Quinn (p. 266) concludes that even the allies' commoners, whose political participation was, in effect, guaranteed by Athens, would just as soon have been "rid of Athens provided that a break with her did not involve injury to themselves."

15. See Thucydides, I.75 and I.140.

16. Ibid., I.144.

17. In Thucydides' account, Pericles asserts baldly that "if we suffered defeat, we should at the same time lose our allies, on whom our strength depends, since they will immediately revolt if we are left with insufficient troops to send against them." Ibid.

18. "You should feel confident in ultimate victory, if only you will make up your minds not to add to the empire while the war is in progress, and not to go out of your way to involve yourselves in new perils." Ibid.

19. For an excellent treatment of Periclean strategy, see Hans Delbruck, *Die Strategies des Perikles* (Berlin: Reimer, 1890).

20. Thucydides, VII.87. For a detailed account see Donald Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 159–353.

21. Xenophon, *Government of Athens*, II.1. That the Athenians had bogged down in the Egyptian campaign in 456 was partly due to the limited number of soldiers committed to the assault and the total absence of siege

troops. That the Athenians could not restore Orestes, King of Thessaly, to his throne in 458 was because Thessalian cavalry prevented the Athenians from moving outside their fortified camps. On the other hand, when the Athenians successfully subdued the islands of Aegina and Samos, they did so with ground attacks and sieges, although these were accompanied by and seen as great maritime victories. Finally, in Sicily, the Athenians arrived without any cavalry at all, could not win without it, and, later, were themselves cut to pieces by Syracusan cavalry.

22. See Grundy, pp. 262–4 and 277. Thucydides mentions the effectiveness of cavalry many times: I.3; II.22, 31, 100; IV.44; V.73; VI.64; and VII.6. For more on the use of light-armed troops in the ancient Greek world (specifically about fifty years after these events), see Charles D. Hamilton, "From Archidamus to Alexander: The Revolution in Greek Warfare," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1995, p. 96ff.

23. Thucydides, I.142.

24. William H. McNeill, *Venice: The Hinge of Europe* (Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 55–6.

25. John Julius Norwich, *A History of Venice* (New York: Knopf, 1982), p. 299.

26. Ibid., p. 304.

27. M.E. Mallet and J.R. Hale, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), p. 47.

28. The population of Venice was about two hundred thousand, of which forty thousand were males fit for arms. Drawing on its mainland possessions and mercenaries, Venice could field an army of forty thousand in addition to a navy of thirty-six thousand men. Locally raised garrison troops around the Mediterranean and Aegean littorals added to these numbers, but they had to be supplemented by the regular Venetian army—which, as a result, was spread around the empire and, in individual battles, usually suffered accordingly from inferiority of numbers.

29. Paul Kennedy makes that case in three places: in *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (New York: Scribner, 1976); "The First World War and the International Power System," *International Security*, Summer 1984, pp. 7–40; and in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. See also Aaron Friedburg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline 1895–1905* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988); Bernard Porter, *The Lion's Share* (New York: Longman, 1975); Peter Mathias, *The First Industrial Nation* (New York: Scribner, 1969); Derek H. Aldcroft, *The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition, 1875–1914* (Toronto, Ont.: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1968); and E.J. Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968).

30. Among those who have argued that a formal British commitment to defend France and Belgium would have altered German policy are Henry Kissinger, "Coalition Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1964, pp. 525–45; and Pierre Renouvin, "Britain and the Continent: The Lessons of History," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1938, pp. 111–7.

31. Memo by General Sir Charles Callwell, member of the Directorate of Military Operations, "British Military Action in Case of War with Germany," 3 October 1905, quoted in Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., *The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904–1914* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1969), p. 50.

32. The various industrialists, shippers, naval officers, bureaucrats, and politicians who constituted the navalist faction generally believed that government spending should heavily favor the navy; and that a maritime strategy, relying almost exclusively on that navy, would be the most effective deterrent to war and, if necessary, the most efficient means of prosecuting a war. Radicals, a caucus of the Liberal Party, believed Britain's involvement in continental disputes and imperial rivalries would sooner or later enmesh the kingdom in a war abroad to the detriment of social reform and economic progress at home. "As so often before," writes historian Michael Howard, "radicals and navalists found themselves in a natural alliance against the spectres of militarism, continental strategy, and Balance of Power." Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment* (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1972), p. 41.

33. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, quoting letter, Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, *Twenty-Five Years, 1892–1916*, vol. 1 (London: Frederick A. Stockes, 1925), p. 97.

34. Report by Captain von Muller, in London, 19 February 1914, *German Diplomatic Documents 1871–1914*, vol. 4 (London: Methuen, 1931), pp. 324–7.

35. See Grey, vol. 2, pp. 1–18 and 62ff; and Williamson, pp. 346–61.

36. Navalism found many sympathizers in high places who had a pecuniary or practical political interest in naval armaments and related industries, a phenomenon well described by Phillip Noel-Baker, *The Private Manufacture of Armaments*, vol. 1 (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1936). Arthur Marder speaks of this insistence on naval armaments and a "blue water" strategy as "the steady pressure of a vested interest and a state of mind"; see his *The Anatomy of British Sea Power* (New York: Octagon Books, 1940, reprinted 1976), p. 27.

37. Arthur Marder, *Portrait of an Admiral* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952), pp. 48–9. Richmond's outspokenness eventually earned him an early retirement.

38. Arthur Marder, "The Influence of History on Sea Power: The Royal Navy and the Lessons of 1914–1918," *Pacific Historical Review*, November 1972, pp. 418ff.; and H.W. Richmond, *National Policy and National Strength and Other Essays* (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1928).

39. Grey, vol. 2, p. 73.

40. On the costs of the war see A.S. Milward, *The Economic Effects of the World Wars on Britain* (London: Macmillan, 1970); Corelli Barnett, *The Collapse of British Power* (New York: Morrow, 1972), pp. 423–8; Mathias, pp. 431–7; and David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Longman, 1991), pp. 105–11.

41. This is not to say that bureaucracies and other organizations in closed political systems or authoritarian societies do not have vested interests that they seek to protect against threatened change.

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*Also by this issue's cover artist:*

**Marshall, Ian. *Ironclads and Paddlers*. Charlottesville, Va.: Howell Press, 1993. 108pp.**

This is the second book written and illustrated by Ian Marshall, a distinguished maritime artist and scholar now residing in Maine. His first, *Armored Ships*, was published in 1991; the present work, as suggested by John Maxtone-Graham (himself a maritime author) in his foreword, is a "retroactive sequel," concentrating on the developments in metal construction and steam propulsion that eventually produced the propeller-driven battleship types of the earlier book. Mr. Marshall's text not only traces the development of the ships themselves but looks at certain closely related subjects: the operational concept of *guerre de course*; the personalities of Thomas, Lord Cochrane (an apparent model for Patrick O'Brian's Jack Aubrey) and of Jackie Fisher; and two "island fortresses," Bermuda and Malta (to which the need for coaling stations gave new importance). Learned, informative, and enjoyable as is Mr. Marshall's writing, his art is even better: the thirty-eight watercolor plates (which, as is his style, portray ships with exacting precision in settings authentically associated with them) and his many pencil sketches are stunning.

# A Littoral Frustration
## The Union Navy and the Siege of Charleston, 1863–1865

Robert J. Schneller, Jr.

ON 7 APRIL 1863 NINE UNION IRONCLADS in line-ahead formation, under the command of Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont, stood into the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina. Du Pont, one of the Union navy's leading officers, had already won fame by capturing Port Royal, South Carolina, in November 1861. Now commanding the Union's most technologically advanced ships—seven *Passaic*-class monitors, the broadside ironclad *New Ironsides*, and the lightly armored *Keokuk*—he was setting his sights on "the cradle of the rebellion."

The idea of attacking Charleston with the ironclad fleet was the brainchild of Gustavus Vasa Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Fox had spent the morning of 9 March 1862 in a tugboat off Norfolk, Virginia, with a ringside seat for the historic encounter between the USS *Monitor* and the CSS *Virginia*. He boarded the *Monitor* after the four-hour duel, which he considered to be the greatest naval battle ever fought. Viewing the outcome as a clear-cut victory for the Union, Fox was convinced that no enemy cannon could stop the Yankee ship; ten days after the battle of Hampton Roads, he told a congressional committee that the Navy would have "no hesitation in taking the *Monitor* right

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into Charleston."[1] Fox likened the fall of that city to "the fall of Satan's kingdom";[2] Northern newspaper editors reviled Charleston as "that viper's nest and breeding place of rebellion," the "hot-bed of secession";[3] and Fox's superior, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, wrote that "there is no place that the American people would so delight to see captured as Charleston."[4]

Welles knew that the North badly needed such a victory. The winter of 1862–1863 had been the darkest period in the war for the Union. Major General Ambrose E. Burnside's Fredericksburg campaign had just been added to the list of Union disasters; no progress had been made on the inland waters since the capture of Memphis the previous summer; and the initial operations at Vicksburg had failed. A victory at Charleston in the spring of 1863 would reap vast moral and political dividends.

Fox (a former naval officer turned businessman) became obsessed with the idea that the Navy should take this prize without help from the Army. Jealousy had much to do with his reasoning, for he believed that the Navy never received due credit for its achievements in joint operations. "I feel my duty is two-fold," Fox wrote to one naval officer, "first to beat our Southern friends; second to beat the Army."[5] Charleston fallen to the guns of technologically advanced Federal warships would be an unparalleled propaganda coup for the Navy.

At their desks in Washington, the Secretary and his assistant imagined that Du Pont's ironclad fleet could steam right past the Confederate fortifications guarding the entrance to Charleston Harbor and, once inside, compel the city to surrender by threat of bombardment. Welles and Fox were confident of victory, for they believed that the monitors were invulnerable.[6]

However, Admiral Du Pont, commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, knew better. Charleston was the most heavily fortified port in the Confederacy. British officers who had visited the place reported that its defenses were stronger than those of Sevastopol during the Crimean War. The city itself lay five miles beyond the harbor entrance, at the extremity of a peninsula formed by the Ashley and Cooper rivers (see the map); numerous narrow but deep rivers and creeks divided the surrounding terrain into a patchwork of islands, which the Confederates had fortified against a land attack. In command was General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard, one of the Confederacy's finest military engineers, who exercised operational control of Confederate naval as well as army forces in South Carolina and Georgia, his area of responsibility. Charleston Harbor was a cul-de-sac; Beauregard's engineers had ringed its perimeter with fortifications and batteries, the most prominent being Battery Wagner on Morris Island, on the southern side of the harbor entrance, and Fort Moultrie on Sullivan's Island, on the northern side. Fort Sumter, almost midway between James and Sullivan's islands, covered the surrounding batteries, and the island batteries could in turn cover Sumter. Beauregard had placed buoys in the harbor

## The Siege of Charleston, South Carolina, 1863–1865.

A 1902 chart of Charleston Harbor and its approaches, showing the position of major features, fortifications, and wrecks of U.S. naval vessels. *Housatonic* (#5) has, for clarity, been moved up (i.e., northwest) approximately a quarter-mile. The wharves where the Union commanders at first confidently expected to demand the surrender of the city were (and are) located on the Cooper River side of the Charleston peninsula, generally opposite "Hog Isle." The city's battery (today a park) was at the southern tip of the peninsula, where, local tradition has it, the Cooper and Ashley rivers join to form the Atlantic Ocean.

Adapted from Richard Rush et al., eds., *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion*, series I, vol. 14, courtesy Naval Historical Center (NH 42916).



to give his gunners the exact ranges to attacking ships. As E.B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz noted a century later, "All things considered, the path of an attacking column of ships would lead directly through the most devastating heavy artillery fire that could then be concentrated anywhere on earth."[7]

A tiny Confederate fleet complemented the fortifications. In addition to a few small wooden gunboats, Charleston's naval force eventually included the *Palmetto State*, the *Chicora*, and two other ironclads. Slow, difficult to handle, mechanically unreliable, and unseaworthy, these examples of Confederate high technology had earlier damaged two blockading vessels but posed no great threat to attacking Union ironclads.

"Low technology," in the form of underwater defenses, was a much greater problem. The Confederate government actively funded underwater warfare and had established a "torpedo station" in Charleston. That city's underwater defenses consisted of mines (called "torpedoes" in those days), heavily constructed rope and log booms stretched across the channel to prevent ships from passing or to entangle their propellers, and pilings arranged to keep attacking ships in the main channel, under the guns of the shore batteries. Shortages of materials and strong winds and tides made these obstructions difficult to maintain, but they were cheap and effective. As one historian put it, "The harbor's organic defensive system was the strongest in North America."[8]

The main attacking force was to be Du Pont's ironclads. His seven *Passaic*-class monitors, which were larger, improved versions of the original *Monitor*, were radical ships, quite different from the stately sailing vessels in which he and other naval officers of his generation had come of age. Atop the centerline of the *Passaic*'s low hull sat an armored, revolving turret, giving the vessel the appearance of (as had been said of the *Monitor*) a "cheesebox on a raft." Living conditions were wretched onboard these damp, smelly, dirty, cramped, dark, and poorly ventilated craft. A hot sun beating down on the iron deck turned a monitor into a veritable oven; temperatures in the engine room reached as high as 130°F. The air in the living quarters was an almost unbreathable thick fog. Everything was wet, from both condensation and innumerable leaks. With only about two feet of freeboard, the deck of a monitor underway in anything but a flat calm was awash, forcing the crew to remain below with hatches battened down.

Even the monitors' designer, John Ericsson, thought that a purely naval attack on Charleston would not succeed. Although perfectly confident that his weird ships could destroy enemy vessels, he believed that they could not by themselves overcome well sited fortifications.[9] The inventor of the cannon that armed the monitors, Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren, also thought that a strictly naval attack against Charleston stood little chance of victory. He felt that an offensive should be a joint operation involving 50,000 troops.[10] Although Du Pont's

success with wooden ships at Port Royal led some to believe that, in principle, ships could successfully attack forts, the ironclad fleet would be badly outgunned at Charleston. Each monitor carried only two Dahlgren guns, one eleven and one fifteen-inch smooth-bore;[11] Fort Sumter and the batteries on Morris and Sullivan's islands alone mounted over seventy guns. Furthermore, though the fifteen-incher was the Union navy's heaviest piece of ordnance, it was a new weapon, with a low rate of fire, and Dahlgren was unsure that it would endure protracted use.[12]

Du Pont had tested the mettle of the ironclads, and the results increased his doubts that they could overcome Charleston's defenses. On 27 January 1863 he had sent the *Montauk* up the Ogeechee River, just south of the Georgia line, to attack Fort McAllister, a modest nine-gun sand fort in Savannah's ring of defenses. The *Montauk* had bombarded the fort for four hours but failed to silence its guns. Other attacks had produced similar dismal results. Du Pont had concluded that the monitors' big guns were ineffective against forts; the ironclad fleet simply could not produce the volume of fire necessary to destroy an enemy fort in a single attack. He had reported this view to Welles and had argued that troops would be necessary to take Charleston.[13] Accordingly, in February the Union government had dispatched Major General John G. Foster's XVIII Corps to Port Royal to join forces with Major General David Hunter's X Corps, but wrangling between Hunter and Foster over the plan of attack and chain of command, as well as the administration's insistence on attacking immediately, left the Navy to attack the city by itself.

Du Pont devised a plan for a reconnaissance in force. His fleet would steam into the harbor and reduce the fortifications in turn, with Sumter as the initial target. If the Rebel forts proved too strong, he would withdraw; if not, he would press the attack. Although Du Pont did not believe this plan would force the city to surrender, he determined to try, fearing that a lesser commander would suffer a rout.[14]

At the head of Du Pont's column, now coming within range of the Confederate batteries, steamed the monitor *Weehawken*, pushing a fifty-foot-long raft designed by John Ericsson to clear mines and obstructions. Union commanders hoped that Ericsson's "torpedo rake" would enable the *Weehawken* to sweep a lane into Charleston Harbor for the rest of the column. The contraption succeeded in detonating a mine without damaging the ship, but it made the already unwieldy monitor almost impossible to steer, and as a result the *Weehawken*'s captain, John Rodgers, had to cast it loose.[15]

The ironclads bombarded Fort Sumter for almost two hours, and every Confederate gun in range fired furiously into the attackers. Ninety rounds of shot and shell perforated the *Keokuk*, which later sank, and five monitors suffered

extensive damage. The *Weehawken* fired twenty-six rounds and received fifty-three hits, which fragmented her side armor in places and snapped off thirty-six of the cast-iron bolts that held together her turret armor. The *Passaic* fired thirteen shells and received thirty-five hits; a shot striking the base of her turret jammed together the rails of a gun carriage, putting half of her two-gun battery out of action. Broken bolt-heads flew like bullets inside the *Nahant*'s pilothouse, one of them fatally wounding the helmsman. It was the same all down the line. The disparity of fire was tremendous: where Fort Sumter alone expended over two thousand rounds, the entire ironclad squadron managed only 139, its inherently low volume of fire further restricted by shot striking the monitors' turret bases and gunport covers, putting cannon out of action. With Sumter damaged but far from destroyed, Du Pont withdrew. The monitors had proved difficult to maneuver and their complicated machinery vulnerable to concentrated gunfire.[16]

***"'I feel our duty is two-fold,' [the Assistant Secretary of the Navy] wrote to one naval officer, 'first to beat our Southern friends; second to beat the Army.'"***

Du Pont was furious that his superiors in Washington, by ignoring his warnings that the striking power of the monitors was inadequate for strictly naval operations against forts, had brought about this repulse. He reasoned that renewing the attack without the cooperation of a land force could cost half his command; to attack again, he told his wife, would be "sheer folly." With the agreement of his captains, Du Pont decided against a second effort; all felt that it would have been "madness."[17]

Welles, who had staked on the monitor program not only his own reputation but those of the Navy Department and the Lincoln administration, could not accept this decision. The monitors, on which Welles's department had expended enormous amounts of money, had already proved useless for operations on the open sea. Barely able to remain afloat outside protected coastal waters, they could neither pursue enemy commerce raiders nor escort cargo vessels, such as those carrying gold from California. Only by taking the remaining Confederate seaports, or at least by occupying their harbors, could more seaworthy blockaders be released for such duties—and the monitor program be vindicated. Since Charleston and Wilmington, North Carolina, tied up the most blockading ships, Welles accorded their capture the highest priority.[18] After all the preparation and expense, he was distressed that Du Pont apparently intended to abandon the offensive after a two-hour fight and the loss of one man. He ordered two separate investigations, both of which understated the damage that the monitors had sustained. The newspapers inferred that the admiral was to blame for the failure

to capture Charleston and venomously denounced him. Du Pont, bristling at their accusations of incompetence and cowardice, demanded permission to publish his own account of what had happened. Welles refused, unable to afford political backlash from assertions that the monitors were flawed; in any case, publishing the truth about the ironclads would provide valuable information to the enemy.[19]

Du Pont continued to refuse to renew the attack, so Welles considered sacking him. It was a difficult decision, because, as the Secretary realized, doing so would be tantamount to blaming the admiral for the failure; Du Pont, who had friends in Congress and a reputation as a "shrewd intriguer," would defend himself by blaming the monitors. It all would boil down to a showdown between Du Pont, his command abilities, and his powerful friends on the one hand, and Welles, the monitors, the Navy Department, and the policy of the Lincoln administration on the other. Eventually Welles decided to accept the risk, and he relieved Du Pont on 3 June.[20]

Even so, the Secretary had come to accept Du Pont's contention that the "cradle of the rebellion" would not fall to a naval force alone; there would have to be a joint operation. Although Welles would have now preferred sending the ironclads to Rear Admiral David G. Farragut for an attack on Mobile, Alabama, Charleston remained important from a political standpoint. To capture the city would not only redeem the Navy's honor in the wake of Du Pont's failure but would also boost Union morale, which was sagging under the weight of financial difficulties, the draft, and, on 2–4 May, a new disaster at Chancellorsville, Virginia—Robert E. Lee's greatest victory. The Secretary chose Rear Admiral Dahlgren to succeed Du Pont in command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

John Adolphus Bernard Dahlgren was intelligent, meticulous, honest, and, more than anything else, ambitious. He wanted power, glory, promotion to high rank, and an immortal reputation as a naval hero, and he shamelessly used his friendship with President Abraham Lincoln to further his ambition. In the decade prior to the war he had won international recognition as an expert in naval ordnance, a reputation unparalleled by any other American naval officer. Despite his stature, however, the Navy Department had consistently resisted his projects. It had taken him years to convince the Navy to adopt his nine and eleven-inch guns. Even when these weapons earned a reputation as the world's most powerful and reliable naval artillery, the Department refused to organize the Ordnance Bureau as he wished and delayed for three years his development of rifled cannon. Assistant Secretary Fox's insistence on developing a fifteen-incher against his wishes proved the last straw.

Although he had never been in battle, Dahlgren decided to abandon his ordnance career in favor of a fighting command, as the true path to everlasting

naval fame. He had early caught wind of the planned naval attack on Charleston and in October 1862 had asked Welles to be chosen to lead it. Turned down, he went over the Secretary's head, to Lincoln; Secretary Welles, however, convinced the president that Dahlgren belonged in ordnance, and there he remained for the time being. As a consolation, Lincoln supported Dahlgren's promotion to rear admiral over Welles's objections. When Dahlgren learned of the Secretary's desire to replace Du Pont, he again went after the command, and this time he got it. Welles had originally picked Rear Admiral Andrew Hull Foote, but Foote had become terminally ill. Reluctantly, and at Lincoln's prodding, Welles gave Dahlgren command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.[21]

None of this endeared Dahlgren to his fellow officers, but he did have certain qualifications for his new job. To take Charleston he would have to conduct four distinct types of operations: amphibious assault, support of ground troops, naval bombardment of land fortifications, and underwater warfare. In the 1850s, while developing bronze boat guns, Dahlgren had devised tactics for amphibious and naval gunfire support operations. In *Shells and Shell Guns*, his 1856 magnum opus on ordnance, he had discussed the actions of allied fleets against Russian shore batteries during the Crimean War, particularly the French use of armored floating batteries against Russian forts at Kinburn. On the other hand, like all naval officers of his day, he had nothing in his background to prepare him for underwater warfare.[22]

Dahlgren's counterpart in the Union army would be Brigadier General Quincy A. Gillmore, commanding X Corps. One of the Army's best engineers, Gillmore had already compiled an impressive war record: he had served as chief engineer on the Port Royal expedition, reduced Fort Pulaski at the mouth of the Savannah River in April 1862, won a victory at Somerset, Kentucky, the next month, and had been twice brevetted for gallantry and meritorious service. Unfortunately, however, Gillmore understood almost nothing about naval operations. He was also a vain and egotistical man who posed for photographs with a hand inside his coat in emulation of Napoleon. (Upon his promotion in the summer of 1863 to major general of volunteers, the rank commensurate with his position, he was to have a military band follow him around for a day or so, playing loudly all the while.) His concern for his reputation outmatched even Dahlgren's, and, as time would tell, he would stoop to almost anything to protect it.[23]

In late May, Gillmore held a series of conferences with Fox, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, and Major General Henry W. Halleck, General in Chief of the United States Army. He proposed a broad plan for joint operations against Charleston, comprising four distinct steps. The Army would, first, make an amphibious landing on Morris Island; second, capture Battery Wagner; and

third, knock Fort Sumter to pieces. The Navy would then, fourth, clear the harbor obstructions and steam past the remaining enemy batteries to the wharves and demand the surrender of the city. Welles, Fox, and Stanton approved of the plan; even Halleck, who generally disapproved of joint operations, seemed to like it. On 12 June 1863 Gillmore formally took command of the Department of the South, the Army counterpart to the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.[24]

Dahlgren arrived at Port Royal on 4 July and took over the squadron two days later. Welles gave him only one specific instruction: "Please afford [Gillmore] all the aid and assistance in your power in conducting his operations."[25] Other than that, the admiral was "to consider himself clothed with full powers" in planning and executing his own operations.[26]

Dahlgren and Gillmore met on 4 and 5 July. The general laid out a plan for operations against Morris Island and insisted that the attack commence as soon as possible, because the enemy was strengthening his defenses there. The admiral agreed to support the assault. A month earlier Dahlgren had considered a purely naval attack against Charleston but thought one feasible only if the Navy Department gave him six or seven more monitors in addition to the seven already under his command. Since Welles had told him that no new monitors would be ready before October, Dahlgren considered his primary role to be supporting army operations ashore. Gillmore did not mention his grand four-phase plan, and Dahlgren came away from the meeting believing that Morris Island itself was the sole objective. Although Dahlgren clearly understood that a naval assault into the harbor was in the offing, he believed it would come later rather than sooner. Gillmore, however, understood his own goal to be to prepare the way into the harbor for the Navy.[27]

This misunderstanding was not the worst of it. There was no overall Union commander at Charleston; Dahlgren had the naval forces, Gillmore the army, and neither had authority over the other. The naval chain of command ran upward from Dahlgren to Fox and Welles, to Lincoln. Similarly, the army chain went from Gillmore to Halleck, to Stanton, to Lincoln. For their parts, Welles and Halleck, like Dahlgren and Gillmore, had differing ideas about the campaign: Welles had begun to entertain doubts that an attack on Charleston would succeed (but failed to convey his misgivings to anyone), while Halleck remained confident that the city could be taken—yet seemed ready to withdraw the land forces there and dispatch them to Vicksburg.

There were other problems as well. Fox's dislike for joint operations stemmed from Halleck's claiming for the Army exclusive credit for the February 1862 victories (won jointly by Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant and then-Captain Andrew Foote) at forts Henry and Donelson on the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. Furthermore, no written plans for a joint attack on Charleston existed

when Gillmore and Dahlgren assumed their respective commands. Success, therefore, would depend on Dahlgren's and Gillmore's ability to cooperate and solve problems themselves.[28]

Four days after Dahlgren assumed command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, the Federal forces attacked. At 5:00 in the morning of 10 July, 2,500 Union troops landed on the southern end of Morris Island and began moving north. The monitors *Nahant, Montauk, Weehawken*, and *Catskill*, in which Dahlgren flew his flag, opened fire at 6:15 to cover the advance. Small craft armed with Dahlgren boat guns provided close-in support, and with well aimed fire drove the Confederates from their positions. Shell and canister inflicted heavy casualties on the defenders as they retreated towards Fort Wagner. By nine o'clock the Federals had occupied three-fourths of the island, with skirmishers in range of the fort; the troops, exhausted by the heat and four hours of combat, went no further. The monitors moved up to bombard Wagner and maintained a steady fire until 6:00 that evening.[29]

***"[General Gillmore's] easy manner allayed Dahlgren's suspicions—how could someone he got along with so well in person be condemning him behind his back? But Gillmore was doing exactly that."***

At dawn the next day, Gillmore's troops assaulted the fort. The attack failed, because the Federal column barely outnumbered the defenders; the Confederates beat them back, inflicting 339 casualties. Dahlgren had first learned of the movement at 6:00 A.M. Three hours later, Gillmore asked him for gunfire support; the admiral sent four monitors, but by then it was already too late. Nevertheless, in an after-action report to Welles, Dahlgren praised both the monitors and Gillmore's effort. Welles thought that Gillmore had attacked prematurely and with insufficient forces.[30]

Dahlgren and Gillmore decided to soften up Fort Wagner with a heavy bombardment before launching another attack. For a week Dahlgren's ironclads kept up a steady fire while Federal troops constructed batteries on Morris Island. On the 18th, Federal naval and land forces bombarded Fort Wagner for eleven hours; Rebel commanders later estimated that the Yankees fired nine thousand shells, at the rate of about fourteen per minute. The fort remained almost silent throughout the bombardment. Late in the afternoon Gillmore signaled that he intended to storm the fort at sunset, when the dim light would make it difficult for Confederate gunners on the islands across the harbor to see their targets. The Federal cannonade ceased at dusk, and six thousand troops moved forward in a dense column. The 1,300 defenders in Fort Wagner and the nearby batteries poured a withering fire into the attackers. At the climax of the battle, soldiers of

the 54th Massachusetts, the most famous black regiment of the war, made it to the top of the parapet, where most of them fell. The attackers retreated after a fierce fight, leaving behind 1,500 casualties; the rebels lost only 188 men. In his report to Welles Dahlgren attributed the failure to "a manifest lack of force."[31]

Gillmore settled down to siege operations. His engineers constructed a series of zig-zag trenches approaching Fort Wagner, while his gunners bombarded it day and night. Nearly every morning the fleet would close in and pound the fort with heavy ordnance, firing all day (aside from a pause for lunch). The naval gunners became expert, placing rounds almost anywhere they wanted; they even devised a way to reach the center of the fort by ricocheting shells off the water. No doubt having the United States Navy's principal ordnance expert as their commanding officer had something to do with their performance.[32]

By 8 August the Federals had opened a parallel trench five hundred yards from Wagner, bringing the sappers within range of Fort Sumter's barbette guns, whose projectiles now arced over Wagner and fell almost vertically into the Union position. Federal progress stopped cold. Unless Sumter's barbette batteries were silenced, Wagner might hold out until disease and attrition compelled a Federal withdrawal from Morris Island.[33] On 17 August, therefore, a week-long bombardment began from the ironclads and the Union batteries erected on Morris Island. Gillmore requested support from the Navy almost daily. Dahlgren cooperated fully but warned the general that the monitors' cannon were wearing out. Gillmore agreed that the guns should not be used up against Wagner and Sumter "but kept for the interior defenses of Charleston."[34] The bombardment of Sumter climaxed on 23 August. That day Gillmore wrote Dahlgren, "I consider the offensive power of Sumter entirely destroyed from to-day's firing. I do not believe they can serve a single gun."[35] Yankee engineers could now press closer to Wagner. The general later recalled that Sumter was "reduced to the condition of a mere infantry outpost, alike incapable of annoying our approaches to Fort Wagner, or of inflicting injury upon the iron-clads." He believed that Dahlgren was free to launch an attack into the harbor and fully expected him to do so. As he saw it, the Army had eliminated the threat to the fleet; it was now up to the Navy to deliver the city.[36]

But the general had overlooked three important developments. First, the condition of the fleet had deteriorated. For the attack of the 23rd Dahlgren could muster only five of his seven monitors and the broadside ironclad *New Ironsides*. One of the two unavailable monitors was on station in Wassau Sound, keeping an eye on a rebel ram building in Savannah, Georgia; the other was having her pilothouse repaired at Port Royal. All had been in service for six to seven months and were the worse for wear—in the actions off Morris Island the monitors had fired approximately eight thousand rounds and received 882 hits. Their fifteen-inch guns were fast approaching the limit of their service life, which was only

one-third that of the eleven-inchers, and only eleven-inchers were available as replacements. Enemy shot had bent many armor plates, loosened turret packing, and sheared off dozens of nuts and bolts. Lying close inshore during often foul weather had strained their hulls, causing some to leak badly. Their bottoms had become fouled with barnacles and grass, reducing their speed to between three and three and a half knots. The second development was that during the two weeks after 23 August 1863 the Confederates removed all the serviceable heavy cannon from Sumter, which was still in their hands, and systematically distributed them among the James Island batteries, Fort Moultrie, and the city of Charleston. This made the inner defenses more formidable than the outer wall of fire that had wrought such havoc on the ironclads during Du Pont's attack of 7 April. Finally, and most importantly, while Union cannon had been pounding Fort Sumter to rubble, the Confederates had been strengthening their underwater defenses. In sum, the defenses of Charleston had grown stronger and the ironclad fleet weaker since the Union's original attempt.[37]

Nevertheless, Dahlgren intended to launch a naval attack into the harbor to probe the enemy's defenses. Early in the morning of 26 August, he assembled the captains of the ironclads to explain his plan: small boats and a steam tug would clear a lane through the obstructions, whereupon the monitors would pass the forts and attack into the harbor. The ironclads got underway at nine o'clock but had difficulty making headway against a strong flood tide. After about two hours the weather took a turn for the worse, and Dahlgren called off the attack.[38] He intended to try again on the 29th but cancelled the operation because of reports of gunfire from Sumter. The success of the naval attack, he reasoned, depended upon the fort being absolutely silent; even musket fire would hinder efforts to clear the obstructions, and he considered it impossible to enter the harbor while those remained in place. Dahlgren still regarded Sumter as a considerable threat.[39]

Meanwhile, Gillmore's sappers had pushed their siege lines to within 150 yards of Fort Wagner, and the general decided that the time had come for the final assault. At dawn on 5 September, Gillmore's artillery and Dahlgren's ships opened up a forty-two-hour bombardment of the fort. When the shells began falling, the Confederates on Morris Island numbered nine hundred men; the firing reduced the defenders to four hundred effectives. Gillmore scheduled the final assault for the morning of 7 September, but the Confederates evacuated Morris Island the night before.[40] At about 5:10 on the morning of the 7th, Gillmore signalled Dahlgren, "The whole island is ours, but the enemy have escaped us."[41]

In an attempt to exploit any ensuing confusion or loss of morale in the Confederate ranks, Dahlgren demanded the immediate surrender of Fort Sumter. "Come and take it," the Rebels replied.[42] The admiral intended to do exactly that with an amphibious assault; "There is nothing but a corporal's guard at the

fort," he told the commander of the landing force, "and all we have to do is go in and take possession." On the 8th Dahlgren signalled Gillmore of his intention to attack that night. The general replied that he was planning the same thing and proposed that Dahlgren place his force under army command to coordinate the effort and prevent mistakes. Dahlgren flatly turned down the suggestion; he did not want to share the glory.[43]

In fact, Dahlgren's plan was foredoomed. In April the Confederates had recovered a code book from the wreck of the *Keokuk*, sunk in Du Pont's attack, enabling them to read the signals exchanged between the flagship and Gillmore's headquarters. Intercepting the admiral's signal on the afternoon of the 8th, the Confederates prepared a hot reception.[44]

Before sunrise on the 9th, small boats carrying five hundred sailors and Marines rowed toward Fort Sumter, unaware that the defenders knew they were coming. The fort's walls were near the water's edge, and when the boats drew to within a few yards of them the Rebels fired a devastating volley. Union sailors who struggled ashore met a deluge of hand grenades and musketry. The Confederate ironclad *Chicora* now opened fire on them, as well as artillery from across the harbor. Unable to scale the walls, the Yankees sheltered in the recesses, realizing that they had fallen into a trap. Those who could, surrendered; the rest withdrew, leaving behind 127 sailors and Marines. The Confederates lost not a man. As for Gillmore, his assault never got started. His men had rendezvoused in a creek west of Morris Island, but when the general realized that the sailors had failed he cancelled the attack.[45]

Despite this failure, Dahlgren retained his zeal for a naval offensive against Charleston; he had, however, no desire to attack with his current force. With several more monitors, he told Welles, "there would be every reason to look for success."[46] The Secretary promised to send new monitors as soon as they were completed but discouraged Dahlgren from attacking before they arrived; Welles did not want to risk losing the nation's only ironclad fleet while there was a possibility of other operations along the Southern coast, not to mention the political backlash. Dahlgren inferred that the Secretary did not want him to launch an attack unless guaranteed of success, whereas Welles considered the final decision to attack to be up to the admiral. Dahlgren held a council of war on 22 October to discuss the question; the majority of his ironclad captains expressed the view that an attack should be postponed until the new monitors arrived. Dahlgren concurred.[47]

The decision to postpone offensive operations angered Gillmore. He had fully expected the Navy to enter Charleston Harbor and attack the city soon after 23 August; now, the general reasoned, because Fort Sumter no longer mounted heavy cannon, it no longer posed a threat to the ironclads. The longer Dahlgren delayed the final attack, the more impatient Gillmore became.[48] The press,

meanwhile, had perceived that the monitors had suffered little damage and were criticizing the Navy for not attacking. Dahlgren could not admit the truth about the monitors' condition without politically damaging the administration and providing useful information to the enemy. Many of the newspaper accounts seemed to originate from Gillmore's headquarters, and Dahlgren began to suspect that the general was behind them. He confronted Gillmore, who denied any role in the matter, attributing it to sensational journalism and disgruntled officers. His easy manner allayed Dahlgren's suspicions—how could someone he got along with so well in person be condemning him behind his back?[49]

But Gillmore was doing exactly that. Not wishing to be blamed for the lack of progress at Charleston, he was seeking to focus the newspapers' criticism on Dahlgren and the Navy. On 24 October two of his subordinates visited Welles to denounce Dahlgren as totally unfit for command and even called him an imbecile. Welles, who was certain that Gillmore had sent the officers, reported the matter to Lincoln.[50] Upon hearing the suggestion that Dahlgren be relieved, the president was said to have exclaimed that he would "be damned if he would do anything to discredit or disgrace John A. Dahlgren."[51] Lincoln, Welles, and even Fox believed that the admiral had done all that could be done with the forces available to him; the president censured Gillmore for his behind-the-scenes insinuations.[52]

By January 1864, Dahlgren himself began to suspect that Gillmore had in fact condoned the press attacks on the Navy. His suspicions were to be confirmed in May when, after the War Department transferred Gillmore, two of the general's former subordinates told Dahlgren that Gillmore had been trying to set him up as a scapegoat for the failure to capture Charleston. For a campaign then still in progress, whose final success depended upon cooperation between the Army and Navy, it was a bad omen.[53]

On the night of 5 October 1863, the Confederate torpedo boat *David*, a steam-powered, cigar-shaped vessel about fifty feet long and six in diameter, had attacked the 3,486-ton *New Ironsides* with a spar torpedo, a contact mine affixed to a ten-foot-long pole projecting from the bow. The *New Ironsides* sustained damage but remained in action. Now, on the night of 17 February 1864, the Confederate human-powered submersible *Hunley*—delivered by rail from Mobile, Alabama—drove a spar torpedo against the *Housatonic*, a wooden steamer. The ensuing explosion sent the *Housatonic* to the bottom.

As a result of these attacks, Dahlgren implemented countermeasures against torpedo boats (see the plate). Every evening Union sailors set up nets and log booms around their ships; ships not so protected remained constantly underway. Throughout the hours of darkness small boats, operating in the eerie glow of calcium searchlights, patrolled the waters around the fleet's major units. For the

## ORDER, No. 20.

**Flag Steamer Philadelphia,**
PORT ROYAL HARBOR, S. C., Feb. 19, 1864.

The *Housatonic* has just been Torpedoed by a Rebel *David*, and sunk almost instantly.

It was at night and the water smooth.

The success of this undertaking will, no doubt, lead to similar attempts along the whole line of blockade.

If Vessels on blockade are at anchor, they are not safe, particularly in smooth water, without outriggers and hawsers stretched around with rope netting dropped in the water.

Vessels on inside blockade had better take post outside at night and keep underweigh, until these preparations are completed.

All the Boats must be on the patrol, when the vessel is not in movement.

The Commanders of Vessels are required to use their utmost vigilance—nothing less will serve.

I intend to recommend to the Navy Department the assignment of a large reward as prize money to crews of boats or vessels who shall capture or beyond doubt destroy, one of these Torpedo boats.

JOHN A. DAHLGREN,
*Rear Admiral, Commanding*
*South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.*

Rear Admiral Dahlgren's response to the "torpedo" threat. From George W. Emory, ed., *Historical Monographs in the Navy Department Library: A Catalog*, Naval History Bibliographies no. 3 (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1994), p. 14.

rest of the war, Union sailors at Charleston would stand to their guns by night and sleep by day. These countermeasures prevented further successful torpedo boats attacks but ceded control of the inner harbor at night to the Rebels, enabling them to strengthen their fortifications and underwater defenses.[54]

Dahlgren believed that the loss of the *Housatonic* would force Union authorities finally to take underwater warfare seriously. "Torpedoes have been laughed at," he wrote in his diary, "but this disaster ends that."[55] Dahlgren told

Welles that torpedoes constituted "the most formidable of the difficulties in the way to Charleston."[56] The Secretary, however, proved reluctant to fund counter-torpedo research. As a result, Union naval commanders developed their own ad hoc countermeasures.[57]

Dahlgren devoted substantial effort to the problem. To gather intelligence on the enemy's underwater defenses he used both active and passive measures, sending vessels to reconnoiter the harbor, interrogating deserters, and examining obstructions washed away by heavy weather. He learned that the enemy's underwater defenses included various kinds of mines, nets, rafts, wooden booms, and even railroad iron. The mines could be detonated electrically from shore or by contact with ships, and they ranged in size from metal cylinders filled with about forty pounds of gunpowder to steam boilers filled with from one to two thousand pounds of powder. To counter these defenses Dahlgren entertained various proposals from private inventors for mine and obstruction-clearing contraptions, but apparently none of them worked out. He also devised tactics involving formations of boats and tugs equipped with grapnels and other equipment to clear paths through the obstructions. On one such mission, the monitor *Patapsco*, sent to cover the small craft and rigged with a variation of Ericsson's torpedo rake, struck a mine and went down with sixty-two officers and men. Dahlgren was never to find an effective counter to Confederate underwater defenses.[58]

Nevertheless, he remained eager to mount an offensive. In meetings at the Navy Department in March and April 1864, however, Fox told him that an attack was now out of the question unless he was certain of success. The Assistant Secretary declared that a defeat would hurt the government, the Navy Department, and Dahlgren's reputation. In view of Farragut's impending attack on Mobile and Grant's requests for naval aid on the James River to support the Richmond campaign, Fox added, Dahlgren could not hope for early reinforcements. Furthermore, Welles no longer regarded capturing the city as essential, although it would certainly yield political dividends; strategically, blockade was sufficient. In any case, months before, by the end of 1863, the War Department had abandoned hope of capturing the city by amphibious operations.[59] Stephen B. Luce, who commanded the monitor *Nantucket* during the siege, put it this way: "The government's policy was to keep only just enough troops in and about that district to occupy the attention of the Confederate authorities and prevent them from sending the troops for the defense of Charleston, to re-enforce the army under Lee."[60]

Dahlgren decided that there was no glory in presiding over a stalemate; on 5 March and again on 14 May 1864 he asked Welles to relieve him of command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. These requests stunned the Secretary; Dahlgren had pulled a great many strings to get the post, and although

Welles had originally opposed it he was now perfectly satisfied with the job Dahlgren was doing and doubted that even Farragut could have done better. The Secretary did not permit the admiral to step down.[61]

Dahlgren endured the humdrum of blockade and the ignominy of stalemate until Thanksgiving, when he received word that Major General William T. Sherman and fifty thousand troops, who had made the famous march through Georgia, had left Atlanta and were marching on Savannah. The approaching juggernaut promised to break the impasse; Welles ordered Dahlgren to render any assistance he could.[62] Sherman made contact with the squadron on 12 December. Thereafter, while the Army invested Savannah on the land side, the Navy maintained a presence on the rivers, creeks, and sounds. Nevertheless, Confederate forces successfully evacuated the city during the night of 20–21 December, escaping across the Savannah River on a makeshift bridge.[63]

Dahlgren spent the next few weeks examining the conquered city's defenses and discussing future operations with Sherman. From Savannah the general intended to march inland through South Carolina and then North Carolina, eventually linking up with Grant's army. He did not intend to march on Charleston, for he believed that the city itself had little military value. Besides, he felt there was no need to in any case. As he put it to Luce, "You navy fellows have been hammering away at Charleston for the past three years. But just wait till I get into South Carolina; I will cut her communications and Charleston will fall into your hands like a ripe pear."[64] Sherman asked Dahlgren to make demonstrations up the Edisto and Stono rivers to pin down Charleston's defenders and divert enemy attention from his march. Dahlgren proposed a naval attack against the forts on Sullivan's Island; the general, unimpressed by the prospects of another frontal fleet assault on Charleston's defenses, persuaded Dahlgren to support instead a feint at Bull's Bay, roughly twenty-two miles up the coast. Sherman's army left Savannah on 24 January, Dahlgren's ships operating in the rivers nearby to cover it and compel the Confederates to spread out their forces.[65]

On 6 February 1865 a steamer brought an unexpected passenger to the Union forces near Charleston. It was Gillmore, who had returned to resume command of the Department of the South. When the general boarded the flagship to greet Dahlgren officially, the admiral refused to shake his hand.[66] Dahlgren decided that he could not work with a man who had "harbor[ed] scribblers to lampoon me," as he noted in his diary, "and den[ied] their assertions to my face."[67] He again asked Welles to relieve him.[68]

Nevertheless, over the next several days the Navy supported diversionary attacks against Secessionville, James Island, and Bull's Bay, a kind of joint operation Dahlgren had perfected over the previous year. In February 1864 he had supported army operations along the St. John's River near Jacksonville, Florida. In the vicinity of Charleston, he had supported attacks up the Ashepoo

and South Edisto rivers in May of that year, up the Stono in July, and the Broad River in November and December. Most of these operations followed a common pattern: the Army landed, the Confederates repulsed its attack, and the Navy covered its retreat. These defeats disgusted Dahlgren, but his naval gunfire did enable the troops to make clean getaways. The Bull's Bay operation agreed to with Sherman broke the mold, however; the landing force drove the Confederates from their positions and pushed inland. Meanwhile, vessels of the Blockading Squadron covered Sherman's army at various river and stream crossings.[69]

On 13 February 1865, Dahlgren received a communication from Sherman: rain had so muddied the roads that the general thought he might have to turn toward Charleston after all. Dahlgren immediately withdrew his latest request to be relieved of command; the prospect of finally taking the cradle of the rebellion outweighed the indignity of working with Gillmore. "Now I must . . . fight it out with the Rebs. [*sic*] in front and Gillmore in the rear," he noted in his diary.[70] In the end, Sherman marched inland, bypassing Charleston as he had originally planned.

The Confederate high command believed that losing Charleston's garrison would be worse than losing the city itself. Accordingly, rebel forces abandoned the city on the night of 17–18 February. As the last Confederate pickets left the city on the morning of the 18th, the magazine at Battery Bee on Sullivan's Island exploded with a deafening roar. Dahlgren's ironclads gingerly approached the entrance of the harbor. The monitor *Canonicus* steamed opposite Fort Moultrie and fired two rounds into it; there was no reply. The *Canonicus*'s crew had fired the last shots of the 587-day siege of Charleston. A detachment from the 21st U.S. Colored Infantry regiment raised the Union flag over Fort Sumter.[71] Later that day, Dahlgren wrote to his sister:

> The game is played out—The leaders may struggle on so long as there are fools to follow, but their last die is cast and the end is on them—
>
> It would have been a great satisfaction to me to have entered this harbor amid the smoke of battle—but this was not to be and I must ever bear the disappointment as I can—[72]

Why did the Union fail to capture Charleston by storm?

Conceptualization and coordination of operational plans are perfectly appropriate activities for the national leadership, exercised in those days (for lack of other mechanisms) by the cabinet. Secretary Welles and Assistant Secretary Fox's objective for the siege—the fall of the symbolic cradle of the rebellion—cannot be faulted at the strategic level. Victory would have provided a tremendous boost to Northern morale and the political fortunes of the Lincoln administration, whenever it might have occurred; it also would have deprived

the Confederacy of a valuable port and dealt the Rebel cause a stunning psychological blow.

At the operational level, however, the failure of Welles and Fox to understand technology—both Union and Confederate—doomed from the start their concept of a strictly naval assault. The *Monitor-Virginia* duel placed in their minds an alluring vision of invulnerable monitors steaming imperiously past Confederate fortifications and over underwater defenses right up to Charleston's wharves to demand its surrender. In the earliest stages, Ericsson (the ships' designer), Dahlgren (the designer of their guns), and Du Pont (the operational commander) all told them that they were wrong, but Welles and Fox were blinded by glory and by rivalry with the Army. Furthermore, they never mustered sufficient forces for an attack, and they never considered the potential of Confederate underwater warfare to hinder offensive operations. After the war, Admiral David D. Porter observed that "naval success in an attack on Charleston was out of the question. The force supplied the naval commanders-in-chief was so small, and the obstructions, torpedoes and forts so numerous, that it would have been little less than a miracle for a hostile fleet to reach the city."[73] The result was Du Pont's failure and political repercussions probably worse than those that may have arisen had the Union navy never attacked.

Given a decision to launch a joint campaign, the principal reason for the Union's failure to capture Charleston was lack of coordination within the high command. The absence of a unified command structure meant that coordination of planning for so large a campaign was a matter for the Navy and War departments jointly, but Welles and Fox never met with their counterparts to do the necessary work. Again, Fox's rivalry with the Army hindered interservice cooperation, as did Halleck's dislike of the very idea of joint operations. In sum, the Union's national leaders failed to reconcile political ends and military means with respect to Charleston.

Farther down the chain of command, success in joint operations often hinges on the ability of the commanders on the scene to cooperate with one another. Admiral Dahlgren proved an excellent team player. It is true that his unwillingness to share with the Army the glory of capturing Fort Sumter helped to botch the September 1863 boat attack; but he answered General Gillmore's every call for naval gunfire during the Morris Island operation, and he provided solid support to General Sherman's forces during their march into South Carolina. One Union officer, Brigadier General Alexander Schimmelfennig, captured the general tone of Army-Navy relations at Charleston in a letter to Dahlgren after the city fell. He expressed high esteem for Dahlgren, thanked him for "the uniform courtesy and invaluable cooperation" the admiral had shown him, and stated that "good feeling and true comradeship" had existed between army and naval officers throughout the campaign.[74]

On the other hand, it is hard to imagine how Quincy Gillmore's behavior could have been worse. His failure during the summer of 1863 to explain his grand four-phase plan to Dahlgren was bad enough. Worse, with regard to the newspaper attacks on the Navy, he lied to his comrade's face while stabbing him in the back. In an era and profession in which honor meant everything, this act could have ruined any subsequent chance for cooperation during the campaign. Fortunately, Dahlgren faulted only Gillmore personally, not the Army as a whole.

Both commanders deserve criticism on other accounts. Dahlgren thrice tried to resign simply because the situation frustrated him. Despite the importance of the government's purpose of pinning Confederate forces on the Carolina coast to keep them from Lee, the glory-hungry admiral did not wish to preside over a stalemate. His frustration at never being in a position to lead a glorious naval charge may have prevented him from devising operations more in line with his superiors' strategy. Dahlgren's principal shortcoming, however—though it may have been a shortcoming of the state of military technology, inasmuch as he did try—was his inability to develop a counter to the enemy's underwater defenses. For his part, Gillmore had a lengthy catalog of errors to answer for. Most prominently, besides his character defects, not only did Gillmore fail to concentrate his forces for the first two assaults on Fort Wagner but he never came to understand the limitations of the monitors, nor did he grasp the necessity of countering the Confederates' underwater defenses. In sum, Gillmore showed little understanding of joint operations.

There was no serious threat to the lines of communication outside Charleston Harbor, and the Union navy maintained sea control throughout the campaign. The few Confederate ironclads and torpedo boats could not prevent Union naval commanders from landing ground troops wherever they wanted. Until Sherman arrived, however, the Rebels managed to counter this advantage with a unified command, interior lines of communication, and an integrated defensive system. For the Union navy, problems arising from inattention to joint and littoral operations—misunderstandings about weapon technology, the absence of high-level coordination, inadequate planning within the theater, personality clashes, mistakes by senior commanders, and a failure to find effective countermeasures to underwater defenses—resulted in its most frustrating campaign of the war.

## Notes

1. Quoted in A. James Merrill, "Strategy Makers in the Union Navy Department, 1861–1865," *Mid America*, January 1962, p. 28.

2. Fox to Du Pont, 3 June 1862, *Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy*, ed. Robert M. Thompson and Richard Wainwright (New York: Naval History Society, 1920), vol. 1, pp. 126–8.

3. Quoted in E. Milby Burton, *The Siege of Charleston, 1861–1865* (Columbia, S.C.: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1970), p. 99; and in Rowena Reed, *Combined Operations in the Civil War* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978), p. 268.

4. Quoted in Stephen B. Luce, "Naval Administration, III," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* [hereafter *Proceedings*], December 1903, p. 817.

5. Fox to Du Pont, 3 June 1862.

6. Other sources for Charleston, Fox, Welles, and monitors are: K. Jack Bauer, "Samuel Francis DuPont: Aristocratic Professional," *Captains of the Old Steam Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition*, ed. James C. Bradford (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 153–4; Burton, p. 135; Eugene B. Canfield, *Civil War Naval Ordnance* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969), pp. 8–10; John D. Hayes, "Captain Fox—*He* Is the Navy Department," *Proceedings*, September 1965, pp. 67–8; Gerald Henig, "Admiral Samuel F. Du Pont, the Navy Department, and the Attack on Charleston, April 1863," *Naval War College Review*, February 1979, p. 69; Reed, pp. 263–9, 280–93; and Richard S. West, Jr., *Gideon Welles, Lincoln's Navy Department* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943), pp. 218–20.

7. E.B. Potter and C.W. Nimitz, eds., *Sea Power: A Naval History* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 313.

8. Bauer, p. 154; Burton, pp. 132–6, 268–75; Samuel Jones, *The Siege of Charleston and the Operations on the South Atlantic Coast in the War among the States* (New York: Neale Publishing Co., 1911), pp. 198–9; Tamara Moser Melia, *"Damn the Torpedoes": A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777–1991* (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1991), pp. 9–10; Milton F. Perry, *Infernal Machines: The Story of Confederate Submarine and Mine Warfare* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 49–62; Reed, pp. 289–91, 319; and William N. Still, Jr., *Iron Afloat: The Story of the Confederate Armorclads* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 112–27, 219, 228.

9. Ericsson to Fox, 10 April 1863, box 6, Ericsson Papers, American Swedish Historical Museum; Robert B. Ely, "This Filthy Ironpot: Ironclads in the Battle of Mobile Bay," *American Heritage*, February 1968, pp. 46–7; and William N. Still, Jr., "The Common Sailor, Part I: Yankee Blue Jackets," *Civil War Times Illustrated*, February 1985, p. 39.

10. Du Pont to Sophie Du Pont, 11 February 1863, *Samuel Francis DuPont: A Selection from his Civil War Letters* [hereafter *DuPont*], ed. John D. Hayes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1969), vol. 2, p. 430.

11. The *Patapsco*, the exception, carried one fifteen-inch Dahlgren smoothbore and one 150-pounder Parrott rifle.

12. For more on this point, see Robert J. Schneller, Jr., *A Quest for Glory: A Biography of Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995).

13. Bauer, pp. 155–6; Shelby Foote, "DuPont Storms Charleston," *American Heritage*, June 1963, p. 34; Henig, p. 71; Du Pont to Fox, 7 March 1863, *Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox*, vol. 1, pp. 190–1; and Reed, p. 267.

14. Reed, pp. 267–93.

15. Alvah Folsom Hunter, *A Year on a Monitor and the Destruction of Fort Sumter*, ed. with an introduction by Craig L. Symonds (Columbia, S.C.: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1987), pp. 49–59; and Reed, p. 292.

16. Reed, pp. 293–4; and Richard S. West, Jr., *Mr. Lincoln's Navy* (New York: Longman's Green, 1957), pp. 233–7.

17. Du Pont to Sophie Du Pont, 8 April 1863, *DuPont*, ed. Hayes, vol. 3, pp. 3–4; Ammen to Du Pont, 14 April 1863; *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy 1863*, pp. 208–9; and DuPont to McKean, c. 29 April 1863, *Du Pont*, vol. 3, p. 66.

18. Reed, pp. 295–8.

19. Bauer, pp. 156–7; Burton, pp. 142–3; Robert MacBride, *Civil War Ironclads: The Dawn of Naval Armor* (Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1962), pp. 31–2; West, *Gideon Welles*, pp. 233–7; West, *Mr. Lincoln's Navy*, pp. 237–9; Howard K. Beale, ed., *The Diary of Gideon Welles* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1960), vol. 1, pp. 273–7; and U.S. Navy Department, *Report of the Secretary of the Navy in Relation to Armored Vessels* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1864), pp. 80–1, 83–5.

20. *Diary of Gideon Welles*, vol. 1, pp. 311–2; and *Armored Vessels*, p. 112.

21. For more on this point, see Schneller, *A Quest for Glory*.

22. John A. Dahlgren, "Trial of Boat Howitzer Carriage (No. 2)," 4 December 1848, box 1, John A. Dahlgren Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereafter DLC]; Dahlgren, miscellaneous notes on boat guns, 1849 folder, box 21, DLC; and John A. Dahlgren, *Shells and Shell Guns* (Philadelphia: King and Baird, 1856).

23. Allen Johnson, Allen and Dumas Malone, eds., *Dictionary of American Biography* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928–1937) [hereafter DAB], s.v. "Gillmore, Quincy Adams"; John A. Dahlgren Diaries, John A. Dahlgren Papers (New York: Syracuse Univ. Library) [hereafter Dahlgren Diary], 8 October 1863 entry.

Gillmore, at this point a brigadier general of volunteers, was at the same time a brevet (i.e., temporary) colonel in the regular Army—a situation typical of many who had held prewar commissions.

24. Reed, p. xix; Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Being for the Most Part Contributions by Union and Confederate Officers* (Secaucus, N.J.: Castle Books,

1984 [1887]), vol. 4, pp. 54–5; Quincy Adams Gillmore, *Engineer and Artillery Operations against the Defences of Charleston Harbor in 1863; Comprising the Descent upon Morris Island, the Demolition of Fort Sumter, the Reduction of Forts Wagner and Gregg. With Observations on Heavy Ordnance, Fortifications, Etc.* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1865), pp. 12–8; and Gillmore to Cullum, 28 February 1864, *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1880–1901) [hereafter ORA, and cited as follows: series, volume, part, and page], I: 28: 1: 5.

25. Welles to Du Pont, 6 June 1863, Richard Rush et al., eds., *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion*, 31 vols. and index (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1894–1922) [hereafter ORN, and cited as follows: series, volume, and page], I: 14, 241; Du Pont to Welles, 11 April 1864, ORN I: 14, 242; Welles to Dahlgren, 15 July 1863, ORN, I: 14, 343; and Dahlgren to Welles, 16 October 1865, ORN, I: 16, 443.

26. *Diary of Gideon Welles*, vol. 1, p. 338.

27. Dahlgren Diary, 4 and 5 July 1863 entries; Dahlgren to Welles, 6 July 1863, ORN, I: 14, 311; and Dahlgren to Welles, 16 October 1865, ORN, I: 16, 442–3.

28. Reed, p. 89; Dahlgren to Welles, 16 October 1865, ORN, I: 16, 442–4; *Diary of Gideon Welles*, vol. I, pp. 309, 313–4, 324, 330–1; and Gillmore to Cullum, 28 February 1864, ORA, I: 28: 1: 7.

29. U.S. Navy Department, Naval History Division, *Civil War Naval Chronology, 1861–1865* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1971), pp. III-112, III-113; Dahlgren, diary extract, 10 July 1863, ORN, I: 14, 325–6; and Gillmore, pp. 26–31.

30. Burton, p. 158; Jones, p. 220; Dahlgren Diary, 11 July 1863 entry; Gillmore, p. 32; Dahlgren to Gillmore, 11 July 1863, ORN, I: 14, 319; Dahlgren to Welles, 12 July 1863, ORN, I: 14, 319–21; and *Diary of Gideon Welles*, vol. 1, pp. 380–1.

31. Burton, pp. 161–71; Gillmore, pp. 34–42; Reed, 307; Dahlgren Diary, 18 July 1863 entry; and Dahlgren to Welles, 19 July 1863, ORN, I: 14, 359–60. It was this attack that was reenacted in the well known motion picture *Glory* (Tri-Star, December 1989).

32. Burton, pp. 171–8.

33. Reed, p. 308; and Jones, p. 264.

34. For Army-Navy cooperation, see Dahlgren Diary extracts, log extracts, and reports, 17–23 August 1863, ORN, I: 14, 472–509, and correspondence between Dahlgren and Gillmore, 19–22 August 1863, ORA, I: 28: 2: 48–56; Dahlgren to Gillmore, 22 August 1863, ORA, I: 28: 2: 54–5; and Gillmore to Dahlgren, 23 August 1863, ORA, I: 28: 2: 56.

35. Gillmore to Dahlgren, 23 August 1863, ORA, I: 28: 2: 56.

36. Gillmore, pp. 63–7, 324–5.

37. Perry, pp. 61–2; Reed, pp. 310–2; Dahlgren to Welles, 28 January 1864, ORN, I: 14, 590–601; and Dahlgren to Welles, 16 October 1865, ORN, I: 16, 430–4.

38. Dahlgren, "Order No. 34," 26 August 1863, Orders to South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Penna.; Dahlgren Diary, 26 August 1863 entry; and Dahlgren to Gillmore, 27 August 1863, ORN, I: 14, 520.

39. Dahlgren to Gillmore, 29 August 1863, ORN I: 14, 524–5; and Dahlgren to Gillmore, 29 September 1863 ORN, I: 14, 682–3.

40. Burton, pp. 178–80; Jones, pp. 268–73; and *Battles and Leaders* vol. 4, pp. 63–4.

41. Gillmore to Dahlgren, 7 September 1863, 5:10 A.M., ORA, I: 28: 2: 86.

42. Dahlgren Diary, 7 September 1863 entry.

43. Burton, pp. 194–8; Reed, pp. 312–4; communications between Dahlgren and Gillmore, 8 September 1863, ORN, I: 14, 608–10; and Dahlgren Diary, 8 September 1863 entry.

44. Reed, pp. 312–3.

45. Burton, pp. 195–7; Dahlgren to Welles, 11 September 1863, ORN, I: 14, 610–1; and Gillmore to Cullum, 28 February 1864, ORN, I: 14, 636.

46. Dahlgren to Welles, 29 September 1863, ORN, I: 14, 680–1; and Dahlgren to Welles, 18 October 1863, ORN, I: 15, 52–3.

47. Welles to Dahlgren, 2 November 1863, ORN, I: 15, 96–7; Dahlgren Diary, 8 November 1863 and 22 October 1863 entries; unsigned document, 22 October 1863, box 6, DLC; and Dahlgren to Welles, 18 February 1864, box 6, DLC.

48. *Battles and Leaders*, vol. 4, pp. 62–8; Gillmore to Dahlgren, 27 September 1863, ORN, I: 14, 674–6.

49. Du Pont to [Senator James W.] Grimes [R., Iowa, chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, 1865–1869], 11 September 1863, *DuPont*, vol. 3, pp. 235–6; Dahlgren to Wise, 18 October 1863, Henry A. Wise Papers, New-York Historical Society; Dahlgren Diary, 11, 19 October 1863 entries; Dahlgren to Ulric Dahlgren, 19 October 1863, box 19, DLC; and Dahlgren to Welles, 20 October 1863, ORN, I: 15, 63.

50. *Diary of Gideon Welles*, vol. 1, pp. 474–5.

51. George E. Belknap, "Reminiscent of the Siege of Charleston," *Naval Actions and History, 1798–1898*, vol. 12 of the *Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts* (Boston: Griffith-Stillings Press, 1902).

52. Lincoln to Stanton, 21 December 1863, *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953), vol. 7, p. 84; and Wise to Dahlgren, 23 December 1863, John A. Dahlgren Papers, Syracuse Univ. Library, Syracuse, N.Y.

53. Dahlgren Diary, 14 and 18 January 1864 entries; *Diary of Gideon Welles*, vol. 1, p. 547; and Dahlgren Diary, 3–4 May 1864 entries.

Gillmore had been transferred at his own request because he did not think that Dahlgren intended to attack. Major General John G. Foster, who succeeded Gillmore, did worse; hence Gillmore's return.

54. Perry, p. 86; David P. Werlich, *Admiral of the Amazon: John Randolph Tucker, His Confederate Colleagues, and Peru* (Charlottesville, Va.: Univ. of Virginia Press, 1990), p. 57.

55. Dahlgren Diary, 20 February 1864 entry.

56. Dahlgren to Welles, 19 February 1864, ORN, I: 15, 329–30.

57. Melia, p. 9.

58. Perry, p. 168; Dahlgren, "Order No. 45," 7 September 1863, Orders to SAB5 [South Atlantic Blockading Squadron], Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Penna.; Dahlgren to Fox, 24 Seprember 1863, ORN, I: 14, 671–2; Dahlgren to Welles, 21 December 1863, ORN, I: 15, 185; Johnson to Dahlgren, 1 February 1864, box 6, DLC; Dahlgren to Welles, 18 February 1864, box 6, DLC; Dahlgren to Dichman, 21 May 1864, ORN, I: 15, 437; Dahlgren to Welles, 19 October 1864, ORN, I: 16, 19–25; Dahlgren Diary, 15 December 1864 entry; Dahlgren to Welles, 16 January 1865, ORN, I: 16, 171–5; and Dahlgren to Welles, 1 June 1865, ORN, I: 16, 380–9. The *Patapsco* incident occurred on 15 January 1865.

59. Reed, pp. 314–6; Dahlgren, journal note, 16 January 1864, box 27, DLC; Dahlgren Diary, 4 and 29 March and 18–24 April 1864 entries.

60. Luce, p. 816.

61. Dahlgren Diary, 5 March 1864 entry; Dahlgren, "Memorandum," [?] March 1864, box 27, DLC; Dahlgren to Welles, 14 May 1864, ORN, I: 15, 430–2; and *Diary of Gideon Welles*, vol. 1, p. 520 and vol. 2, pp. 128–9, 147.

62. Welles to Dahlgren, 22 Novenber 1864, ORN, I: 16, 57.

63. Dahlgren Diary, 12–21 December 1864 entries.

64. Luce, p. 820. This remark was auspicious for the future Naval War College; see "President's Notes" (quoting Frank Uhlig, Jr.), *Naval War College Review*, Spring 1994, esp. p. 5.

65. Burton, p. 313; *Civil War Naval Chronology*, pp. V-18, V-27; Burke Davis, *Sherman's March* (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), p. 139; Dahlgren Diary, 2–24 January 1865 entries; Dahlgren to Welles, 4 January 1865, ORN I: 16, 156–8; Dahlgren, general instructions, 15 January 1865, ORN, I: 16, 169; Sherman to [Dahlgren], undated, 1865 folder, box 6, DLC; and Dahlgren to Welles, 22 January 1865, ORN, I: 16, 185.

66. Dahlgren Diary, 11 February 1865 entry.

67. Dahlgren Diary, 6 February 1865 entry.

68. Dahlgren Diary, 7 February 1865 entry; and Dahlgren to Welles, 7 February 1865, ORN, I: 16, 221.

69. Burton, pp. 314–7; *Civil War Naval Chronology*, pp. IV-14, IV-62, IV-63, IV-138, IV-142, IV-150, V-6, V-11, V-37, V-39, V-40; and Dahlgren Diary, 1–11 July 1864 entries.

70. Dahlgren Diary, 11–15 February 1865 entries; and Dahlgren to Welles, 14 February 1865, ORN, I: 16, 243–4.

71. "Monthly Record of Current Events," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, April 1865, p. 668; and Burton, pp. 317–20.

72. Dahlgren to Patty Dahlgren, 18 February 1865, John Adolphus Bernard Dahlgren Papers, Newberry Library, Chicago, Ill.

73. David D. Porter, *The Naval History of the Civil War*, reprint ed. (Secaucus, N.J.: Castle Books, 1984), p. 769.

74. Schimmelfennig to Dahlgren, 10 April 1865, Schoff Civil War Collection, Manuscripts Department, William L. Clements Library, Univ. of Michigan.

Ψ

# Doctrine for Naval Planning
## The Once and Future Thing

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Adkins, U.S. Marine Corps

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS OFFICERS do not look at planning in the same way. Marines approach it from the point of view of good, honest staff work—and as something, like any other job, that if they do well enough someone may notice and keep them in mind for some future command selection board. Naval officers see billets in which they are expected to perform planning duties as "holding patterns," places to mark time until they can go to a ship or squadron and do something worthwhile, like command it. Under no circumstances would they want to earn a reputation as a "good staff officer" or of being a "good planner." All "good" naval officers are operators. They don't often say "administrator" and would probably misspell it should they ever have occasion to write it down.

The Navy and Marine planning processes are different too. The Marine process is a sequential listing of command and staff actions required to decide on and implement a course of action to accomplish an assigned mission. When the Navy talks about the "process" of planning, it is usually referring to the decision-making process associated with selecting the course of action—that is, the *commander's* job; after the course of action has been selected, "the staffers" scurry around and iron out all the irritating little details, if they absolutely cannot avoid it. After all, they're only commanders-in-waiting, not really staff officers—certainly not planners.

Of course a large part, or at least much (*some*, anyway), of what I've just said is misconception, half-truth, and exaggeration. As with many such sweeping and

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Naval War College Review, Winter 1996, Vol. XLIX, No. 1

inflammatory statements, however, there is a little truth buried in there somewhere. It really does seem that naval officers, on the whole, take the art and science of formal planning less seriously than do their Marine counterparts.

That is not to say that the Navy cannot or does not plan well, or that it has no planning methodology—naval officers don't talk or write about it as much as they used to, up through the end of World War II, but it is there, and it is written down. On the other hand, Marine officers routinely laminate posters of the "15 Steps of the Commander's Estimate of the Situation" and plaster them on their walls, *at home.*

The Naval Warfare Publication *Naval Operational Planning*, known as NWP-11, is the sister document to the planning portion of the Marines' Fleet Marine Force Manual *Command and Staff Action*, FMFM 3-1. If anything, NWP-11 probably explains the process of arriving at the commander's decision (or course of action) better than FMFM 3-1 does. Anyone really interested in planning should read both. A *real* difference, though, between Navy and Marine Corps planning is that Marines read and use FMFM 3-1 extensively. Just finding a copy of NWP-11 may not be as easy as you might think; it is not a classified document, but it has a long history of being hidden away as if it were.

So, regardless of the differing attitudes, regardless of the similarities or differences between the two "processes," regardless of the availability of the manuals, there is *Navy* planning and there is *Marine* planning. If the two are simply put in close proximity to each other, does it automatically add up to *naval* planning? Once upon a time . . . the answer might have been yes. The Pacific campaigns of World War II proved that the Navy and Marine Corps could, in fact, plan and operate as a tremendously effective team. Formal, *naval* operational planning was a critical element of nearly every major American military success of World War II. Naval planning, however, is no longer what it used to be.

The basics are still there, but widely disparate attitudes toward formal planning in the Navy and Marine Corps make it difficult to say that naval planning is as good as it once was (and, we may hope, will be again). The newly created Naval Doctrine Command is wrestling with the formidable task of translating the broad strategic guidance contained in ". . . From the Sea" and "Forward . . . From the Sea" into working naval doctrine. The Naval Doctrine Publication *Naval Planning*, NDP-5, is the portion of that project dealing with formal operational planning in the United States naval service.

In fact this process has taken place before; NDP-5 is not "new technology." We are close to "reinventing the wheel"—if not quite. Why do we need NDP-5 today?

Formal naval operational planning originated around 1900 and evolved in both theory and practice through the end of World War II. During the Cold War era, theory and practice went their separate ways—for reasons we shall

explain—and an entire generation of naval officers grew up without the benefit of, or the perceived need for, instruction in formal operational planning. NDP-5 is needed to frame and focus a dialogue that will eventually lead us back to a comprehensive, written, and effective naval planning doctrine. Such a doctrine, however, is not the kind of thing that, because it is written down in a book, immediately becomes gospel. It did not happen that way the first time, and it won't now. Doctrine takes time; it has to evolve (again). The process might be accelerated a little by keeping it in the forefront, by discussing naval planning as if it were one of the most important things professional military people can do during war or peace—which, of course, it is.

## Once upon a Time

The history of naval operational planning is almost as rich and diverse as the history of the United States naval service itself. Firmly rooted in early nineteenth-century rationalism, naval operational planning and the military planning process as a whole have been the bases for sound military decisions and successful operations from well before World War I through post–Desert Storm crises.

Until relatively recently in the history of warfare, however, military planning was assumed to be the exclusive province of a few with special gifts of genius and charismatic leadership. Outcome in war was held to be solely dependent on brilliance in generalship, which could not be taught. In 1806, however, Prussia's defeat by France (due to the presence of Napoleon and the conspicuous absence of Prussian genius) prompted Prussia to explore the revolutionary concept that military planning—obviously associated with the mysterious art of military command—might be taught to fairly ordinary men. To this end the first war college, the Kriegsakademie, was established in Berlin in 1810, and the Prussian General Staff thereafter became the world's model of the systematic approach to planning for, and waging, war.[1] Of course, a genius, when available, was still the first choice, but a well educated senior officer corps now appeared to be the most promising alternative.

The United States Naval War College was founded in 1884 at Newport, Rhode Island, under the leadership of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce. The Civil War, less than a generation removed, was still terribly fresh in the hearts and minds of most Americans, reinforcing their belief that war was an aberration.[2] Regardless of what was going on in Europe (or perhaps because of it), Americans did not (and still do not) believe that future wars are inevitable, and they certainly did not want to waste time thinking about or planning for them. If they absolutely had to go to war, they would fight and win as they always had—with inspired amateurs led by Washington-like geniuses, who would undoubtedly appear in time of need. Luce, of course, disagreed and was eventually successful

in establishing the first American institution of higher learning dedicated to the study of war, but it was not an overwhelmingly popular project at the time.

A problem Luce had to consider almost immediately was the scarcity of literature useful for teaching professional military men about their career. The one exception was a fairly extensive body of instructional material compiled by the Kriegsakademie in the area of military planning. Collectively referred to as "the System" or "the Estimate of the Situation," it was already very popular throughout Europe. What is generically referred to today as "the military planning process," what NWP-11 and FMFM 3-1 call "the Commander's Estimate of the Situation," is directly descended from nineteenth-century Prussian military instruction.[3]

As early as 1895, the Naval War College was drafting actual war plans, utilizing an early form of the estimate process. In 1907, in conjunction with the General Board in Washington, the College faculty prepared the first series of "War Portfolios."[4] The Naval War College continued to create actual war plans for the General Board until the Chief of Naval Operations, or CNO, assumed those duties in 1915; before that time, no other agency in the Navy had appeared capable of completing this type of staff action.[5] After 1915, although no longer doing actual war planning, the College maintained exclusive control over development and articulation of naval planning methodology, a situation that survived until 1948, when Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, as its president, advocated moving that responsibility also to the office of the CNO.

The College had officially introduced the planning discipline into its curriculum in 1910, in the form of a lecture entitled "The Estimate of the Situation" given by Commander Frank Marble to twenty-six officers of the summer class. The lecture relied heavily on two pamphlets prepared at the Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The first, *Field Orders, Messages and Reports*, had been written in 1906 by Major Eben Swift, USA, and the second, *Estimating Critical Situations and Composing Orders*, by Captain Roger S. Fitch, USA, in 1909. In Newport, several officers were heavily involved in the preparation of the first "Estimate" presentation. A young Marine major, John H. Russell, worked out map exercises (to be used by students for practical-application problems) from a translation of Kriegsakademie pamphlets recently acquired by the Naval War College.[6] When the lecture was finally delivered, Commander Marble, perhaps a little blunter than Naval War College platform speakers of today, began by assuring his audience that "no amount of education and training would assure success to some, but no one can deny [that] careful and assiduous training is vastly beneficial, even to the stupid."[7]

In 1915 a pamphlet, *The Estimate of the Situation*, was written by the president of the College, Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight; it was also published as an article in the United States Naval Institute *Proceedings*. The pamphlet was routinely

revised by each succeeding president until 1926, when the estimate was combined with standard formats for written orders into one planning manual, *The Estimate of the Situation with the Order Form*. Other revisions continued to appear about every two years (the typical tour of a Naval War College president) until 1933, when a companion booklet was published, *The Study and Discussion of the Estimate of the Situation*. It prompted Rear Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, who became president in 1934, to observe that if the Estimate of the Situation pamphlet were written clearly and logically, it would not need such a supplement.

Although the effort took him two separate terms (1934–1936 and 1939–1941) as president of the Naval War College and involved three distinct published versions, Admiral Kalbfus expanded a pamphlet of about fifty pages into a 243-page book.[8] *Sound Military Decision* was intended to be an authoritative treatise on naval warfare, in the vein of Clausewitz's *On War*. While the *Estimate* pamphlets had been dedicated to simplicity, Admiral Kalbfus's version was anything but simple. It was difficult to read and comprehend, and it dedicated very few pages to the actual process of preparing a plan.[9] In fact, because of its length, ponderous style, and complexity, it became the center of a broad controversy, particularly in the Navy, but to a lesser degree in the Marine Corps as well. *Sound Military Decision* was, however, the official, definitive document on naval operational planning during World War II, and it was employed extensively.

Rear Admiral Charles J. ("Carl") Moore, who served on Kalbfus's staff at the College and later as Admiral Spruance's chief of staff in the Central Pacific Force and the Fifth Fleet, relied heavily on the book but summed it up in this way: "I believe, and I always have believed and I still believe, that the book is sound, that everything that he has said in it is correct. But to get what you want out of it is extremely difficult."[10] Admiral Spruance, who had also served under Kalbfus at Newport, had been very direct in his criticism of *Sound Military Decision* from the very beginning. In his opinion it was too long and convoluted to meet the needs of the service.

When Spruance returned as president of the College in 1946, armed with his extensive wartime planning experience and his considerable intellect, he immediately initiated the production of a "simplified and reduced" version of *The Estimate of the Situation*.[11] Insisting that the manual not be subject to the whims of Naval War College presidents, changing every two years or so, he strongly recommended that *The Estimate* be issued under the imprint of the Chief of Naval Operations.[12] Also, World War II had not only clearly demonstrated the utility of the formal naval operational planning process but had underscored the requirement that it function in the joint arena. Under Admiral Spruance's direction and supervision, his revised *Estimate of the Situation* was carefully

compared to the most recent joint documents prepared by the War Department. It was determined that the basic steps it laid down for estimating were completely compatible with joint and other service procedures.

In 1948, the Chief of Naval Operations published the first doctrinal manual on naval operational planning, basing it on an original draft submitted by Admiral Spruance. The *Naval Manual of Operational Planning, 1948*, was forty-eight pages long and, with surprisingly few substantive changes, survives today as *Naval Operational Planning*, NWP-11, and also as the planning portion of *Command and Staff Action*, FMFM 3-1. Its foreword explained:

> Following the adoption of standard planning forms for use in Joint schools and in all agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the President of the Naval War College to prepare a manual containing these standard forms and such amplifying instructions as necessary in order to adopt these forms as standard throughout the Navy.
>
> *The Naval Manual of Operational Planning* has attempted to combine, in the clearest and simplest terms, the various existing instructions in effect for planning Naval operations.[13]

This foreword, promulgated by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld (and presumably drafted, or at least approved, by Admiral Spruance), would seem to indicate that naval operational planning was not only correctly codified by this document but was also completely compatible with joint doctrine. At this point, then, the evidence suggests that the United States naval service had a working, written, comprehensive, "joint-compatible," and effective doctrine for naval operational planning.

What happened?

## The Cold War Era

Throughout the 1960s, '70s, and '80s (that is, during the Vietnam War and throughout the Cold War), naval forces, particularly ships at sea, concentrated almost entirely on two missions, self-defense and fire support. There were no high-seas fleet engagements or major amphibious assaults during these years; Leyte Gulf (1944) and Inchon (1950) had been (and have been to date) the last of their kind. "Self-defense" meant countering "the threat," mainly from the USSR, and it was focused much more on identifying enemy capabilities than on selecting and executing courses of action. Once the threat was identified, the response—the course of action—was almost automatic. Naval gunfire support and air strike missions did not often require an extensive formal planning process either. The result in general was what became known as "threat-based," as opposed to the classic "mission-based," planning. In the latter, the commander (or his planner) identifies the mission and then works backward through

intermediate or enabling objectives, addressing all the associated decisions and details, which, when correctly orchestrated and executed, produce the best chance of accomplishing the goal. By contrast, "threat-based" planning begins with these matters presumably settled but with enemy action underway to interfere with friendly operations. Much less is required of planners conceptually in reacting to threats.

In reality, for this era the differences between these two seemingly opposite "types" of planning were probably matters more of style and streamlining than of fundamentals. For what the United States Navy was doing on a day-to-day basis during this period—identifying the threat and devising standard operating procedures to counter it—was probably a perfectly acceptable way of solving the specific military problems at hand. But daily routine seemed to eclipse the larger planning picture, that of major contingencies or global war with the USSR. "Big picture" planning was done by joint staffs, and most lower-echelon naval officers never made the connection between what they were doing in "the real world" and anything joint staffs did or were supposed to do.

For their part, Marine missions did not change during this period, so neither did basic Marine planning procedures. They still have not. The operative title changed a few times, from *expeditionary* to *amphibious* back to *expeditionary*, but what Marines did before and during World War II is the same thing they did during the Cold War (and is the same thing they do today). Planning was then, just as it is today, the key to success—formal, detailed, exhaustive, step-by-step planning, as time permitted. (This does not mean, as we shall see, that Marines too do not now have some adjusting to do.)

If the Navy made a mistake during this period, it was one of omission. Everything learned through 1945 about planning processes, procedures, and methodology seemed to have been discarded, because it did not offer the easiest and quickest way to solve the current, lowest-level, tactical problems. A large part of the service seemed willing to ignore altogether the requirement for formal planning—and for formal planning education.

At the Naval War College, the *Estimate of the Situation* and the military planning process maintained an honored spot in the curriculum during the Cold War era, although certainly not as the same "hot topics" they had been between the two world wars. In point of fact, however, many "front running" naval officers did not attend the Naval War College and were less likely than those who had gone to Newport to be exposed to formal planning instruction. It could be argued that during the middle and later Cold War years, specifically during the Reagan-era buildup toward the six-hundred-ship fleet, *most* of the Navy's "best and brightest" did not attend the College, certainly not until after their first command tour. Even then it was not considered a particularly career-enhancing assignment.[14]

By itself, however, this propensity of the Navy's senior leadership to bypass formal planning education at Newport might have had much less overall impact on contemporary attitudes had naval officers been routinely exposed to NWP-11. They were not, and still are not. While, as noted above, FMFM 3-1 is known and used extensively throughout the Marine Corps, NWP-11 has never been widely read in the Navy, and the main reason is that it is poorly distributed. Here too, traditional Navy attitudes played a big part. Since 1748, when Frederick the Great wrote his version of *The Principles of War* and held each of the fifty copies strictly accountable, it has been generally accepted that letting the enemy know how you "think about war" is not a good idea. (Predictably, one of Frederick's officers was eventually unlucky enough to be captured with the book, which was soon copied, translated, and distributed throughout Europe.) In 1936, Admiral William H. Standley, as CNO, decided that Admiral Kalbfus's *Sound Military Decision* should be classified, because, in Rear Admiral William S. Pye's words, "to deny that such a guide to naval thought would be a distinct asset to a foreign nation is to deny the usefulness of the publication itself."[15] Admiral Spruance's 1948 manual was also classified, as "Restricted." NWP-11 today is unclassified, but old habits die hard, and the Navy still holds many such publications close to the vest. Considering also that the Naval War College has always retained administrative control of, and reviewing authority over, NWP-11, one can understand why few naval officers became familiar with the book.

Instead, the formal planning process became linked to the academic world of the College—while the top-notch officers were getting on-the-job planning experience out in the fleet, where the Soviet threat was much more than an interesting classroom topic. As a result, the formal naval operational planning process, however well tried, proven, and established, was sidetracked for several decades after World War II, away from the "real" operational world of ships at sea.

Today, the Soviet threat has dissipated, and the U.S. naval service has officially changed course from the high seas to the littorals; but while the Marines still look upon planning as a generally worthwhile endeavor, the Navy remains skeptical. In this field, Marines have a book, they read it, and they generally consider themselves "above" any "upstart" naval doctrine on planning. Sailors have a good enough book; but they do not read it, and they are not at all sure they want to "sign on" to any doctrine whatsoever. It was to counter this conundrum that the Naval Doctrine Command has published *Naval Planning*, NDP-5. The real solution to the problem, however, is not publication of NDP-5; that is just the first step.

## Attitude Adjustment

Planning is an essential and inherent function of command. As a discussion item, that assertion generates little debate; the disagreement comes when the conversation turns to the who, when, and how. For many naval officers, the phrase "formal planning process" carries unpleasant connotations of anonymous, unaccountable, non-tactical, and self-important staff officers "crunching numbers," preempting decisions, setting in motion giant cogs, and thereby severely restricting the sound judgment, common sense, and freedom of action of the people who should be in charge, the commanders. Lower-echelon tactical commanders (and their staff officers) harbor a certain skepticism about the abilities, professionalism, and motivations of higher echelons. This wariness increases exponentially the farther away the senior staff is from the "pointy end of the spear." This is particularly true when one crosses the service boundary into the "joint" arena, where such process "nightmares" as the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) enter the picture.[16] At the tactical level, particularly in the Navy (but also, to a lesser extent, in the Marine Corps), skepticism about motivations and people at higher echelons has somehow been translated into distrust of the processes they use, which in turn has generated a degree of doubt as to the need for formal planning in general. Such understandable (even if generally unfounded) reservations have soured the attitude of two entire generations of naval officers toward the art and science of formal planning.

At the same time the Navy was loosening its ties to formal planning, Marines were going the other direction. At some point Marines had taken the "planning" ball and started running with it by themselves; somewhere along the line, they had stopped considering themselves as under the purview of "naval" planning. In Quantico, Virginia, at the Marine Corps Development and Education Command, the logic of the formal planning process was being institutionalized through education.[17] During his or her career, nearly every Marine was (and still is) exposed to planning education, beginning at the non-commissioned officer level. Perhaps more importantly, this approach has fostered an attitude throughout the Marine Corps that planning, at all levels, is serious business.

In recent years, few Marines believed that NWP-11, *Naval Operational Planning*, had anything to do with them. Unfortunately, they were right; it did not. But now the *Naval* Doctrine Command is in business, and if its product, NDP-5, *Naval Planning*, is to be effective, it must apply to both Marines and sailors. Because Marines consider their own planning process to be graven in stone, this fact may cause more than a little consternation.

So here we are, back to the original dilemma. The Navy does not trust or believe in—much less admire—formal planning, planners, JOPES, joint staffs, or

anything remotely connected with staff work. The Marine Corps does not feel that the latest discussion concerns it—Marines already know how to plan. Thus, Navy planning and Marine Corps planning do not currently add up to effective *naval* planning, and NDP-5 will do little to remedy the situation unless all approach it with a different attitude than they have had toward formal naval operational planning for the last few decades.

## NDP-5 and the Future

The Naval War College has long been, as noted, the reviewing authority for NWP-11. When the Naval Doctrine Command sought assistance in drafting a new document on the subject, the College was the natural choice. The initial draft of NDP-5 was completed there and was sent to the Doctrine Command for review, editing, more review, and publishing. The finished book took more than two years to produce, and its success or failure will be to a large extent determined by how widely it is read and discussed outside the Naval War College and Doctrine Command.

The Navy and Marine Corps both need NDP-5 to succeed. Like it or not, accept it or not, believe it or not, the United States naval service is embarked on a new course. Whether that course has been adequately or conclusively articulated in ". . . From the Sea" or "Forward . . . From the Sea" is yet to be determined; but it is a new course. For the foreseeable future, there will be no major, high-seas, fleet engagements. Such traditional missions as the defense of sea lanes remain, but shallow-water mine countermeasures receive much more attention today than does the open-ocean defense of aircraft carriers. Words and phrases like "littoral," "adaptive force packaging," and "naval expeditionary forces" have become prevalent. What it all really means is that the Navy and Marine Corps are going to be working even more closely together in the future than they have in the past. It also means they need to plan more closely together than they have in the last few decades, and for that they need a truly *naval* planning doctrine.

NDP-5 could be a good start. To be successful, however, it must be read, argued over, used, and improved out in "the real world." It has the potential to prompt a great deal of good discussion. Where does naval operational planning fit within the larger arena of national security and joint operational planning? How is formal tactical planning to be conducted? How are Navy and Marine Corps planning to become *naval* planning? What is the difference between planning itself (processes, procedures, steps, and phases) and its products (plans, directives, orders, etc.)? *Naval Planning* is a "round in the air," and probably a good one, but all it can be is a "marking" round—something to adjust *from*.

NDP-5 is not perfect. It will not satisfy everyone, and it is bound to have anomalies. In the draft review process there were, inevitably, compromises along the way, and the solutions to some issues were, at best, just adequate. Problems arose from trying to conform to the "parent" (next-higher echelon) document, *Joint Planning*, Joint Publication 5.0. Even proper English took a back seat to standardization. For instance, the adjective "operational" does not appear in NDP-5; the reader will see "naval *operation* planning." That is how Joint Pub 5.0 gives the term, which is not to be confused with the "operational" level of war (or planning at that level).

Also, NDP-5 spends little time either defending or criticizing JOPES. That system has evolved, and it will probably evolve into something else, but it is in place now, and the basics need to be understood—which is not really very difficult. JOPES is employed at the "operational" level and above, addresses somewhat different details than do the Navy or Marine Corps tactical planning processes, and connects with them at various points. The most obvious interface is the mission: commanders and their planners need one to start "mission-based" planning, and JOPES essentially translates political guidance into that mission. Thereafter missions are passed to successive subordinates until the lowest-level tactical commanders know what their units have to do and can start their own planning processes. Not, of course, that the matter is quite that simple and clear-cut: all sorts of adjectives are set in front of "planning" ("adaptive," "concurrent," "sequential," "preliminary") as if to confuse things. Even so, JOPES is not beyond understanding; the hardest part is changing attitudes. Contrary to popular belief, JOPES is not a monster out of its cage, devouring all common sense, judgment, and freedom of action of on-scene commanders. JOPES and its successors will pose no insuperable obstacles to well developed naval planning.

Lastly, NDP-5 is not a "how to " manual on planning. For that, NWP-11 and FMFM 3-1 are perfectly good. They may now need some refining, updating, and integrating, but all the information is there. They share the same remarkable bloodlines. They just need to be used, and together. NDP-5 works one level above them. Its real purpose is to set forth doctrine, not procedures: it talks about planning, not *how* to plan. Those who helped write it hope that it will assist Marines and sailors understand their jobs better and see where they fit into national security. It will help "real world" naval officers, in particular, tie together their plan of the day, their stacks of messages, the Cable News Network, and the national security strategy. Navy ships and Marine units do not just randomly wander the globe. If one looks hard enough, every movement, deployment, training evolution, or visit can be traced back, through a joint operations plan or order, to a national security issue. What can be more important in peacetime than thoroughly understanding how to plan for future missions?

NDP-5, *Naval Planning*, represents a great deal of work on the part of many people, but however good it may be, if it does not (at least eventually) generate enough interest to change current attitudes toward formal planning, it will have failed. If, as Navy and Marine officers, we do not respond to this challenge, then we are not the professionals our predecessors were.

The history of formal naval operational planning is long and colorful, and its evolution culminated, once, in a process more than capable of handling the formidable challenges of World War II. Some of the most impressive military operations the world has ever seen were conducted on the basis of it. Navy planning and Marine planning were one, single thing, *naval* planning, and it was well codified. During the Cold War era, the Navy turned to "threat-based" planning aimed essentially at countering the tactical problems presented by the monolithic Soviet threat. Naval planning was no longer what it used to be, so the Marines went ahead on their own.

The Navy and Marine Corps must get naval planning back. Naval forces are embarked on a new course, and the two need to work and plan together as closely as they once did. This essentially amounts to changing attitudes toward formal planning; NDP-5 should be a step in that direction.

*Naval operational planning*—something the Navy and Marine Corps once did very well and must do well again.

## Notes

1. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, eds., *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History*, 4th ed. (New York: HarperCollins 1993), p. 811.

2. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 46, 55.

3. Charles W. Cullen (Lt. Cdr., USN), "From the *Kriegsacademie* [*sic*] to the Naval War College: The Military Planning Process," *Naval War College Review*, January 1970, pp. 6–18, esp. p. 9.

4. The General Board of the Navy was created in 1900. Similar to a general staff of senior naval officers, the Board provided the Secretary of the Navy professional advice on naval operations, policy, war plans, naval bases, building programs, ship characteristics, personnel legislation, etc. *Encyclopedia of the American Military*, John E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz, eds. (New York: Scribner, 1994), vol. I, p. 253.

5. Cullen, p. 13.

6. General John H. Russell served as Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1934 to 1936.

7. Cullen, p. 14.

8. John B. Hattendorf, *Sailors and Scholars* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1984), p. 328.

9. Kalbfus dedicated only eight pages to the actual writing of an operational plan or order. Depending on which side of the controversy one was on, the rest of the book was an intellectual or pseudo-intellectual discussion of naval problem solving and decision making. See Thomas B. Buell (Cdr., USN), "Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus and the Naval Planner's 'Holy Scripture': *Sound Military Decision*," *Naval War College Review*, May-June 1973, p. 38.

10. Oral History of C.J. Moore (Rear Admiral, USN, Ret.), Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., pp. 594–5.

11. Buell, pp. 38–9.

12. Frank M. Snyder, introduction to *Sound Military Decision* (1942 edition), reprinted in Classics of Sea Power (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992), p. xxiv.

13. One of the original copies of *Naval Manual of Operational Planning, 1948* is today in the Naval War College Library.

14. There were 173 regular line admirals on active duty at that time. Of those officers, according to the Dean of Students office of the Naval War College, thirty-three attended either the on-campus junior or senior course. That equates to less than two of ten Navy flag officers (19 percent) having attended either the College of Naval Warfare or the College of Naval Command and Staff. For Marines the percentage is about double, at twenty-seven of sixty-nine (39 percent). See U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1994 ("Naval Review" issue), p. 177.

15. Rear Admiral William S. Pye worked for Admiral Standley at the time. It was he who actually informed Admiral Kalbfus of the decision to classify the manual, in his 1 December 1936 letter. Letter, Rear Admiral William S. Pye, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, to Rear Admiral Kalbfus, 1 December 1936, NWC Archives, RG 2.

16. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national and theater-level commanders and their staffs. JOPES includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. It is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations.

17. The organization is now known as the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).

Ψ

# Myths and Misconceptions about the United Nations

Captain John N. Petrie, U.S. Navy

IN THE U.S. NAVY, INSPECTIONS MEASURE READINESS and performance against standard criteria. These evolutions identify problems for correction and provide an opportunity for improvement. They can offer both assessment and prediction, but only when the inspectors understand the criteria and how they influence performance. Analogously, any evaluation of the United Nations, if it is to achieve comparable results, should proceed from a similar foundation—a shared understanding of standard criteria. Let us consider, then, how these familiar practices may be applied to an assessment of the United Nations.

The increasingly prominent role of the UN in American security policy since Desert Storm has not been accompanied by a better understanding of the organization's utility. Myths and misconceptions persist about the organization and its relationship to its members. Left unaddressed, these misapprehensions will prevent full appreciation of what the UN can do. Conversely, criticism of the United Nations—even when richly deserved—will not contribute to correcting problems that reduce or even destroy the organization's effectiveness in matters of international security, unless these issues are clarified and addressed. What must be kept in mind?

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The opinions expressed are those of the author alone and do not reflect the position of the National War College, the National Defense University, the United States Navy, or the Department of Defense.

Quite simply, the UN exists to *enhance international security*. Its Charter is the source of its authority in meeting this responsibility; the Charter is oriented wholly to maintaining or restoring international security or to removing the root causes of instability. Few would argue that success has been the norm, the routine, in UN operations—failures are easy to identify. But, as with an inspector, we need to look beyond the simple fact and ask: Why is the UN not successful more often? What exactly is taking place?

Although the UN has not had an impressive record lately, the myths and misconceptions that pervade current discussions are contributing unfairly to the worsening of its reputation. Are assessments based upon valid measures of effectiveness? Can an organization succeed when evaluated against unreasonable expectations? Can corrections be designed if the problems themselves are misunderstood? Can the depth of specific failures be fathomed when their origins are not recognized? Indeed, are the real problems even being identified?

What, then, are the myths and misconceptions about the United Nations? Can they be encapsulated in a number of statements that are widely accepted as true—including by many military officers—but that can be shown to be false?

***Myth**: The UN was founded upon excessive confidence in idealism.* The "Joint Declaration by the United Nations" was signed in Washington on 1 January 1942. It extended the purposes and principles of the Atlantic Charter to twenty-four nations besides the original signatories, the United States and the United Kingdom; six more countries joined by February 1943. Those purposes and principles were incorporated, in evolved and elaborated form, in the UN Charter, which was signed by representatives from fifty-one countries in the San Francisco Opera House on 26 June 1945, to enter into force on 24 October 1945.[1] The realities and priorities that dominated those momentous times were the immediate roots of the United Nations. The Second World War had not yet ended when the UN Charter was drafted and signed. Memory was recent and vivid of the catastrophic failure of the League of Nations in Manchuria and Ethiopia; of Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, the terror-bombing of cities, the battles and destruction on a scale truly without historical precedent; the death of more than fifty million people; and confirmation of the Holocaust.[2] Even as we celebrate the coincidence of the fiftieth anniversaries of the end of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations, it remains clear that values and ideals had indeed been fought for, but while those who wrote the Charter may have approached the future with optimism, the UN was not—could not have been—the product of facile idealism. The framers were tough-minded about their business, which was to design a better system of world affairs.

The Charter of the United Nations was drafted both to be acceptable to the victors of World War II—to succeed where the League of Nations had failed—and to meet the test of time. The document spoke to the highest

aspirations of mankind (in its Purposes and Principles), but it was tempered by the realities of power (as reflected in voting procedures and requirements).[3] Achieving consensus within a world committed to this apparent dichotomy took both deft diplomacy and the confidence not to compromise where steadfast resolution was appropriate. Those who can remember the conferences at Moscow, Cairo, Teheran, Yalta, Dumbarton Oaks, and San Francisco recall the endurance involved in their successes. At the time, those involved saw their negotiating partners as obstinate, intractable, and heavy-handed.[4] Consequently, the Charter they negotiated fully acknowledged that the world was far from unified in its values and priorities, so the Charter incorporated checks and balances. Frequently ineffective during the Cold War precisely because of the checks, the Charter nevertheless has proved on the whole to be resilient and useful. In fact, even the United Nations' limited successes in the early decades of the Cold War—such as the legal maneuvers that brought the United Nations into Korea and the Congo despite the Soviet view of those cases—fostered a limited but real confidence. That assurance produced an ever-increasing list of specialized agencies and organizations, such as UNICEF, that today continue to assist the international community in areas where the UN has proven to be of value.

***Myth:*** *The UN is just a debating society; it has no real authority.* To junior officers on board ship, the question of authority in daily business is real and sometimes perplexing. They soon learn, however, that they possess all the authority necessary to fulfill their responsibilities. This is always true because there is an unbreakable link between responsibility and authority: no one is made responsible to take action who is not invested with the authority to do so. In various circumstances, that authority may be seen to flow from the commanding officer, Navy Regulations, or even their own oath of office. In any case, valid authority proceeds from some source accepted by all as legitimate.

The indispensable connection between authority and responsibility is rarely questioned in the context of the professional actions of a naval officer—but it is less clear with respect to international relations, even though the question of authority is not greatly different in that setting. Very simply, since 1648, sovereign states have been the source of authority.[5] The UN itself is neither an independent international entity nor a supranational authority but a collection of sovereign states that have vested the organization—for certain purposes and with clear limitations—with their authority. Their instrument for doing so is the Charter, which is both a treaty and a constitution that guides, and in some cases compels, the actions of the member states and the United Nations itself.

Although the UN comprises six principal organs, the most significant authority delegated by the member states is exercised by the Security Council. Understanding how the framers shaped the Charter both to empower and

restrain the Security Council dispels false expectations and makes clear what the Council is responsible to accomplish. The member states have vested in it only that authority which is consistent with the formal "Purposes and Principles" and with decisions taken in accordance with the Charter. Specifically, common public expectations of the Security Council most frequently fail to take into account the Charter's requirement for at least a minimal consensus.[6] Absent that consensus, the Security Council lacks authority to act. Situations in which no consensus was formed frequently have been interpreted as failures on the part of the Security Council—or some member of it—to fulfill its responsibilities in times of crisis. In reality, a defeated proposal is a failure to achieve the consensus required for a plan of action to proceed under the collective authority of the sovereign member states. At times, this may be a good thing, as will be discussed later. In any case, the UN cannot be held responsible when there is no authority to act. Again, that authority is what has been granted and specified by the member nations.

There are remarkably foresighted provisions in the Charter regarding such matters as threats to and breaches of the peace; principles of justice and international law; humanitarian concerns; human rights; self-determination of states and peoples; and economic, social, and cultural issues.[7] The UN's record, however, is quite inconsistent on these matters, and obviously not only as a consequence of the Cold War. Inconsistency has been and will be a result of the fact that "the United Nations is a gathering of sovereign States and what it can do depends on the common ground that they can create between them."[8]

Inconsistency is not in itself a problem if it simply reflects the changing desire and will of the member states at different times. However, it can be less than inspiring to observers, and it certainly contributes to the impression that the organization lacks steady authority. This impression is compounded with respect to the United States, which enjoys veto authority as a permanent member of the Security Council (discussed below); the UN cannot act on matters of international security without American agreement or acquiescence. Consequently, it appears to many that the United Nations acts on U.S. authority rather than that the United States acts in cooperation with the collective authority of the other member states.

***Myth:*** *The veto keeps the UN from being effective.* Neither the powers entrusted to the Security Council nor its voting procedures for decision making are well understood. The latter have been depicted in generally negative terms over the years. As early as 1951, commentators and analysts as well informed as Hans Kelsen reported that even the term "veto" was seen as pejorative.[9] Well before the UN became involved in Korea, the proper interpretation of the voting procedures was a subject of important debate. The post–World War II situation in Iran was among the earliest examples where decisions were taken with a

permanent member abstaining.[10] The purpose of according only the permanent members the power to veto a Security Council resolution was to prevent a recurrence of the experience of the League of Nations Council, where even an abstention by any Council member prevented a decision.[11]

Voting in the Security Council is complex. Decisions on other than procedural matters must be made by what has been called a "qualified majority"—the crux of the veto authority worked out at the Yalta Conference.[12] The intent of the qualified-majority approach—which today means that nine votes are required for approval, including affirmative votes or abstentions by all the permanent members (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China)—is to ensure that the organization does not make decisions that any permanent member of the Security Council opposes. Clearly, it would not further the maintenance of international peace and security for the United Nations to take decisions that one of these major powers considered inimical to its national interests. Therefore, although the veto has earned much criticism over the years, it probably remains essential if the UN is to continue to enjoy the support of the permanent members. It is fair to conclude that without their involvement the organization would quickly lose any semblance of effectiveness and solvency.[13]

Moreover, the veto protects all member states against the Security Council taking a binding decision that would require them to oppose a major power on an issue of great importance to that power.[14] It likewise protects each major power from underwriting an organization acting against its interests. Ultimately, the veto protects the world from decisions that would undermine both international stability and the United Nations' potential for playing a useful role in facilitating that stability.

Thus the appropriateness of the veto derives from national interests. Member states vest the organization with limited authority to take actions in their mutual interest. The permanent members of the Security Council have interests considerably broader in scope than do most other states. If a proposed resolution is so contrary to the interest of a permanent member as to be blocked by veto, it is also clearly outside the bounds of "mutual interest." Also, the potential consequences to a state of confronting a permanent member on such an issue are themselves not in the mutual interest, or of benefit to the organization. The problem with "parliamentary diplomacy" arises only when that logic is weakened by the capricious use of the veto to wield power that would, or could, not be exercised in any other manner.[15]

The states entrusted with the veto already possess influence over world affairs commensurate with their veto authority. That is, the permanent members are presumably able to ensure that their national interests prevail whether they hold the veto or not; having that assurance, they at least lose nothing by restricting

themselves, by and large, to pursuing international goals within the United Nations or in a manner consistent with the Charter. Those nations can accordingly be expected to bring their considerable influence to bear when the expectations of the Charter are not fulfilled. The Security Council's permanent members certainly possessed such leverage at the end of World War II, when the Charter was drafted and they willingly accepted the additional responsibilities it placed on them.

If today, however, the Council's permanent members no longer command so great an influence, the logic of entrusting them with the veto is less sound. Of course, alliances, alignments, and political, economic, and even ideological issues must be considered in addition to the more easily measured and understood indicators of national power. On the other hand, if all the potential advantages of the veto are to be realized, full account must be taken of the current and emerging status of other member states. If and when other states command such leverage and are prepared to accept the burdens of permanent Security Council membership, perhaps they also should enjoy the veto—without it, and were their influence ignored in Council decisions, the dangers the veto is supposed to prevent could arise.

Like so many complex matters, all this is easy enough to say as a matter of reasoning. Yet probably no one could set forth the intricate combination of the elements of national power that would unmistakably identify those nations having such stature that they should hold the veto. World War II made such a formula unnecessary with respect to the original permanent members; peacetime politics lack such clarity.[16]

Another facet of disillusionment with the veto also warrants inspection. In recent years a well intentioned but wholly unfortunate idea seems to have arisen that Security Council members are not entitled to disagree. A legacy of the apparently capricious casting of the veto for ideological reasons during the Cold War, which was believed to prevent the UN from fulfilling its intended role, this view now frames a different but no less damaging mindset. Disagreement is an important element in the search for clear vision. The process of discussing disagreements yields perspective on the problem and limits the potential courses of action to those that will promise success. Acknowledging disagreement causes adjustment to reality; choosing to ignore differences in order to preserve the appearance of agreement calls to mind the tale of "the Emperor's new clothes." Certain recent "agreements" reached in the latter way in the Security Council certainly could be said, like the emperor of fable, to have failed to prepare fully for the task at hand. Before nations accept onerous responsibilities and bring significant power to bear in good-faith efforts to make a better world, they should discuss and examine every important perspective, frankly and fully.

Criticism of the United Nations for failing to solve a particular international problem assumes (besides, erroneously, that all problems have solutions) that a consensus exists about which party is wrong and how the matter should be solved. That is simply not always the case. After all, if the parties to the dispute can legitimately disagree, so can the members of the Security Council. Plainly stated, they retain the sovereign authority to disagree—and the sovereign authority to be wrong. So it is not necessarily inappropriate, although it may be disappointing, for the Security Council to fail to achieve consensus. This is not, by the way, to say that it is always wise to act on consensus that *can* be reached; if the consensus view cannot be expected to lead to success, it does not justify action.

The authority of the UN can be exercised only when there is agreement about what to do and the collective political will to do it. At some point a threshold of tolerance is crossed allowing the level of consensus necessary for an effective response in pursuit of justice.[17] That threshold was obviously met for Desert Storm; it has still (at this writing) not been crossed in the Balkans.[18]

To characterize that threshold would be difficult indeed, involving perhaps some elaborate formula relating the issues to the nations involved and the principles at stake. For example, Argentina's attempt to seize the Falklands (Malvinas) was rejected in Security Council Resolution 502, whereas China's effort to perfect its claim to the Spratly Islands has been met in an entirely different manner; the same principles applied in different situations brought different reactions, indicating different thresholds of tolerance and a different balance of priorities.

***Myth**: The UN costs too much.* Perhaps this complaint is legitimate—though if so, only recently. It certainly gained impetus from the explosion of peace-keeping operations in the wake of the Cold War. If all the proposed peace-keeping actions in 1994 had been approved by the Security Council, manned by the member states, and funded by the General Assembly, the bill would have exceeded $4 billion.[19] The United States would have paid over 30 percent of that cost. In fact, of course, only a fraction of the possibilities were carried out by the United Nations.

As it is, the United Nations is undoubtedly an expensive undertaking. If its operating costs were to soar higher, the impact on the U.S. federal budget would make impossible much of what Congress has been convinced should be done about vital national concerns. Obtaining additional funding for UN activities would require Congress to show greater confidence in the UN than recent events would seem to justify.

Consider, however, the UN price tag from another perspective. The peace-keeping portion of the UN budget reflects the costs of military operations in response to threats to peace affecting all member states. That is, it reflects the

costs of global responsibilities. Certainly there is waste in the UN budget, and it is more than reasonable to expect that the organization should quickly reduce it. In the meantime, however, in view of the importance of the issues at stake, the overall cost appears sobering but not unreasonable. Again, the real problem seems to arise when the projected costs are measured against results to date. Improving results could cost even more, at least at first. But the price of *success* in international peace is rarely an issue; it is always money well spent. On the other hand, the cost of failure is never low enough. To spend money, time, effort, and lives in half-hearted futility achieves nothing, nor does it preclude the more terrible consequences of war.

***Myth**: The Geneva Conventions do not apply to all UN peace operations.* Anyone harboring this baseless concern should consult the documents. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 have Articles 2 and 3 in common; their combined effect is to extend the protections of the treaties to the broadest possible characterization of armed conflict.[20] The Conventions apply to all military activities with which the United States might occupy itself, "even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance."[21] They also apply to conflicts "not of an international character" that take place within the territory of a party to the treaties.[22] Whether a "war" exists is no impediment to the application of the Geneva Conventions.

Moreover, the Security Council has no authority to act unless it determines that a threat to or breach of international peace exists; that threat, however, may be perceived entirely within the boundaries of a single sovereign state.[23] Of course, if the Security Council were to decide to place or permit foreign forces on the territory of a state, the conflict would thereby gain an international character; in either case, the Conventions apply.

There are few states that are not parties to the Conventions.[24] Many of these—for example, the fragments of the former Yugoslavia—would be bound as successor states to observe the Conventions unless they formally renounce them.[25] Accordingly, that the armed forces of the United States would be introduced into a location or situation in which the Geneva Conventions did not in some way apply is unlikely. If such a situation did exist, the Security Council could stipulate the application of Geneva (and Hague) Conventions through the very resolution that authorized the deployment of forces. Such direction by the Security Council then would carry the same legal authority as the treaties themselves.[26] While parties to a conflict cannot be made to comply with the Conventions, they can be held accountable for transgressions. Finally, since the UN itself commands no armed services, its troops—who are not "stateless" but forces of member nations—enjoy the protection of the Conventions by virtue of the fact that their nations are parties to them. Participation in these Conventions is already so wide that it would be difficult to argue that they

do not constitute an obligation in all cases, on all parties, under international law.

It is a fact that situations have occurred in which states have argued that the Geneva Conventions did not apply—but such arguments strain credulity. Treaties are to be interpreted according to the ordinary sense of their wording.[27] The language of the common Articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions would have to be distorted indeed to define an instance in which they did not apply.

Finally, any proposed operation deemed to be outside the protections and obligations of the Geneva Conventions would probably be seriously, and properly, questioned. In the United States, the Constitution considers treaties to be "the supreme Law of the Land";[28] it would surely be grotesque if those sworn to defend the Constitution were not protected by that law—but there is no substantial prospect of any such thing. The circumstance would be too extraordinary, its likelihood too remote, to warrant weight in the forming of U.S. policy.

***Myth**: When an international security problem arises, the UN should help solve it.* Each international dispute has its peculiarities and characteristics; not all lend themselves to solution through the United Nations. Experience suggests that only those for which consensus is sustainable throughout the implementation of a solution are amenable to direct Security Council action. Some disputes might be referred to mediators or lend themselves to other peaceful settlement methods consistent with the Charter.[29] Others resist solution but so threaten escalation that some action is required even at the risk of yet worse consequences.

Consensus in the Security Council must answer the demands of both international and domestic politics. Achieving that may be easier now than at any other time since the end of World War II, but it is by no means easy. For example, a nation having no other recourse is likely to seek the support of the United Nations. Such a case will, by definition, present the greatest possible demands on the resources and the political will of that organization's member states, so it will be the most difficult for which to achieve agreement about effective action. Given that agreement, moreover, the Security Council will probably find it necessary to request that the General Assembly vote additional funds to support the action decided upon. Accordingly, national representatives must explain at home why the extra funds should be made available. In essence, this process requires a solution consistent with the values, priorities, commitments, and abilities of all concerned. The more significant the proposed action, the more problematic the prospects become—with the unfortunate result that the UN frequently finds itself in the "do *something*" dilemma. An action taken to assuage the urge to act somehow but that offers no promise of at least improving matters (as is likely, since it necessarily reflects only the "lowest common denominator") can actually make them worse. Some would interpret

such action as a decision not to compel an offender to reverse a wrong, and it only compounds the difficulty later of extracting political commitments from delegations that must now explain at home the investment in failure.

***Myth**: The UN is dominated by the permanent members of the Security Council.*[30] There are ten non-permanent members of the Security Council, and any seven of them could block a decision sought even by all five permanent members; but that has never happened. In fact, Security Council decisions have been blocked only by permanent members exercising their veto authority. The implication should be that the ten states elected to the Security Council (each to represent a region) have decided—at least frequently enough to meet the Charter's requirements—that it was in their own interest, and presumably their region's, to agree to proposed Security Council resolutions when no permanent member opposed them. The rationale by which they define those interests may be wrong-headed, illogical, short-sighted, misguided, cynical—or precisely correct. That is really not at issue. They each have sovereign authority to make their own political decisions, upon their own criteria, and to cast their votes.

If a certain member state, having been unable to convince seven of the Security Council's non-permanent members to side with it on some dispute, is disappointed by a decision taken by the Council, nothing therein is inconsistent with the Charter it accepted when it joined. Since no state has withdrawn from the organization over disagreement with Security Council decisions, we may conclude that even those who make this complaint see it as in their interest to belong to the UN.

That there is an imbalance of influence under the Charter regime is itself reasonable. In theory, considering the reasons for the Charter's solicitude for the Council's permanent members, the non-permanent members might even enjoy (through the seven-of-ten rule) disproportionate leverage. True, the regional distribution criterion by which they are elected to the Council was devised to make it unlikely that any seven could join and work their collective will outside the framework of "parliamentary diplomacy."[31] Notwithstanding, the Charter does so empower them, through collective action—which they have not exercised. Therefore, if on a specific issue the permanent members of the Security Council dominate the UN, it is with the considered acquiescence of the rest of the member states.

***Myth**: "The UN directed the United States to. . . ."* In truth, this simply does not happen. Owing to the veto authority of the United States as a permanent member of the Security Council, the UN can levy only those requirements that are specifically acceptable to this nation. It is true that the General Assembly can require certain financial assessments even when the United States voted against the assessment.[32] However, even this authority can be avoided, by withdrawing from the organization.

Membership in the UN has not encumbered the sovereign authority of the United States. Claims to the contrary are either less than candid or reflect an underestimation of that authority and inappropriate deference to the UN—false assessments that the American population as a whole does not seem to share. If the government cannot gain domestic support for cooperation with the United Nations, to claim that it has been compelled by the organization does not help; it is more likely to inflame domestic opposition to that and future UN-associated actions.

But more important—and fully refuting this myth—is what agreement with the UN on an issue means *for* U.S. sovereignty. Working with the UN is simply a formal procedure for cooperating with other states. When it does so, the United States loses no part of its sovereignty. Member governments do not surrender their sovereignty to the UN; they *invest* their sovereignty *in* it.

This is no rhetorical nicety: working with and through the UN is a "force multiplier," not a loss but a gain. It offers the United States the opportunity to define publicly a diplomatic or legal position, and in a setting that tends to align, as we have seen, other sovereign states in support. It is likely that in the UN the opponent can be isolated and stigmatized as having violated some aspect of the Charter, as having gone back on its solemn word—transforming what, from other viewpoints, might have been a purely partisan or ideological dispute into a matter of good faith and obligation.

When the use of force is anticipated, the UN structure at least influences states to avoid interference and could even effectively compel them to help.[33] The result is more likely to be a coalition or alliance framework that both offers economies of force and reduces the ability of the target state to enlist allies of its own.

Even when there is disagreement with the American position in the Security Council or General Assembly, the character and scope of the opposition can become clear and, accordingly, the scale of effort required to prevail can be more accurately estimated. This ability to count potential costs in advance can assist in choosing tools of statecraft to protect national rights and interests in the dispute.

In any case, in working with or through the UN the United States surrenders nothing that it could do independently except those options it is willing to forego to enlist assistance or agreement to an even more attractive course. If in a given case a course of action is decided upon by the Security Council that is not actually in the national interest, that is a failure on the part of those who negotiated the issue for the United States, not of the United Nations.

When, then, is it best for the United States to pursue a solution with or through the United Nations? Clearly, if the collective authority and resources

of the UN can be brought to bear, the various costs to the United States are reduced, domestic consensus is easier to attain, and the legitimacy of the complaint is confirmed. Gaining such cooperation or endorsement is a matter of framing and obtaining a favorable Security Council decision. There are a number of questions any state would need to answer in deciding whether to address a crisis unilaterally or through the UN (or perhaps a regional organization as provided for in the Charter).[34] A sampling of questions that might be useful for the United States is offered as an appendix.

The years that have passed since the United Nations won great favor by sanctioning the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq have produced a confused and generally uninformed view of its Charter. The recent flurry of American involvements in high-profile UN decisions and operations have been disappointing indeed. If the nation is to remain engaged with its treaty partners, avoid further failures, and get the most out of its investment in this instrument that was specifically designed to improve international security, it is essential that the fundamental nature of national obligations to, and the authority of, the United Nations be properly understood.

The ability of the UN to fulfill its goals will depend, in part, on the ability of those who represent the member states to use the tools and methods authorized, endorsed, conceded, or at least not prohibited by the Charter. As the world moves inexorably away from the global constructs of the Cold War, the United Nations faces a critical period quite different from any in its history. The balance and flexibility of its Charter are sufficient to meet this new challenge—but only if those who must make the required decisions enjoy domestic support. To that end, the United States needs to base understanding of the United Nations on firmer ground than myth; but it also needs to see more effective realization of the UN's potential. Without such evidence of the ability to succeed, the UN's opportunity to try will be withdrawn. If that happens, some of these myths will have become self-fulfilling prophecies.

### Resorting to the United Nations

The questions below apply in general to any issue involving national security policy. In some cases, a different order might be useful. Obviously, each option has costs as well as benefits, all of which must be considered by policy makers attempting to achieve goals reflecting national priorities. This is not an easy task; neither is it an escapable one.

Concerning the United Nations, one might ask:

- Will resort to an international authority establish a precedent that is not in the broad interests of the United States? That is, can the nation accept

the costs, for instance, of reciprocity, the establishment of precedent, and so on?

• Is there benefit in attempting to use the peaceful methods of resolution listed or implied by Chapter VI of the Charter?

• Should the United States deal with the matter multilaterally through an ad hoc coalition, work through a third party, negotiate bilaterally, or simply act unilaterally?

• Could the International Court be asked to deliver an advisory opinion or order "provisional measures" (more frequently referred to as "interim measures") that would strengthen the U.S. position if it does resort to the Security Council? If so, among the questions to be considered are, first, what is the likelihood that if the United States sought such an opinion or order from the Court that it would fail? Would such a loss be acceptable? If an adverse ruling were ignored, would the loss of credibility be acceptable to the Court itself? Second, does time permit that option? Can it be taken concurrently with other actions? Third, will the Security Council support enforcement of the Court's interpretation? And fourth, will the Court's ruling strengthen the authority for unilateral action?

• Does the issue call for or permit action by the United States under Article 51? If so, is a collective security response required? Would such a response be useful? Is the use of force appropriate? What political, military, geostrategic, or economic costs would result from the use of force?

• Does the issue, in itself, involve an expectation that the United States will resort to the UN or treaty partners in order to keep an obligation or promise? That is, was the promise, or is the treaty provision, explicit? Is the treaty bilateral or multilateral? Have unforeseen disadvantages appeared that make the original treaty provisions adverse? What are the costs of ignoring, abrogating, violating, or failing to fulfill the obligation? What might reciprocal responses involve? What would the reactions of other states be?

• Is the position of the United States consistent with the Principles and Purposes of the Charter? Will the other permanent members agree? Will the majority of other member states agree?

• Will U.S. security policy be furthered by resort to the UN, or by the involvement of the international community? Or would it be constrained by competing interests or by the difficulties inherent in consensus-building?

• Is the issue a clear and present danger to the security of the United States—i.e., its domestic tranquility, citizens, territory, rights, property, or vital interests?

• Does the issue represent a threat to or breach of the international peace? Do other nations recognize the issue as either a direct or otherwise

important threat, or a precedent for one, to themselves? Can a qualified majority be achieved in the Security Council to take appropriate and effective action against the threat? Can a regional organization be called upon to take Chapter VIII action to avoid the possibility of failure to attain a qualified majority or consensus in the Security Council?

## Notes

1. Louise W. Holborn, ed., *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations: September 1, 1939-December 31, 1942* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1943), p. 1. See also *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 6, p. 3, "Declaration of Principles, Known as the Atlantic Charter, 14 August 1941," in Holborn, pp. 2–3. See also *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 5, p. 125; and 236 U.S. Executive Agreement Series, p. 4.

2. For war losses, H.P. Willmott, *The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1989), p. 477. Willmott's figures count only the war's dead; he considers them an underestimation.

3. Charter of the United Nations with the Statute of the International Court of Justice annexed thereto [hereafter "Charter"]. Entered into force 24 October 1945: 59 Stat 1031, TS 993, Bevans 1153. Amendments ratified 17 December 1963: 16 UST 1134, TIAS 5857, UNTS 143; 20 December 1965: 19 UST 5450, TIAS 6529; 20 December 1971: 24 UST 2425, TIAS 7739. Chapter I, Articles 1 and 2.

In brief, the Purposes are: maintenance of peace and security—including the prevention and removal of threats, suppression of acts of aggression, adjustment or settlement of international disputes, strengthening universal peace, and furthering international cooperation. The Principles include sovereign equality, fulfilling the obligations of membership, peaceful settlement of international disputes, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of states, cooperation with UN efforts for prevention and enforcement, the responsibility even of non-members not to threaten the peace, and avoiding interference in the domestic matters of member states except when international peace and security are threatened or breached.

For voting procedures and requirements, see Charter, Articles 18, 19, 27 (which deals with the Security Council), 67, and 89.

4. For a detailed discussion of the international negotiations and the U.S. view, see Ruth B. Russell and Jeanette E. Muther, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940–1945* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1958). For the specifics of the Yalta Conference see U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, the Conferences at Malta and Yalta* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1945).

5. The Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648, established the current nation-state system.

6. Charter, Article 27 (3).

7. Ibid., Preamble and Chapter I.

8. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1992), para. 2. See also Security Council, S/PV.3046, 31 January 1992 (Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand and Forty-Sixth Meeting), p. 144.

9. Hans Kelsen, a prominent international legal scholar, and the first holder of the prestigious Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law at the Naval War College in 1953, had other insights into the United Nations as well. The author studied with the late Professor Leo Gross, who worked in the Secretariat of the League of Nations, helped to craft the UN Charter, and married Hans Kelsen's daughter, Gerta. Professor Gross was another early Stockton Professor.

10. Hans Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems* (London: Stevens & Sons, 1951), pp. 239–43; see especially the explanatory notes.

11. See the Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 5 (1). Since the 1965 amendments enlarging it, the Security Council has been composed of fifteen members. The five permanent members are the victorious major powers of World War II or, in the cases of Russia and the People's Republic of China, their successor states. The others are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly from among all UN members in good standing. A regional quota system, not addressed in the Charter, ensures geographically representative membership.

12. See communique signed at the Yalta Conference (11 February 1945), in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States.*

13. Quite another question is the matter of voting on procedural issues, which require only an affirmative vote of nine members; here the veto and "qualified majority" do not apply. Much important diplomatic work is conducted concerning these "procedural issues." The agenda of the Security Council, for example, is voted on as a procedural matter. Such a vote can determine, how, when, and even if a question is to be dealt with. For a more thorough discussion of Security Council voting and procedures, see Sydney D. Bailey, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1988).

14. Charter, Article 25.

15. See Philip C. Jessup, "Parliamentary Diplomacy: An Examination of the Legal Quality of the Rules of Procedure of Organs of the United Nations," in Academic de Droit International, *Recueil des Cours*, vol. 89, 1956 (The Hague: A.W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1957), pp. 181–320.

16. See the Charter, Chapter XVIII, Articles 108 and 109. Two-thirds of all member states including the current permanent members of the Security Council would have to vote for, and then *ratify* nationally, any change to the Charter. That is, not only do the UN delegations of the permanent members enjoy veto authority over such a change, but their national legislators do as well. This formula makes it highly unlikely that any permanent member will lose its status.

17. Ibid., Articles 1 and 2 (3).

18. For the crisis in the Balkans there is no clear political consensus in the Security Council on basic questions such as: Is there aggression by one party against another? Is there a clear rationale for establishing borders for the recognized states? Is genocide in progress? Is the political leadership of these nascent states sufficiently in control of their populations to guarantee compliance with agreements to which they become parties? What enforcement actions are required and appropriate to bring the fighting to an end? Do the parties who have accepted peace-keepers want to stop fighting?

19. Chapter IV (Articles 9 through 22) of the Charter deals with the composition, functions, and authority of the General Assembly and its relationship to the other organs of the UN. The General Assembly establishes the budget and assigns assessments to the members. These assessments vary widely and are based upon economic ability above a minimum level.

Decisions in the General Assembly, on a list of issues defined as "important matters," require a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. Other questions, including the addition of "important matters" to the list, are decided by a simple majority. Members in arrears of their dues can lose their voting privileges.

20. TIAS 3362, UST 6, pp. 3114–216 (Convention I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field); TIAS 3363, UST 6, pp. 3217–315 (Convention II: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea); TIAS 3364, UST 6, pp. 3316–515 (Convention III: Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War); TIAS 3365, UST 6, pp. 3516–695 (Convention IV: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War)—all dated 12 August 1949 [hereafter "Geneva Conventions"]. Also in Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, eds., *The Laws of Armed Conflict: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents*, 2nd ed. (Rockville, Md.: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981), pp. 305–31, pp. 333–54, pp. 355–425, and pp. 427–88 respectively, and pp. 299–523 inclusive for the attendant documents and listings of reservations by the parties.

In Article 2, which is identical in each Convention, the parties agree that:

> In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
>
> The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.

Article 3, which is also common to all of the Conventions, extends their provisions even "in the case of armed conflict not of an international character in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties. . . ."

21. Geneva Conventions, Article 2.

22. Ibid., Article 3.

23. Charter, Article 2(7) includes two provisions, of which the first prohibits interference and the second provides an exception to the prohibition. The text reads: "Nothing contained in the current Charter shall

authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." Chapter VII deals with threats to and breaches of the peace and the authority to take enforcement action.

24. U.S. Department of State, *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1993*, Department of State Publication 9433 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., June 1993), pp. 389–91, lists 174 parties.

25. Yugoslavia was a party. See ibid., p. 390.

26. Charter, Articles 2 (5) and 25.

27. See Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331; and American Law Institute, *Restatement of the Law: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States*, 2 vols. (St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute, 1987), at §325 (1).

28. U.S. Constitution, Article VI.

29. See Charter, Article 33 for a partial list, and also United Nations, *Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States* (New York: United Nations, 1992), for a more detailed treatment.

30. This complaint was almost universal among the International Fellows from the National Defense University and the Inter-American Defense College students who have taken the author's courses at the National War College. It was also a common lament among attendees at a number of conferences at which the author has addressed UN issues.

31. See General Assembly Resolution 1991A (XVIII) of 17 December 1963; and Bailey, pp. 111–2.

32. Charter, Article 17. This "power of the purse" invested in the General Assembly is a most significant one. Failure to pay assessments can be cause for loss of voting rights or even dismissal from the organization. Over the years many nations have fallen behind in their assessment payments—including the United States. Some have withheld payments for internal political reasons or because those assessments were to support an operation or action they had opposed. The International Court of Justice, in its decision in the "Expenses Case," has made clear that these states are still obliged to make payment; nevertheless, members continue to fall behind. With UN operations being undertaken on an unprecedented scale and at unprecedented cost, a financial crisis is imminent. See International Court of Justice, *Reports, Judgements, and Advisory Opinions (1962), Certain Expenses of the United Nations*, p. 151; the ICJ Report is also digested in William W. Bishop, Jr., *International Law: Cases and Materials*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), p. 262.

33. Charter, Articles 2 (5) and 25. While it is legally possible to compel a state's behavior through authority derived from Article 25, it would not seem a good or credible strategy. Enforced neutrality, however, could pay dividends.

34. See Charter, Chapter VIII.

Ψ

Truth lies within a little and certain compass, but error is immense.

Henry St. John,
Viscount Bolingbroke

# The United States and Sub-Saharan Africa

Commander Robert W. Higgs, South African Navy

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA HAS a state system that was imposed from abroad during the era of colonialism and that does not reflect ethnic realities. Most of these states achieved independence in the 1960s and emerged into the bipolar system of the Cold War. The international rivalry produced assistance and also a measure of influence for their governments, despite the fact that the fifty-three nations in Africa make it the world's most balkanized and fragmented region.[1] When African states were supported by bipolar forces, methods of governing seemed to be of little consequence, and there were many abuses of human rights by both military and civilian governments.[2] Today, African states have a desire for democracy, based on the perception that democratic governments can be stable, effective, and responsible, and can attract foreign capital to ensure equitable economic growth. In addition, democracies are understood to be able to prevent and resolve conflicts with the involvement of all parties.[3] Well structured democracies are also seen to be more responsive to the material needs of their people.[4]

Yet today, economic viability and internal political stability are two major problems for the troubled continent. Democratic revolutions sweeping through Africa bring with them a number of difficulties. Strong authoritarian leaders of the past are being replaced by new leaders within states having only weak democratic traditions.[5] The resulting instability could cause reticence or even

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detachment in the developed world, which sees hopeless anarchy prevailing in Africa. However, many states in the region suffer from these conditions but do not collapse into disorder, because where there is good government, lawlessness, violence, and breakdown of authority do not occur. Concurrently, most African nations are attempting to develop free market economies. However, this reform is painfully challenging. In the past, wealth was distributed along traditional tribal lines, and such arrangements are now in question.[6] With respect to either governance or finance, however, to assume that the development of Africa is beyond hope is premature.[7]

The United States, as the preeminent superpower, identifies with sub-Saharan Africa primarily on humanitarian grounds arising from fundamental values of the American philosophy. Budgetary constraints, shifting policies, and the lack of tangible humanitarian successes have caused the United States to disengage from the region. The U.S. will continue to back away until it is deemed to be in the American interest to reengage, or until a program with the potential to assure sustained reconstruction and development in sub-Saharan Africa is recognized.

This article addresses U.S. foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. Its aim is to investigate ways in which the United States can engage and enlarge its interests in the region, to mutual benefit. It will deal in general with U.S. interests and American security strategy in the region. Thereafter it will focus on the maritime component in detail. The analysis makes three major assumptions. First, there will continue to be international interest in Africa, but a significant, coherent, and coordinated effort for the region's reconstruction and development will require the support of the United States, through the United Nations. Second, it is unlikely that powerful economic blocs will compete for influence in Africa, because of the lack of tangible returns in comparison with other emerging markets. This situation could change if Africa becomes able to compete successfully with the emerging markets. Third, if African states wish to achieve the level of production and wealth that the developed nations enjoy, their leaders will have to demonstrate that they are committed to a transition toward a work ethic, competitiveness, the freedoms associated with democracy and capitalism, and elimination of class status.[8] Such commitment is a prerequisite for attracting the developed world to reengage economically and politically in the region.

## Factors Influencing United States Policy

As noted, significant transformations are occurring in Africa today; they include the expansion of democratic governments and the growth of economic reform and of liberalized economic policies aimed at building an environment for private sector–led growth.[9] Currently nearly two-thirds of African countries




Joseph R. Nunes, Jr.

are at some stage of democratic transition, compared to only four in 1989.[10] However, these fledgling governments are fragile and often not fully consolidated. In a June 1994 address at the White House Conference on Africa, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Brian Atwood, observed that "what is most significant today is that a new group of African leaders has come to power. These leaders are pushing the continent to realize its potential. They are encouraging people to participate in government and in the development of their societies. These are leaders like Nelson Mandela of South Africa."[11] There have been fewer major unresolved conflicts or instances of state collapse in the 1990s than there were in the 1980s, when battles raged in Uganda, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Western Sahara, Sudan, and Angola. It is true that there has been a major setback for democracy in Nigeria, where the 1993 elections were nullified, and also a number of smaller reversals. The point, though, is not that there will be no more trouble in Africa, but rather that anarchy is not a foregone conclusion.[12] There is hope.

From an economic point of view, it is well understood that Africa is not healthy. In the decade from 1980 to 1990 its gross domestic product (GDP) showed a decline of 1.1 percent. By almost every social and economic indicator,

sub-Saharan Africa performs less well than any other developing region of the world.[13] In addition, many African nations face high debt burdens, which can hamper any economic transition.[14] On the other hand, the African consumer market, with over one-half billion potential buyers, is already significant. In 1992 sub-Saharan Africa imported about $60 billion in goods, but only about $5 billion came from the United States; this disparity indicates that other developed nations are benefiting from this marketing opportunity.[15] In addition, the potential of the southern sub-region has led the U.S. Commerce Department to declare southern Africa one of the world's ten major emerging markets for U.S. exports.[16]

***United States Leadership.*** A number of countries have dealt successfully with Africa. However, if one assesses the present situation, there clearly is no coherent and coordinated approach to the continent by the developed world. If Africa is to succeed in its reconstruction and development, international efforts must be coordinated. The United States—and only the United States—could provide the leadership that is needed at the international level among the developed countries and also coordinate support efforts within the continent.

The leading role in facilitating support for the reconstruction and development of sub-Saharan Africa, one might think, should surely lie with the major trading partners. If one measures the penetration of African markets as a criterion, then the United States, with only 8.3 percent of the trade with Africa, has no place.[17] But some African leaders do not see it that way. In the 1994 White House conference, the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Salim Ahmed Salim, said, "We see the American experience in social accommodation as the most readily adaptable to the African situation. . . . I see the United States providing the leadership at the international level, with the industrialized countries and the monetary and financial institutions, in mobilizing support for reforms and development generally in the continent."[18] He argued further, speaking to the Americans in his audience, that the United States should care about Africa because "it is in your interests as well. Africa and this country share common bonds of history and culture. In this rapidly shrinking global village, we need global solidarity to sustain cooperation and our interdependence. . . . You need a strong Africa that can be a strong partner in global development and not a subject of your constant compassion and unending charity."[19]

Secretary General Salim's view is shared by some senior U.S. leaders. Ambassador Herman Cohen, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until 1993, contends that respect for the United States in Africa has never been higher. He sees this as primarily a result of the Cold War victory of democratic and free market systems. In addition, U.S. work in the field of conflict resolution

in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia added to its reputation; Africans feel that the "moral guarantee" of the United States is important to the success of agreements reached.[20] Probably most significant, however, is the example U.S. democracy provides.

African and U.S. leaders conceive a prominent role for the United States in African affairs, but how feasible is this? Can the United States lead, and collaborate with, the rest of the developed world, catalyzing an international program of reconstruction and development of Africa? The answer is a qualified "yes." The crucial issue is that America has achieved since World War II something that is quite rare for a superpower—it has identified its national interests with international institutions. The United Nations, the Marshall Plan, Nato, the World Bank, the General Agreement an Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund—these are phenomena that germinated on American soil.[21] They are proof that the United States has the ability to lead and facilitate world cooperation and solidarity in support of Africa.

***U.S. Interests in Africa.*** Despite diminished political influence and weak economies, Africa is becoming more important in the scale of U.S. regional and global interests. Africa presently accounts for about one-third of United Nations membership and has considerable leverage in the Group of 77, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and many institutions where African states sit as de facto regional representatives, including the UN Security Council and the World Bank.[22] In addition, African states have started to play an active and prominent role in global and regional peacekeeping efforts.[23] On the domestic side, 23.8 million African-Americans form a potentially powerful interest group in the United States; their cultural concerns about their roots and heritage cannot be summarily dismissed.[24]

From an economic perspective, Africa's oil-producing states are of direct importance to the United States. Nigeria pumps nearly two million barrels of oil a day, most of which ends up in the United States. During the 1973 Arab oil boycott, Nigeria was the number-one supplier to the United States and today is one of the top five. Together Nigeria and Angola have nearly twenty-five billion barrels of proven reserves.[25] Their location makes these reserves of strategic importance to the United States.

U.S. direct investment in Africa approaches $3.5 billion. In 1993 U.S. firms exported nearly $4.8 billion in goods and services to sub-Saharan Africa; this figure is 20 percent greater than U.S exports to the Commonwealth of Independent States. Every $1 billion in exports adds nineteen thousand new jobs in the United States. Doubling exports to Africa could create an additional ninety thousand, provided the political and economic transformation currently underway is sustained. To further illustrate not-implausible assumptions about African

demand for foreign goods, Brian Atwood projects that the average $3 per year that each American family presently contributes to African development assistance could, if sustained over thirty years, generate an annual $600 in African exports per family by the year 2025.[26]

Also, the United States and other nations have a stake in the environment of Africa in the next century. Today many African leaders are taking impressive steps to preserve natural habitats and promote methods of sustainable forestry development.[27] But the continent is under great environmental strain. Two-thirds of sub-Saharan Africa's wildlife habitat has been destroyed by development.[28] Uganda's forests have been decimated, and its once plentiful grasslands have been nearly eliminated by overgrazing, itself caused by the excessive livestock per acre necessary to support the increasing population.[29] In Ethiopia, the Rift Valley's acacia forest is fast becoming semi-desert.

Finally, humanitarian concerns particularly affect the people of the United States, especially when scenes of famine, violence, and destruction are projected into its living rooms. The violence characteristic of Africa, which has so far prompted nine UN peacekeeping operations, will continue to prod the sensitivity of the American public so long as there is instability in the region. However, in view of both the Clinton administration's policy on multilateral peace operations and the Republican narrowing of "vital interests," the "CNN factor" alone is unlikely to induce active U.S. participation in these operations.[30]

***Other Key Players.*** Europe has a longstanding interest in the condition of Africa. Western Europeans can help with stabilization and the development of democratic and free market administrations, economies, and infrastructures. Also, as a result of their colonial experience, they still have specialists for these regions: the Italians know Somalia, the French know West and Central Africa, the British East Africa, the Belgians Zaire, and the Portuguese Angola and Mozambique. This could prove to be an opportunity for the European Union to assume collectively some responsibility, in cooperation with the UN and OAU, for the reconstruction and development of the continent.[31] As for Asia, Japan already provides a great deal of economic and infrastructural assistance. While the Chinese and other stable and prospering East Asian countries do not have great interests in the region, they could contribute by providing unique assistance, drawn from their own experience, in the transformation of the work ethic and attitudes toward competitiveness.

Among international organizations, the United Nations is positioned to coordinate and legitimize international support for the reconstruction and development of the region. It has the infrastructure and international interface to play a vital part in the process. The OAU is a major regional organisation and a key player in the solution of the sub-Saharan problem. With the demise of the

Cold War, the OAU is achieving broad acceptance and significance. Establishment of appropriate OAU consultative security forums and procedures on a permanent basis could help the region secure cooperation in economic development and ensure the growth of democracy. Nato, despite its present geographical limitations, could play a significant role, primarily as a facilitator as well as a model for collective defence in the African context. Such a role would help Nato define for itself, in the responsible development of the African military, an interim out-of-area mission.

Finally, within the region, South African capabilities will be increasingly critical in the medium and long term to the success of efforts to contain or resolve crises throughout sub-Saharan Africa. The Republic of South Africa has the military establishment needed to support peacekeeping operations; in this regard it occupies a regional position analogous to that of the United States, which has a global ability. Although presently wary of committing combat personnel to peace operations, it can provide logistical support, medical assistance, communications systems, and air transport facilities for any regional security endeavor. South African infrastructure can deliver humanitarian assistance, as has been done in the past three years (for Malawi, Zaire, Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique, and Rwanda). South Africa can and has used its training facilities and expertise to assist neighboring countries: military personnel from Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, and Namibia have taken courses at South Africa's various training colleges, and South African personnel have trained regional army personnel in combat support (notably in connection with mine demolition in Mozambique and Angola). Finally, South Africa can offer extensive assistance in efforts to rebuild the infrastructure of the region.[32]

## U.S. Military Engagement Options

The United States has a wide range of tools that can be used to promote democracy, human rights, and prosperity.[33] Central to these is the U.S. Department of Defense. Options for military engagement include the establishment of a "School for Africa," the development of an anti-drug campaign, programs of military civic action, support of indigenous efforts on behalf of biological diversity, and confidence-building measures. Peacekeeping operations will continue to occupy both the United States and UN as part of a reactive strategy, because of the violence characteristic of Africa.

*The establishment of a "School of Africa"* in which African military, coast guard, and foreign ministry leaders would study together and develop a common cultural foundation based on common destiny could help Africa emulate the success of Latin America. There the U.S. military-sponsored School of the Americas has been very successful in helping develop that region to its present

position of largely prospering democracies, sustained economic expansion, and increasing trade. Such a school could also produce a network connecting future leaders of Africa with those of the more developed world, who would have the opportunity to explain the pitfalls that they have experienced. The statesmanship developed at the School of Africa could also be a source of African-led initiatives. This school would not replace current international military education and training programs but would complement them.

*A strategy to counter the proliferation of drugs* in the region demands further attention. What should be of concern to the United States and the developed world is the possibility of Africa becoming a narcotic production area. As has been seen elsewhere, enterprising individuals without moral values could see in drugs a method of enriching themselves and their region. The problems associated with containing an African drug industry led by either local or foreign drug lords could be significant. That the post–Cold War power vacuum in Africa might be filled by international drug cartels, as they find life in the traditional narcotics areas more risky, is a possibility that should be addressed. The U.S. military could help develop awareness of the problem and assist in the establishment of organisations that would counter the problem when it arises.

Additionally, the U.S. military could engage in *military civic action* (support of African military infrastructure projects that benefit the civilian sector) and in maintaining the *biological diversity* of Africa (assisting African defense agencies interested in protecting and maintaining habitats and in developing wildlife management and fisheries and plant protection programs). These are activities that could be meaningful in the revitalisation of Africa. At the outset, positive programs that are considered low risk but have potentially high returns could be instrumental in gathering the necessary sustained international support.

*The U.S. military could participate in confidence-building exercises.* The armed forces of Africa, rather than being marginalised, should be made shareholders in, and part of, the development of the continent. African militaries have an important role to play in the transition to and support of democratic governments. In fact, a stable and open military is not a by-product of democracy but a prerequisite. American contacts with and assistance to African militaries can promote the transition to democracy, respect for human rights, and civilian control. If the United States can help the military of an emerging democracy to find its niche and accept a proper role in society, it will have gone a long way to creating a condition in which democracy can flourish.[34]

Additionally, the U.S. military can act as a catalyst for international cooperation and reduction of tensions between states in the region. Ground, air, and naval units can foster interactions through multinational military conferences, exercises, and operations that (as has been shown elsewhere) reduce tension and promote understanding between rivals. In particular, the U.S. Navy, Marine

Corps, and Coast Guard can play leading roles in building confidence within and between states of sub-Saharan Africa.

## U.S. Maritime Strategy and Sub-Saharan Africa

The U.S. National Military Security Strategy of February 1995 articulates the promotion of global stability as one of its two objectives. The strategy of flexible and selective engagement focuses on future challenges and opportunities. The concept is to promote long-term stability, because it is advantageous to the United States; stability establishes conditions under which democracy can take hold and expand about the world.[35] Against this background of strategic intent it is necessary to remember the volatility of sub-Saharan Africa: "For the last 12 months, sub-Saharan Africa has been the region [in the world] most plagued by conflict and instability."[36]

Present U.S. naval thinking is succinctly articulated in "Forward....From the Sea," in which traditional Mahanian command of the sea and the decisive sea battle are rejected in favor of joint operations *from* the sea and activity in the littorals. This thinking is consistent with the U.S. National Security Strategy's focus upon peacekeeping and maritime conflict management.[37] The demise of the Cold War brings with it a new set of maritime circumstances and opportunities in which "the free nations of the world now claim preeminent control of the seas and [can] ensure freedom of commercial passage."[38] This change in the maritime situation suggests that a restructuring of the traditionally unintegrated sub-Saharan maritime region is in order.

Maritime forces play an important role in establishing beneficial relationships with allies. They promote a cooperative and collaborative approach to common problems. The nature of the maritime environment ensures that the professionals who use it develop mutual bonds, common habits and attitudes that are conducive to yet further cooperation. Each successful combined activity leads to another, and the result is an ever-widening circle of shared interests. The sea environment itself is largely non-threatening and is not limited by national boundaries. Also, maritime forces are able to serve all types of alliance systems, for a variety of reasons. Cooperation with an ally who is technically and tactically advanced can have significant benefits in training and equipment; in addition, it can influence the perceptions and behavior of the stronger ally, winning for the weaker one a degree of political influence not necessarily forthcoming otherwise. Cooperation with a developing nation's maritime forces bespeaks respect, recognition of shared challenges, and acknowledgment of mutual interests. And multinational activities heighten appreciation of regional opportunities for friendship and acceptance of common responsibilities. The U.S. Navy's extensive network of both bilateral and multilateral exercises around the world,

such as with Nato in Europe, the UNITAS program for South America, and the RIMPAC exercises with the nations of the Pacific Rim, show that the advantages of alliance-building through maritime power are universally understood.[39]

How does this relate to peacekeeping and operations other than war in sub-Saharan Africa? This is where the development of a common maritime strategy and institutions can be of benefit in the stabilization of the region. There is much talk about naval peacekeeping across the beaches, or rather, "from the sea." Since the Gulf war, much of the activity of naval forces has been in monitoring cease-fires, embargoes, and separation of forces, caring for refugees, clearing mines, escorting merchant shipping, and furnishing and protecting humanitarian relief. There have also been three recent instances of sea-based noncombatant evacuation operations on the African continent by the U.S., in Liberia and twice in Somalia; these rescues highlighted the ability of navies to provide rapid and sustained, but controlled and limited, presence. The capability of these forces was demonstrated by their sending helicopters 460 miles at night to rescue 281 diplomats and foreign nationals from the embassy in Somalia.[40] The expeditionary nature of naval forces was exhibited by the deployment of a U.S. Navy amphibious squadron with an embarked Marine expeditionary unit off Liberia for ten weeks, leading to the evacuation of more than 1,600 foreigners escaping from civil war in that West African nation.[41]

On a regional scale, local forces able to operate helicopters and small boats from the sea would help in diffusing crises such as these; to make this kind of limited littoral and expeditionary capability a reality, it would be necessary for regional navies to improve their equipment and develop interoperability. Achieving interoperability, in turn, would highlight the requirement for common doctrine and regular exercises between these navies.

The United States could assist by supporting the establishment of a collective maritime security structure in the sub-Saharan region. The combat capability of sea-borne forces was illustrated by the U.S.-led fleet of twenty-one ships from six navies that in March 1995 withdrew the men and equipment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia, at night, under fire, with no friendly casualties.[42] Multinational naval cooperation could stimulate interest in the developed world, which would see it as a possible method of exploratory, low-risk contact and integration with the less-developed littoral nations of the region.[43] As the hard-pressed African navies find that fewer funds come their way, their only alternative—if they wish to remain relevant and achieve their missions—will be to combine their efforts.

Because of the transnational and transagency nature of maritime problems, the optimum method for addressing them is a coherent and combined regional

maritime sovereignty and ocean policy as a precursor to a form of collective security. Such a policy would create a combined force drawn from regional navies and would address specific functions (listed below). The practical issues involved would facilitate the development of legal, political, economic, social, and environmental interconnections between the more developed world and Africa, in a low-risk environment. An OAU-sponsored international law forum to lay the foundation for such a policy could have a "trickle down" effect for the legal structures of the African littoral states, inculcating the principles of the international legal framework—from concepts of sovereignty to ideas about human rights and democracy. The United States, by virtue of its maritime orientation, could play a key role in the planning and consequent integration of a regional ocean policy, making available the lessons of its own international successes and failures.

The benign nature of the program could expose African states to the advantages of synergism and integration rather than fragmentation. As it started achieving success, a non-contentious symbol of regional identity could be formed. An African maritime force could establish itself as a "pure," professional, and non-threatening vehicle of long-term international interaction. In addition to providing a symbol for the people it represents, this coalition of professional maritime forces could help restore the developed world's confidence in Africa, a necessary precursor to greatly increased international investment and tourism, both of which would be very positive and much needed developments.

*Search and rescue, and aids to navigation* are the first improvements that could be undertaken, with the assistance of the U.S. Coast Guard. The basic navigation infrastructure already exists; most sub-Saharan port facilities work reasonably well. The establishment of a coordinated regional search and rescue organisation would improve the usefulness of African resources in international operations within the area, and possibly in adjacent oceans also. Regular exercise of this ability would help develop an integrated approach and also provide an interface with the developed world on a sustained basis.

*Marine resource management and environmental protection* form another area in which a regional ocean policy could function. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea grants to states unprecedented jurisdiction over the economic resources within two hundred nautical miles of their coasts, by delineation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). These assets include biological stocks and deep-seabed minerals.[44] In the developed world, marine economic resources are jealously protected by sovereign states, with naval and other maritime law enforcement assets. However, the countries where fish constitutes more than 40 percent of animal protein are, with the major exception of Japan, the developing countries in Asia and Africa;[45] unfortunately, many sub-Saharan states lack the ability to protect these resources.

The inability to enforce sovereignty over EEZs is a problem that will get worse; as the 1995 incidents between Canada and Spain over fishing rights suggest, there is no easy solution. The world's oceans are being overfished, and catches are declining steadily. This fishing is being carried out by sophisticated ships—large, fast, expensive, and able to harvest vast areas. Sweeping the ocean clean, the multibillion-dollar worldwide industry is losing money at an increasing rate. The result is pressure either to cut corners on operating expenses in an effort to recover investments in the ships or to exploit every opportunity to catch more fish.[46] As developed countries become more concerned about the depletion of their fisheries, they can be expected to protect rigorously what is legally theirs, forcing the fishing fleets of the less scrupulous into the rich zones of the sub-Saharan African states—where there is a maritime power vacuum. This scenario was sketched out at the 1992 International Conference for Responsible Fishing, in Mexico, which identified the southeast Atlantic as a region where numerous "distant-water high seas fleets" were increasing their catches.[47] It is imperative that sub-Saharan states ensure that their respective EEZs are not violated; protection can best be guaranteed by the regional development of maritime law enforcement.

*Marine pollution* is the shadow of progress, to which developing nations often turn a blind eye. The threat of large-scale oil pollution is very real on the east coast of Africa, where heavy seas have often caused ships to break up with catastrophic consequences. These accidents already have had a major impact on the estuaries and fishing areas of southeastern Africa. As the merchant fleets of the world grow older, the threat of disaster increases; in the longer term, as the importance of tourism in the development of the region grows, the impact of major pollution disasters could be very negative indeed.[48] The pollution issue is of global concern, but its regional causes and effects can be minimized if preemptively addressed in a forum having power to effect treaties on pollution and to clarify the obligations and incentives that regulate and balance competing environmental and economic interests. Methods for dealing with the inevitable pollution accidents could be clearly articulated and contingency plans developed.

*Enforcement of maritime border security* is a fourth arena for an African nations' ocean policy. A major scourge in the region is smuggling, especially of ivory and weapons. The uncontrolled movement of arms makes them a type of currency in the region and adds to instability and lawlessness. Much of the smuggling today takes place across land borders; however, the ocean is important for smugglers because it is a link with the money of the developed world. Customs and anti-smuggling issues could be addressed in the development of a comprehensive strategy.

A combined and joint *rapid deployment force* could be formed by bilateral and multilateral maritime agreements between the African littoral states for local

peacekeeping and disaster relief. Maritime regional cooperation could be further strengthened by deploying vessels and aircraft to conduct combined maritime exercises and patrols. Coordinating these activities with the operations of invited maritime forces from the developed world under the auspices of the UN would further strengthen the concept and enhance international legitimacy.

*The enforcement of state authority* in a regional context could be demonstrated by collectively focusing on the protection of fishing and other marine resources against plundering, piracy, and environmental depredation. Such law enforcement operations could then be extended to include the development of disaster relief doctrine, scientific research programs, and effective prohibition of drug and weapons smuggling and illegal immigration.

*Training and education* in naval standards would be necessary to ensure the development of a professional attitude amongst the forces. This professionalism would have to be established first in the functionally critical areas, such as combined doctrine, procedures, and communications, to allow competent conduct of operations. To sustain momentum it will be necessary to pursue commonality in professional military education, perhaps through exchange assignments and bilateral or multilateral staff formations.

*Compatibility, maintenance, combined procurement, and technology transfer* are major considerations for any regional maritime force. If maritime forces are to operate safely, there must be compatibility in communications through establishment of a standard. Other forms of compatibility would be addressed on a continuing basis. Maintenance, which has previously been a problem in the region, could be addressed by the use of South African naval maintenance resources. Simon's Town could provide the facilities for major refits and extended dockings; for lesser maintenance, a core of South African–trained technicians could meet the need *in situ*. Correct technical standards could be established and enforced by regionally integrated technical inspection groups, their core perhaps supplied by South Africa. Synergy and economy could be achieved through a combined procurement agency, which would ensure that suppliers take serious note of the region in terms of after-sales service. The continued success of such technical synergy would result in the sustained transfer of technology to sub-Saharan Africa, with its associated social and economic benefits.

It is to be hoped that the interest of the United States in a maritime strategy for sub-Saharan Africa would encompass encouraging the developed world to support such an African-led initiative. The U.S. could also help to educate regional leaders as to their maritime opportunities, commitments, and responsibilities, and, further, could assist in building a legal and political infrastructure.

A "School of Africa" might shortly follow. Regional powers should be encouraged to develop common training and doctrine in the maritime environment, as a precursor to broader collective activities. Ultimately, direct security assistance as an incentive and reward for fulfilling international maritime obligations would signal the beginning of United States reengagement and of the reconstruction and development of sub-Saharan Africa.

For any reconstruction and development of Africa to succeed, it is critical that the people of Africa take the lead. The future of the region depends on those Africans who have a positive, feasible, and appropriate vision for their continent. What has been described in this article is how this turn-around in Africa can be supported, in the security and maritime arenas, by the United States and the developed world. The most worthwhile strategy the United States could follow is to recognize a program that has a good possibility of success and then support those Africans who have the motivation and ability to make it work.

## Notes

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13. Walter H. Kansteiner, "US Interests in Africa Revisited," *CSIS Africa Notes*, February 1994, p. 1.
14. Lake, p. 3.
15. Ibid., p. 4.
16. Moose, p. 148.
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18. Salim Ahmed Salim, "The White House Conference on Africa," *CSIS Africa Notes*, July 1994, p. 6.
19. Ibid.
20. Jannie Bates, "An Exit Interview with Hank Cohen," *CSIS Africa Notes*, April 1993, p. 6.
21. *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), 16 February 1995, trans. FRG Office of Defense Administration for USA and Canada Foreign Language Department.
22. Kansteiner, p. 1. Demands by developing countries for a new international economic order can be traced to the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), where they banded together to form the "Group of 77" as a coalition of the world's poor to press for concessions from the rich. Known as the G-77, the group combined forces with the Nonaligned Movement during the 1973 Algiers summit, where issues relating to economic and political "liberation" came to the fore. This led to the 1974

Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, where the G-77, with its superior numbers, succeeded in passing the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. Thus, the voice of the Third World began to be heard; however, in the course of the Cold War this dialogue degenerated into a dialogue of the deaf. See Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformation*, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 254–6.

23. *U.S. European Command Strategy for the Support of U.S. Policy in Africa*, 27 December 1993, p. 3.

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41. T.W. Parker (Lt. Col., USMC), "Operation Sharp Edge," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1991, pp. 102–6.

42. John H. Cushman, (Lt. Gen., USA), "Out of Somalia: United Shield," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1995, pp. 129–30.

43. Till, p. 11.

44. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (New York: 1983), p. 18. See also John H. McNeill, "The Strategic Significance of the Convention on the Law of the Sea," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1995, pp. 123–9.

45. Lennox Hinds, "World Marine Fisheries: Management and Development Problems," *Marine Policy*, September 1992, p. 395.

46. Jaime de Ojeda, "On the High Seas," *The Washington Post*, 18 March 1995.

47. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, *World Fisheries Situation*, International Conference on Responsible Fishing, Cancún, Mexico, 6–8 May 1992, p. 5.

48. With 300,000 to 500,000 tons of oil being transported around the tip of Africa daily, there is a constant danger of spills resulting from accidents, which are highly likely given the aging of the worldwide tanker fleet and the notoriously bad sea conditions in those waters. A recent ore-carrier disaster resulting in pollution along Cape Town beaches is a case in point. See Simpson-Anderson.

Ψ

# Observations on the Role of the Military in Disaster Relief

James F. Miskel

THE ARMED FORCES HAVE PLAYED important roles in disaster relief for more than a century. In fact the military has been so heavily involved in responding to domestic disasters, and for so long, that two questions naturally arise. The first is why there continues to be any controversy about military involvement in disaster relief. The second question is whether, in this dawning era of government reinvention, the federal disaster relief program should be administered by the military rather than by a civilian agency, as it is today.

With respect to the first question, there can hardly still be any controversy over the propriety of using military assets to assist in disaster relief. The precedents are so numerous and, by now, so decidedly commonplace that if they were presented in court the jury would undoubtedly conclude that the nation harbors no serious policy objection to it. Indeed, whatever controversy exists attaches not to the propriety of military involvement but to the cumulative effect of too much involvement. The wear and tear of too many humanitarian operations could erode the military's ability to execute its primary functions.

But how many humanitarian operations are too many? There is no single answer to this question. The answer will and should change over time depending upon such variable factors as the imminence of military threats to national interests, the severity of a given disaster, the recency of the last one, and funds available in various accounts in the defense budget. These factors not only change over time but are assigned different values by military and civilian agencies when

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**Naval War College Review, Winter 1996, Vol. XLIX, No. 1**

disaster assistance is being authorized. For example, a civilian agency, unconcerned about military maintenance and operations budgets, may be predisposed to early and frequent requests for military assistance. Conversely, the Defense Department, if its maintenance and operations accounts are not flush, may prefer to be less accommodating of state and local government requests for minor disaster assistance than would a civilian agency for which relief was the principal mission.

One might suppose that these considerations would incline the military towards proposals to transfer the administration of the federal disaster relief program to the Defense Department. If Defense were in charge of the program, it could ensure that the military costs of humanitarian operations were fully understood. In any case, the military actually contributes more people and equipment to major disaster operations than any other federal agency. Approximately thirty thousand members of the armed forces participated in the response to Hurricane Andrew in 1991; that is more than eleven times as many people as are employed nation-wide by the civilian disaster relief administrator, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

Despite these factors, the Defense Department has been unenthusiastic about assuming leadership of the federal disaster relief program. Why?

One reason may be bureaucratic wariness of taking responsibility for a mission that is often politically controversial. From the Defense bureaucratic perspective, the status quo may represent the best of both worlds. Through its present involvement in disaster relief the Defense Department draws obvious public relations dividends as well as less obvious budgetary benefits: e.g., stronger justifications for existing force structure, occasional supplemental appropriations, and reimbursements from FEMA's disaster relief fund. Another reason may be a misunderstanding about the traditional role of the military in disaster relief. The misunderstanding is one that is shared by the General Accounting Office, the Congressional Research Service and the National Academy of Public Administration—as recent studies by each of these agencies suggest. These studies were commissioned by Congress in the aftermath of the much-criticized federal response to Hurricane Andrew; all expressed opposition to "fixing" the disaster relief program by transferring it to the Defense Department.

In a 1993 report, the General Accounting Office (GAO) opposed military leadership of disaster relief on the philosophical grounds that it could "create the impression that the military is attempting to make or direct domestic policy, which runs contrary to the principles that have guided the military's role in the United States."[1] The flaw in this line of argument is that there is no constitutional prohibition against the Defense Department attempting to "make or direct"

domestic policy. In fact, the Defense Department routinely exerts substantial influence over a wide range of such matters.

For example, Defense acquisition regulations establish national policy towards an important sector of the domestic economy, the defense industrial base. Also, the Department's approach to equal opportunity shapes an important social policy, even sets an example for the nation; in early March 1995, President Clinton acknowledged as much by stating that the military's affirmative action program was the model to which all federal agencies should aspire. Further, as a major employer of civilians, the Defense Department has, properly, as strong a voice as many civilian agencies in the formulation of national civil service policies. As an important deliverer of health care and medical insurance to service people in uniform, their dependents, and retirees, Defense plays a substantial role in domestic health policy. The Army Corps of Engineers effectively makes domestic policy by deciding where flood control projects will be undertaken or commercial waterways dredged. As a final example, through its research and development program the Defense Department establishes domestic policies for much of the scientific research undertaken by universities and non-military research centers.

Indeed, the processes of government literally invite the Defense Department to do what the GAO study says it should not—exert influence on domestic policy. Like other cabinet agencies, the Defense Department is routinely asked to review and comment on hundreds if not thousands of policy documents during the course of any given year. Examples are: legislative proposals on the reduction of the federal civilian work force; regulations affecting the commercial telecommunications industry; and regulations on the transportation, storage, and disposal of hazardous and toxic materials.

More to the point, the Defense Department already has an important role in establishing policy for the disaster relief program itself. Defense was one of several agencies that had virtual veto power over the Federal Response Plan, the interagency agreement that establishes many basic disaster relief policies and defines interagency responsibilities.

In the second of the three studies of Hurricane Andrew, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) observed that there "may" be an issue with respect to loss of civilian control over disaster relief. Although this sounds ominous, the only specific problem identified is a detail of implementation, not a policy or constitutional issue. The CRS study expressed concern about the potential for "arbitrary decisions" by military officers during a disaster operation.[2] Arbitrary decisions are, of course, as likely to be made by civilian officials, particularly when they are faced with stressful situations for which they have not been adequately prepared. The way to reduce this risk is to train effectively and otherwise prepare disaster relief operatives for the realities they will face. Since

the military is generally regarded as the government's preeminent trainer and contingency planner, it is hard to accept the CRS implication that arbitrariness would increase over the long run if the disaster relief program were transferred to the Defense Department.

In the third of the congressionally mandated studies, by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), two of the many points made concern civil-military relations.[3] One is that disaster relief should not be shifted to the Defense Department because the armed forces "must receive their missions and directions from civilian authorities." As wrenching as disasters may be, they are less traumatic for the nation and for civil-military relations than war. The institution of the presidency is the embodiment of civilian control of the military, and the presidency has retained its commander-in-chief powers during two world wars and numerous regional conflicts. Thus it is frankly inconceivable that these powers could be lost during peacetime disasters.

Funding—adding to and subtracting money from an agency budget—is the single most effective way to establish mission and direction. During wartime the president and Congress continue to hold the ultimate reins on the defense budget; there is no evidence to suggest that they would relinquish those reins during a civil disaster. Neither the Congress nor the presidency abdicated its budget authorities during Hurricane Andrew, the midwest floods of 1993, or the earthquakes and mud slides that recently struck California. Further, as will be discussed, the historical record seems to invalidate NAPA's first concern: the military continued to receive missions and direction from the president and Congress when disaster relief was in fact a War Department responsibility.

NAPA's second concern was that if the Defense Department were assigned responsibility for the disaster relief program the military would come "very close to directing civilian agencies, something neither the military nor civilians would appreciate." This argument ignores several important considerations. One is that Federal agencies fail to "appreciate" direction from *any* other agency, military or civilian. That is exactly why leadership of the disaster relief program has for many years been based on coordination among cooperating, equal federal agencies rather than on direction and control by a superior agency. Many in the Defense Department might well prefer a more directive *modus operandi*, but it is impossible to envision any interagency program so politically charged as disaster relief being run unilaterally out of the Pentagon. The basic ground rules of interagency relationships would continue to be set by the White House and Congress. Furthermore, the Defense Department's performance in the northern Iraq, Bangladesh, and Somalia humanitarian relief operations, while perhaps not flawless, amply demonstrates that the military is fully capable of coordinating and cooperating with civilian organizations.

In any case, as is seldom remembered, for most of the nation's history disaster relief has in fact been a military program. During the nineteenth century, federal disaster relief consisted of ad hoc responses—by the military—to individual disasters like the Chicago fire of 1871. At that time, of course, there was virtually no alternative to the military, because the civilian side of the federal government was much less developed than it is today. In the nineteenth century the civilian side of government consisted of basically one agency, the post office.

In 1917 the disaster relief program became more institutionalized. The War Department issued regulations that established policy guidelines for disaster relief operations, although case-by-case funding authorization from Congress was still required. Interestingly, in light of today's debate over the tradeoff between the military's combat and "operations other than war" responsibilities, this regulation was promulgated after the United States had entered World War I and remained in force until after the Second World War.

The size, capabilities, and philosophies of the federal and state governments have, of course, changed markedly in the last half-century. Nevertheless, many of the basic principles that shape the current federal disaster relief program are actually outgrowths or continuations of policies and guidelines that were established by the War Department regulation. This suggests that these same principles would not be undermined if the disaster relief program were transferred to the Defense Department.

Despite its title, the War Department's 1917 Special Regulation No. 67—"Regulations Governing Flood Relief Work of the War Department"—was not restricted to floods. The language of the directive explicitly covered responses to fires, earthquakes, and "other great catastrophe[s]."[4] Among the principles that have been carried forward from this regulation into current practice are state precedence, federal certification of the need for assistance, cooperation with local authorities, appointment of federal on-scene coordinators, accountability, an emphasis on avoiding fraud or abuse, competition in contracting, and equal treatment for minority Americans who are victims of disaster.

*State precedence.* Under the terms of the Federal Disaster Relief Act (also known as the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988) and consistent with long-standing principles of federalism, federal disaster relief is authorized only when effective response is "beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments."[5] In practice this means that with respect to public resources, disaster victims are to look first to local and state coffers for assistance; federal resources are gap-fillers to be called upon only when the state and local governments are overwhelmed or face an unusual constraint upon their

ability to respond. An example might be an economic recession in a particular region or a succession of disasters that have drained a state's financial resources.

This philosophy is identical to the one incorporated in the 1917 War Department regulation. While the War Department ran the program, federal assistance was to be authorized only when local and state resources were insufficient to the requirements of the disaster.

*Federal certification.* Today when a disaster strikes and the governor of the state requests assistance, a federal official or team is dispatched to evaluate the situation. Usually from the nearest FEMA regional office, these officials are responsible for assessing the impact of the disaster, quantifying the need for federal assistance, and confirming that the state and local governments involved have indeed been overwhelmed. This evaluation is used by the FEMA headquarters and the White House to determine whether federal assistance should be authorized.

Notwithstanding certain major differences, basically the same process was followed under the War Department regulations. From 1917 through 1947, federal disaster relief was to be authorized only after the senior military officer in the area had determined that response was actually beyond the powers and resources of the state. His findings were then transmitted to the Secretary of War, who, ordinarily, would decide whether federal assistance was warranted.

The principal difference between the War Department and FEMA processes is that in 1917–1947 there was no standing authorization for federal disaster relief. As long as the 1917 regulation was in force, congressional approval was ordinarily requested whenever the War Department believed that federal assistance was warranted.[6] Congress, in effect, reviewed the appropriateness of the War Department's decisions and determined on a case-by-case basis whether budget priorities allowed additional relief expenditures. Standing authorization for disaster relief was passed in the 1950s, when a revolving fund was established to finance relief expenditures without case-by-case legislation. Congress, of course, continues to review the appropriateness of disaster relief decisions; the hearings on and studies of Hurricane Andrew discussed above are recent examples. Congress determines the budgetary priority of disaster relief through its annual appropriations to the revolving fund and also, in recent years, through the supplemental appropriations that have been necessary due to hurricanes, flooding, and earthquakes near the close of a fiscal year.

*Cooperation with local authorities.* The current federal disaster relief program sensibly emphasizes cooperation during the planning stages with the state and local emergency management agencies and, during disasters, with both state and local agencies and representatives of the governor. As noted above, this is in accord with the principle of state precedence. In the 1917–1947 period there

were no organized emergency management or disaster relief bureaucracies at the state or local levels. Nevertheless, War Department regulations acknowledged the role of local relief committees set up to orchestrate community self-help relief activities. The local committees were also expected to advise federal officials, i.e., the military, about the extent of need.

All levels of government today are more bureaucratic than they were nearly fifty and eighty years ago. Accordingly, cooperation with state and local government authorities has become much more structured and complex. Setting aside differences of organizational development in various states, it is clear that the philosophical principles have not changed. The military disaster relief program of 1917–1947 and the modern civilian program both place high value on cooperation with state and local authorities in the communities affected.

*On-scene federal coordinators.* When the president authorizes disaster relief under the current program, a federal coordinating official (FCO) is automatically appointed, normally an executive from FEMA. According to current federal disaster relief legislation, the FCO determines what types of relief are most urgently needed, decides where federal field offices to facilitate the delivery of assistance to victims should be located, and coordinates the administration of federal, state, and private relief programs.

The process that the War Department established in 1917 was in important respects analogous to the modern civilian procedure. The senior military official in the district affected decided which needs were the most urgent and developed a field structure by subdividing the disaster zone into districts, each with field offices or encampments to facilitate the distribution of relief. Virtually all the federal assets were military; thus coordination at the federal level was largely internal to the armed forces. This is, of course, different from the situation today, when more than twenty federal departments and agencies may be involved in disaster relief.[7] But that the federal structure was different and fewer agencies were involved means only that interagency coordination was less complex in 1917–1947 than it is today.

*Accountability.* In the 1990s, detailed accounting of federal expenditures is a prominent feature of all government programs, including disaster relief. FEMA reports on its expenditures to both the Office of Management and Budget, in the Executive Office of the President, and to the Congress. Its reports are subject to audit by its internal Inspector General and the GAO, a congressional agency. Earlier in the century, program administrators were not subjected to the same withering scrutiny that they are today, but the War Department's 1917 regulation did establish detailed accounting procedures that are similar in spirit to those that now apply. Military disaster relief officials were required to report on

personnel and administrative expenses as well as disaster relief expenditures. Sample copies of the record-keeping forms were actually included in the regulation.

*An emphasis on avoiding fraud and abuse.* The Federal Disaster Relief Act stresses that relief should be administered in ways that minimize duplicate payments to victims. The statute prescribes civil penalties for individuals who obtain relief benefits to which they are not entitled and requires that duplicate payments be recovered. The War Department regulation placed equally great emphasis on preventing fraud and abuse by disaster victims. The 1917 regulation required officers to record the names and addresses of disaster relief beneficiaries and the amount of assistance each received. The records were checked manually to identify or prevent "double dipping."

*Competition in contracting.* The Federal Disaster Relief Act provides for preference to local contractors in clearing debris and reconstructing damaged facilities, as a way of promoting local economic recovery. At the same time, the general requirement for all federal contracting is for open competition, to reduce costs and guarantee equitable treatment of private-sector enterprises. Both of these aspects of contracting were reflected in the War Department regulation. Military relief authorities were directed to purchase relief supplies and equipment from nearby sources, as a means both of assisting economic recovery and providing temporary employment to disaster victims. Furthermore, open competition was to be the order of the day. Written contract proposals were to be invited from prospective suppliers, and the contracts were to be awarded to the lowest bidder.

*Equal treatment of minorities.* Section 308 of the Federal Disaster Relief Act requires that federal assistance be provided without discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, nationality, sex, or economic status. Perhaps because it was promulgated in a less litigious or enlightened era, the War Department did not specifically address non-discrimination in the 1917 regulation. However, it did indicate that federal disaster relief was to be distributed, "wherever and whenever possible," directly to disaster victims. According to one study of the military's role in disaster relief, direct distribution was a way to avoid discrimination against minorities. Particularly in the South, when local governments or employers were relied upon to distribute federal relief, white disaster victims occasionally received preferential treatment over black victims.[8]

On the basis of these similarities between the principles of civilian and military programs, it seems clear that philosophical opposition to transferring disaster relief to the Defense Department is not well founded. The

critiques of military leadership of disaster relief that have been expressed in congressionally mandated studies do not provide a firm basis for policy making. Indeed, it is apparent that military leadership of the program would cause little disruption to enduring principles of civil-military relations, equitable treatment of disaster victims, cooperation with and respect for the prerogatives of state and local disaster relief agencies, and so forth.

Today's federal disaster programs cover more than assistance to disaster victims in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake or hurricane. One conspicuous example is the promotion through federal grants, between disasters, of state and local preparedness and mitigation investments. A second is federal financial support for the economic recovery of disaster zones, through subsidized loans to businesses and the provision of intermediate-term housing for local workers. These programs are obviously not as amenable to military leadership as disaster relief; they may be another reason why the Defense Department and many in Congress have been unenthusiastic about transferring disaster programs to the military. The immediate and longer-term programs are, however, separable. Moreover, it is conceivable that the unrelenting pressures of the budget deficit and the drive to downsize and reorganize the federal government will together cause the preparedness and recovery programs to be phased out or transformed into block grants to the states. If this were to happen, there would be no philosophical or organizational reasons for maintaining disaster relief as a separate civilian program.

As ideas for the "reinvention" of government circulate about the nation's capital, the Defense Department and the Congress have an opportunity to take a fresh look at the disaster relief program—unencumbered, this time, by unsubstantiated objections about potential disruption of civil-military relations or enduring principles of disaster relief in the United States.

## Notes

1. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Disaster Management* GAO/RCED 93-186 (Washington: 23 July 1993), p. 8. GAO based its conclusions on interviews with officials at various agencies, including the Defense Department.

2. U.S. Congressional Research Service, *Disaster Management*, Order Code IB 93094 (Washington: Library of Congress, 6 August 1993), p. CRS–6.

3. The National Academy of Public Administration, *Coping with Catastrophe* (Washington: February 1993), pp. 23–5.

4. U.S. Government, War Department, *Special Regulation No. 67: Regulations Governing Flood Relief Work of the War Department* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1917), U.S. National Archives, Record Group no. 407.

5. Section 401, "Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act," Public Law 100-707.

6. There were exceptions. Section 1 of the 1917 regulation authorized immediate federal assistance by the military when "overruling demands of humanity compel immediate action to prevent starvation and extreme suffering." Military commanders are currently authorized to provide immediate assistance under such circumstances, without waiting for a formal analysis by FEMA and a decision by the president. In both periods, military commanders faced the possibility that the costs of immediate assistance might not be reimbursed—in

1917 Congress might not have appropriated funds, and in 1995 the president might decide not to authorize federal assistance.

7. U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, *The Federal Response Plan* (Washington: April 1992), p. xi–xiii, lists twenty-seven agencies as signatory-participants.

8. Gaines Foster, *The Demands of Humanity: Army Medical Disaster Relief* (Washington: Center for Military History, 1983), p. 78.

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## Surface Navy Association/Naval Institute Literary Award

The Surface Navy Association (SNA) and the U.S. Naval Institute jointly sponsor an annual award of $1,000 for the author of the best article addressing surface warfare matters published in a wide-circulation periodical during the previous year. The award is presented during the annual SNA symposium in October. Nominations may be made through presidents of SNA chapters, members of its Board of Directors, and the editor of the USNI *Proceedings*. For information about the Surface Navy Association or its literary award, contact SNA headquarters at 7205 Burtonwood Drive, Alexandria, Va., 22307, by telephone at (703) 765-SHIP, or by e-mail at NAVYSNA@AOL.COM.

## The Mine Warfare Association

The Mine Warfare Association, or MINWARA, has been recently formed to enhance education and communication concerning mine warfare at sea and on land, and also humanitarian demining. MINWARA is a not-for-profit organization providing for the exchange of operational, technical, and historical information on the many aspects of mining, countermeasures, and international initiatives for controlling indiscriminate proliferation of mine technology. MINWARA will assume responsibility for the newsletter *Mine Lines* and will be convening workshops and symposia in conjunction with other official and unofficial organizations.

Serving and retired military personnel of all services, government and civilian scientists and operations analysts, and individuals from academic disciplines ranging from physics to political science are invited to join. For information contact Albert M. Bottoms at P.O. Box 7135, Charlottesville, Va., 22906-7135; by telephone at (804) 296-3080; or by e-mail at amb2m@virginia.edu.

# IN MY VIEW . . .

## "Institutionalizing Innovation"

Sir:

You are to be commended for publishing the excellent article by Captain Bradd Hayes, U.S. Navy, who challenges the Navy's leadership to foster, recognize, incorporate, and reward change that enhances mission accomplishment. Bradd raises the question of whether change can be institutionalized at all. I think that it can, and that there is a fundamental role to be played by doctrine organizations within the military, to act as "learning organizations."

Peter Senge tells us in *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* that "learning organizations" are those where the individuals within "continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together."

Naval Doctrine Command recognizes this responsibility and has recently chartered an Academic Advisory Group specifically charged with assistance in creating the climate of a "learning organization" which will promote many of the excellent ideas raised in Bradd's article. We would welcome the ideas of others who have considered this issue.

Doctrine organizations, as was alluded to in Bradd's article by Dean Robert Wood of the Naval War College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies, have a dual responsibility as both "keepers of the flame" and as "learning organizations." Dean Wood stated that doctrine borders on dogma (I would have used another

word), whereas innovation represents the opposite. A true "learning organization" should be able to perform the functions of "keeper of the flame" and also be the place where new ideas can have a hearing. Dean Wood was invited to join and head the Naval Doctrine Command's Academic Advisory Group.

When attempting to be both the "keeper of the flame" and a "learning organization," doctrine commands need to make sure that new ideas are clearly identified as such and are not mistaken for approved doctrine. One such method is the publication of technical reports and articles, signed by individual staff members and researchers. These are ideas, not yet fully matured, published for circulation and comment.

Bradd suggests in his article that most new ideas will come into the U.S. Navy from "ad hoc" groups, the SSG, the CNO Executive Panel, or "think tanks." There are, of course, other avenues for the introduction of new ideas. New ideas will come from everywhere, inside and outside the organization. A true "learning organization" will screen the plethora of new ideas that are "out there" to see which of them are of interest. The recent article by Wayne Hughes in the Summer 1995 *Review* includes many recommendations for doctrinal development which will be considered by the Naval Doctrine Command. Wayne is also a member of the NDC Academic Advisory Group. Naturally, if the CNO or Commandant of the Marine Corps determines that a new idea is of interest, they will expect naval doctrine organizations to develop more detailed concepts.

When the external debate on a non-mandated new idea is reaching a close, the doctrinal organization takes the idea inside and prepares concept papers and briefings. The purpose of such concept papers is to create consensus within the service—not necessarily to invite initial comment from outside the organization. Obviously there will be cases where the pressure of time requires the formulation of a concept paper simultaneously with original research. Concept papers and briefings are probably best handled by a specific group within a doctrine organization.

Finally, when the new concept has been briefed sufficiently around the organization, it is time to shift the new idea to the group which is chartered to develop the actual doctrine. The doctrine organizations of the military are well-equipped to do this and regularly interact with each other in a cooperative manner. The product of their efforts will be papers which will influence what is taught and the conduct of training exercises and actual operations.

The above represents one possible view on innovation and doctrinal development. It is not the only possible view. We would like to hear from others.

Bradd's article concentrates primarily on the "idea" part of innovation. The introduction of new ideas into organizations is a completely separate problem that requires different skills than deciding what needs to be changed. This

requires our consideration just as much as those ideas recommended by Bradd. I hope that we will be able to read about this other dimension of innovation on the pages of future *Reviews*.

James J. Tritten, Ph.D.
Naval Doctrine Command

## Doctrine on the Wrong Foot

Sir:

I write in response to Wayne P. Hughes' "The Power in Doctrine" in the Summer 1995 issue of the *Naval War College Review*. There is so much that is constructive in this article that I am loath to criticize. I am also painfully aware that having married an admiral's daughter in no way qualifies me, a retired Air Force officer, as an authority on naval matters. It is evident to me that Captain Hughes has examined the problems of doctrine in considerable depth; however, in the era of jointness, it is singularly important that we employ common definitions for the key terms we use if we expect harmonious cooperation in joint operations. I think he is off on the wrong foot in trying to make doctrine prescriptive.

Much of what Captain Hughes has to say is valuable to the present discussion of doctrine. His analysis of the four echelons of doctrine, for example, is a real advance. The case he makes for the first echelon, at the very top, makes me rethink my stance on the use of the term "doctrine." I even think we should explore the possibility of establishing an officially sanctioned hierarchy of terminology, using the terms "policy," "doctrine," and "technique" rather more precisely than at present. Much of what the Air Force calls doctrine in AFM 1-1, *Basic Doctrine*, is in fact policy, and we might gain by so designating it. Each service is going to have to accept some concessions in its cherished practices if jointness is to become workable.

But the course Captain Hughes advocates with respect to the authority of doctrine is almost certain to cause bitter wrangling in the joint arena. He asserts that doctrine loses its power when it is optional: "When doctrine is not prescriptive, it is emasculated" (p. 12). However, at the same time he defines good doctrine as prescriptive without being constrictive, and he recognizes the need for order without undue restraints on freedom. This, to my mind, undercuts his call for prescription, for mandatory doctrine. Later in his essay he seems further to undermine his case for obligatory doctrine when he proposes the use of "should" rather than "shall" to allow decision-makers more freedom.

If we fail to establish a common understanding, we will be doing a great disservice to national defense. Perhaps we can come to some accommodation that will satisfy those naval officers who have been skeptical of rigid "Fighting Instructions" and at the same time be acceptable to the Army and Air Force conception of doctrine as suggestive but not mandatory. A great deal of what Captain Hughes wants to call doctrine is what can appropriately be called technique and procedures. Technique is, by definition, the mechanical part of any art. Techniques are what we drill; we perform them automatically, almost without the exercise of thought or volition. By contrast, doctrine deals with those areas of the military art where choices have to be made, where the commander must choose a course of action suited to the particular situation. Doctrine has been defined as a statement of "what has usually worked best in the past." But as JCS Publication 1 puts it, judgment must be exercised in its application. If Captain Hughes will back off from his call for mandatory doctrine while retaining most of the "power" he seeks by encouraging greater emphasis on uniform techniques and procedures, we may yet achieve effective joint operations.

I.B. Holley, Jr.
Maj. Gen., U.S. Air Force, Ret.

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**Annual Statement of**
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(signed) Pelham G. Boyer, Managing Editor

# SET AND DRIFT

## The Spectrum of Conflict: What Can It Do for Force Planners?

Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, Jr.

PLANNING THE FUTURE SIZE AND COMPOSITION of the United States military force structure is an arduous effort. It consists of appraising the security needs of a nation, establishing military requirements, and selecting military forces within resource constraints. One graphic tool that can assist force planners is the "spectrum of conflict." This essay examines it in both theory and practice, proceeding step by step as the authors do in the classroom, examining its strengths and weaknesses, and showing how it can bolster security assessments. First providing historical examples from Army and Joint Staff perspectives, the authors then explain the use of the spectrum of conflict from peace through nuclear war. An appropriate range of military missions, operations, and scenarios are analyzed for their relative destructiveness and likelihood of occurrence during the time period under consideration. What are the strengths and weaknesses of this concept? How would potential military tasks be prioritized for the coming decade? What degrees of destructiveness and likelihood can be associated with each one?

The authors are professors in the National Security Decision Making Department of the Naval War College. In addition to teaching, they conduct research on global security issues, national security strategy, and future military force requirements.

This article is adapted, by the kind permission of the authors, from chapter 38 of *Strategy and Force Planning* by the Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, National Security Decision Making Department, Naval War College.

**Naval War College Review, Winter 1996, Vol. XLIX, No. 1.**

Comparing probabilities of occurrence and destructiveness of military operations is a natural part of the planning process, and when approached graphically, the resulting diagram is usually termed a spectrum of conflict. Although it has been used for objective analysis as well as programmatic advocacy, its significance and implications need to be fully explored. Instinctively, military strategists, force planners, and commanders think of a spectrum of operations, missions, and scenarios. Peacetime presence and nuclear war constitute the two extremes. Between them lie many different forms of military activity—some more probable than others. For example, humanitarian assistance is much more likely to take place than two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. The operations more apt to occur are usually less destructive in scope and duration than conflicts at the other end of the spectrum.

## Historical Examples of the Spectrum of Conflict

The U.S. Army has long used the spectrum of conflict to explain its missions and operations. *The United States Army Posture Statement FY 90/91* depicted the spectrum as in figure 1. Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of this rendition is the way it aggregates Army operations into three major planning cases: low intensity, mid-intensity, and high intensity. It makes another distinction in weighing the "probability of occurrence" against "risk to the nation"—an inherently debatable factor—rather than referring to the more measurable attribute of destructiveness. The document carefully explains the importance of these concepts: "While the likelihood of U.S. involvement in a high intensity conflict is low, such a war would pose a high risk to the nation. Low intensity conflicts pose a smaller risk, but are much more likely to occur. Our Army must be prepared to fight and win across this entire spectrum of conflict."[1]

In 1993 General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army, presented a more complicated version of the spectrum of conflict that reflected certain major debates over the Army's future. "By 1991 the Army's capstone doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-1, introduced the term 'peacetime engagement'. . . . [It] reintroduced the concept of 'hostilities short of war' to describe an increasingly important segment of the continuum of potential Army missions and employment. Many wanted to describe these missions as 'non-traditional,' but others recognized that the Army's historic role of serving the nation included a rich heritage of operations other than war."[2]

Sullivan's spectrum used two diverging axes to portray the likelihood and level of hostilities, with a smooth curve connecting the extreme cases of peacetime engagement and global nuclear war (figure 2). This depiction conveyed several predictions about the Army's future. In the aftermath of the Cold War, global nuclear war was deemed far less probable but still not out of the

FIGURE 1
SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT




question. The term "peacetime engagement" was a notable change, but most important was the graphic judgment that more operations might take place at the lowest level of hostilities than during the Cold War.

A more complex version of the concept appeared in the 1991 *Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA)* (figure 3). General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explored implications for the entire force, rather than a single service, at a turning point in America's military history: "This assessment represents a first report of the transition from planning and programming principally for global war with the Soviet Union to planning and programming for the regional situations we expect to face in the 1990s."[3]

In this case, the spectrum of conflict is used to assess specific conflict scenarios, several of which are generic: peacetime engagement; counterinsurgency and counternarcotics (CI/CN); and lesser regional contingencies (LRC), global, and nuclear. Others are more specific in terms of location: Major Regional Contingency-West (MRC-W for Korea), Major Regional Contingency-East (MRC-E for Southwest Asia), and war escalating from a European crisis.[4]

This depiction was built around the axes of "probability of occurrence" and "level of violence." Readers must assume that the point of origin is low (or

FIGURE 2
LEVEL AND LIKELIHOOD OF HOSTILITIES




perhaps zero) for the two axes, while the extremes are higher. The scenarios are labelled and plotted in reference to the two axes. Significantly, then, war is more likely to occur in Southwest Asia than in Korea, while war in Europe is doubtful. To convey another useful theme, the *JMNA* also portrays "consequences of failure" on a second vertical axis. Unfortunately, however, it does not provide the rationale for the consequences for failure (see figure 4). There are some scenarios, like nuclear war, that are intuitively obvious, but readers must decide for themselves why the consequences of failure would be so high for the peacetime scenario and so low for the CI/CN case.[5]

The *JMNA* did arrive at some important conclusions. Above all, "the spectrum of conflict, peace through nuclear war, has not changed; it continues to provide a method to overlay various scenarios."[6] The most destructive forms of conflict may have declined, but the consequences of failure would still be grave. Thus the spectrum of conflict served as a concise way to convey complex judgments about the post–Cold War world.

## Using the Spectrum of Conflict

As teachers of force planning, the authors begin by specifying the time period under consideration. An inevitable debate involves how far into the future we

FIGURE 3
PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE




FIGURE 4
CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE



must look. The factors that drive this time horizon are both international and domestic. How soon, for example, could any country become a military peer competitor of the United States? At home, what are the lead times for procuring major weapon systems to replace aging force structure?

***Operations and Missions.*** The second step is to list specific military tasks that dominate planning. A recent example appears in *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* Joint Publication 3-0, which presents a summary section entitled "Range of Military Operations." In the section "Operations Other Than War," two categories are identified: those that involve the use or threat of force, and those which do not. The former includes deterrence and compellence through raids and strikes. "Other such operations include peace enforcement, counterterrorism, enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, maritime interception, and evacuation of noncombatants." The latter consists of "humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, nation assistance, security assistance, foreign internal defense, counterdrug operations, arms control, support to U.S. domestic civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants, and peacekeeping." Under "War," a graphic summary also entitled "Range of Military Operations" lists simply Attack, Defend, and Blockades.[7]

***Destructiveness.*** The next step is to plot relevant operations and missions along a horizontal axis, from the least to the most destructive. This defines the spectrum of conflict.[8] As the previous examples demonstrate, several other variables as well have been used to perform this task. Among them are "risk to the nation," "intensity of conflict," "level of hostilities," and "level of violence." All suffer from vagueness and subjectivity. A case in point is that most Americans probably believe that ethnic warfare in the Balkans poses little or no "risk to the nation"; yet many historians would disagree, reminding us that World War I began in Sarajevo and warning that American interests could well be jeopardized by another European conflict—especially one involving Greece, Russia, and Turkey. By the same token, mine warfare may present a low "level of violence" to strategic planners, but not to the captain of an aircraft carrier.

The term "destructiveness" lends itself to measurement and tends to reduce misunderstanding. Force planners should estimate the destructiveness of any mission, operation, or scenario (for the time period under consideration) in the context of their country's national interests. They must take full account of the many assumptions and uncertainties that may skew their hypotheses. Specifically, we suggest that they evaluate hypothetical destructiveness in terms of its scope and duration. At the least, scope would involve such factors as lethality of weapons involved, number of forces engaged, and geographic expanse of the war. Duration is the estimated length of time a given conflict will last. Certain

operational environments tend to lengthen wars, often belying the initial predictions of unwary strategists—jungles, mountains, and cities, for example, create sanctuaries for guerrillas while constraining conventional forces. Similarly, such large expanses as the Russian steppes permit the trading of space for time. In general, the duration of the conflict depends upon the intensity of historical animosity between the opponents, national will to bear the costs of war, physical geography, and rules of engagement—especially restrictive rules of engagement and attempts to control escalation, which have lengthened the conflicts from Vietnam through Bosnia.

Potential destructiveness deserves more attention than it has received, especially during an era of ethnic chaos and collapsing states. Civil wars possess a deceptively different kind of destructiveness (combining both scope and duration) than do state-to-state conflicts, which may be why American forces have fared better against such governmental opponents as Grenada, Panama, and Iraq than against the guerrillas of Vietnam, the clans of Lebanon, and the warlords of Somalia.

Figure 5 is an illustrative spectrum of conflict for missions, operations, and scenarios. It includes not only the tasks specified in JCS Pub 3-0 but also, more importantly, weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological).[9] The unprecedented proliferation over the past three years of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium has increased the possibility of a nuclear incident, either by terrorists or by rogue states. Similarly, the rapid diffusion of chemical and biological capabilities has increased the chance of attack by other weapons of mass destruction. Such scenarios could be quite destructive, especially if they posit attacks on civilian population centers.

FIGURE 5
SPECTRUM OF MILITARY OPERATIONS,
MISSIONS & SCENARIOS
(1995 - 2005)



***Likelihood.*** The next step is to plot the estimated likelihood of occurrence for all these operations, missions, and scenarios against a vertical axis. Individual analysts and separate services or departments may disagree vociferously about the likelihood of different contingencies, just as they would over their relative destructiveness.[10] However, the usefulness of the spectrum of conflict lies in accentuating and debating both variables.

***Draw the Curve.*** Some analysts find it useful to connect the plotted points with a curve or line as shown above in figure 2. However, there are pitfalls here. Drawing one smooth curve may oversimplify complex issues and conceal controversial judgments. As an example, "terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction" can range across the entire spectrum in terms of destructiveness and likelihood of occurrence. It could entail chemical attack against an isolated military unit, nuclear targeting of a civilian airport, or even contaminating New York City with a fearsome disease, such as anthrax. Consequently a scatter diagram plotting the points without a curve may be preferable, especially for analyzing a large number of operations, missions, and scenarios. If a curve is drawn, its shape is significant. At the least, it can have historical importance, showing differences in judgment from decade to decade. The smooth, asymptotic curve often plotted during the Cold War (figure 2) has changed considerably: not only will the military be conducting more operations at the lowest level of destructiveness, but the chance of operations other than war in the coming decade is 100 percent. Moreover, there may be some important "spikes" upward or downward. Two MRCs, for example, seem much less likely than one, while the isolated use of weapons of mass destruction appears far more likely than global nuclear war.

***Focus on Major Planning Cases.*** The last step is to divide the spectrum into a few large categories. These broader sets of operations, missions, and scenarios are the major defense planning cases. Here again, experts may disagree on how to label them. There are those who think in terms of the intensity of conflict (low, medium, and high), while some stress technology (especially nuclear versus conventional conflict), and yet others use political circumstances as discriminators (such as war versus operations short of war).

As an example, the 1991 *JMNA* explains some important changes in how the Department of Defense thinks about the major planning cases. This document portrays these changes graphically (figure 6) and explains them with care: "Previously, conventional force requirements were generated by focusing attention toward the right end of the spectrum, where the threat was large and the consequence of failure was great (depicted by the lightly shaded area on the graph). Consequently, our conventional force structure was large, heavy, and

FIGURE 6
PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE (IN BLOCKS)
AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE (IN BURSTS)




robust. However, more recently our focus has shifted to the left (depicted by the darker shaded area). . . . Today, the probability of occurrence for conventional conflicts at the right end of the spectrum is low, and warning time has so greatly increased, that these conflicts are no longer the central point of focus or the principal driver of requirements of forces. We find now, however, that the focus of attention and risk is the range of conflict scenarios where the probability of occurrence is greater and the consequences of failure are still high."[11]

Recent events suggest the wisdom of dividing the spectrum into three major planning cases, "Operations Other Than War," "War," and "Weapons of Mass Destruction." Such a division can help strategists and force planners first to identify the common features among future missions, operations, and scenarios and then to set priorities for the allocation of scarce resources.[12] We do not mean that one case would take all available resources, or even most of them, nor do we mean that it would necessarily take the next available dollar, but rather that it should be considered first, using the criteria of destructiveness and likelihood as outlined above.

However, it will be no easy task to set such priorities. Some will argue that War (such as MRC-E and MRC-W) deserves the highest priority when preparing

for the coming decade, while others would assign the greatest importance to Operations Other Than War. A few might even favor Weapons of Mass Destruction, particularly when rogue states are involved. In a period of constrained resources the ability to set priorities will continue to be crucial, and the spectrum of conflict can be a valuable aid.

This essay began by showing first U.S. Army and then Joint Staff versions of the "spectrum of conflict." Different variables were noted and different purposes were compared. The authors then suggested several steps for constructing a "spectrum of conflict." It has many important attributes that we believe can assist both strategists and force planners by: encouraging a comprehensive review of the operations, missions, and scenarios that a country's armed forces may encounter in the time period under analysis; examining them for completeness, relevance, and plausibility; stimulating debate over likelihood and destructiveness; facilitating aggregation into major planning cases; and setting priorities for the allocation of scarce resources.

This concept, however, does have some drawbacks. The term "spectrum of conflict" is itself a bit narrow and misleading. Perhaps "spectrum of military missions, operations, and scenarios" would be more descriptive, albeit cumbersome. We continue to employ the term "spectrum of conflict" because of its wide acceptance. Unavoidably, the spectrum of conflict accentuates the utility of military power, as opposed to economic and political instruments for achieving national goals. It also reduces complex realities and relationships to stark, unqualified judgments, at the constant risk of oversimplification.

Perhaps most dangerously, the spectrum of conflict relies upon expert opinion about the future, in spite of the fact that such judgments have all too often been wrong. Recent political upheavals, for instance the collapse of the Soviet Union, have altered Cold War formulations of the spectrum of conflict. By the same logic, technological progress (e.g., the mass production of nonlethal weapons) may reorient today's thinking about the probability and destructiveness of future operations, missions, and scenarios.

Such defects notwithstanding, national planners will surely continue to think in terms of a spectrum of conflict that extends from peace through nuclear war. They will also find it an excellent way to explain their decisions to the American people. Under the conditions the authors use in this essay, a major national goal will surely be to reduce both the likelihood and the destructiveness of future conflict. Achieving it will continue to require military capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.

## Notes

1. The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., and General Carl E. Vuono, USA, *The United States Army Posture Statement FY 90/91* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1990), p. 22.

2. Gordon R. Sullivan, *America's Army: Into the Twenty-first Century*, National Security Paper no. 14 (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in association with The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1993), p. 6.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *1991 Joint Military Net Assessment* [hereafter *JMNA*] (Washington: Department of Defense, March, 1991), pp. 1–5.

4. For the definition of MRC-E as standing for Southwest Asia (SWA) and MRC-W for Korea, see *JMNA*, pp. 9-2, 9-8.

5. For example, if one assumes that the most important military mission in peacetime is to deter nuclear war, then the consequences of failure would be high indeed. The low consequences of failure for CI/CN seem harder to justify. Vietnam was a case of counterinsurgency, but the outcome in Southeast Asia had devastating consequences for the country. Many authorities would also contend that the consequences of failure in the counternarcotics scenario are extremely serious.

6. *JMNA*, pp. 1–7.

7. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 [hereafter JCS Pub 3-0] (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1993), pp. I-2 through I-5.

8. According to the *Oxford American Dictionary* (New York: Avon Books, 1980), p. 656, a spectrum is "an entire range of related qualities or ideas."

9. JCS Pub 3-0 does not mention weapons of mass destruction in its section entitled "Range of Military Operations," pp. I-3 through I-5. However, a useful discussion of "Operations When Weapons of Mass Destruction Are Employed" does appear on pp. IV-26 through IV-28.

10. We prefer the term "likelihood" to "probability" or "risk" (which connote a higher degree of statistical rigor than we believe to be achievable in national security matters).

11. *JMNA*, pp. 1–8.

12. During the Cold War, for example, the likelihood of nuclear war was judged by most experts to be low. However, the destructiveness of such a scenario demanded that strategists and force planners treat it as their highest priority. They needed confidence in the ability of the U.S. to deter the worst-case scenario—a surprise Soviet counterforce attack. Lacking that confidence, the nuclear planning case demanded additional resources to bolster deterrence. This case has declined sharply in priority over the past few years, and others have risen.

Ψ

An advantage is an advantage, however offered or obtained; whether by an enemy's mistake, or by the accidents of the ground that play so large a part in land war; and on either element a skillful defense looks warily for its opportunities to the enemy's mistakes, as well as to other conditions.

Alfred Thayer Mahan
*Naval Strategy*, 1918

# BOOK REVIEWS

*A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.*

*Admiral H.G. Rickover*

## "Objectivity Is Impossible in the Face of Genocide"

Vulliamy, Ed. *Season in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War.* New York: St. Martin's, 1994. 370pp. $22.95

OUR TELEVISION SCREENS ARE FILLED with images of war. Of them all, those that make the greatest impression are from Bosnia. Each night we watch terrified civilians in Sarajevo living day to day under the constant threat of a quick and silent death from a sniper's bullet. There are starving prisoners of war, devastated rape victims, and a multitude of newly orphaned children.

Many view this war simply as the continuation of the historical quest of Serbia and Croatia for Bosnia. It is for this reason that the West has been reluctant to get involved. Vulliamy, however, refutes this idea. He demonstrates that the war is actually about which of the two major ethnic groups in today's Bosnia-Herzegovina (Croats and Serbs) will ultimately control the territory currently dominated by the Bosnian Moslems.

Before the war began, Bosnia's population was 47 percent Moslem, 34 percent Serb, and 17 percent Croat. When Yugoslavia collapsed, the new governments of Croatia and Serbia encouraged their compatriots in Bosnia to exert pressure on the new Bosnian government to enhance their joint nationalistic interests. Of course, the best way to protect those interests was to make portions of Bosnia part of a "Greater Serbia" or of a new Croatia. However, the people of Bosnia do not live in convenient ethnic enclaves but are spread throughout the country, and when it was realized that in such a multiethnic society peaceful annexation was impossible, the leaders turned to military force. When military action failed to dislodge the Bosnian Moslems from areas

dominated by the Serbs, Serb leaders adopted the policy of "ethnic cleansing." If the Bosnian army could not be defeated, at least Bosnian civilians could be forced from their homes and the land given to the "more deserving" Serbs.

The solution most often offered by desperate diplomats is simply to divide the country, each side getting some territory—no winners, no losers. The result, however, has been continued fighting and more carnage. Whatever the solution, there will be many losers. *Season in Hell* is a literary montage of the losers.

The author presents a cacophony of depravity of which no real army is capable. In fact, the Serbs appear more a heavily armed band of thugs than an army. It is not surprising that there are few large-scale confrontations between the opposing military forces. Instead, the war is conducted by artillery shelling, snipers, out-of-control freelance warriors who engage in mass rape and deportations, and siege warfare tactics not appreciably different from those of the Middle Ages. It is the civilians who are bearing the brunt of the military's wrath. In fact, the primary strategy against the Moslems appears to be nothing more than an ongoing, escalating string of atrocities: maternity clinics are targeted, Red Cross volunteers are attacked, civilians are deliberately shot, and prisoners of war are tortured. Very little, if anything, is done to punish the perpetrators or to prevent future violations.

Even if the Croats, Moslems, and Serbs were somehow equally responsible for starting the war, Vulliamy provides page after page of evidence clearly showing that it is the Serb forces that are mostly responsible for the carnage. Violations of the laws of war are so numerous that one can only conclude that they are committed with the tacit, if not the express, approval of those who claim to exercise military command over the troops. When confronted with overwhelming evidence of atrocities, the response of the accused leadership is nothing more than a rehash of the historic feuding now presented as the cause of the war, and the idea that if the tables were turned, the other side would do exactly the same thing.

Ed Vulliamy is a British journalist who visited the forces of all three factions. He saw the destruction close-up and understands fully the despair of the people. He is aware of the need for objectivity in a story but admits that it is impossible to be objective in the face of genocide. How can one be objective when confronted with overwhelming evidence of a soldier's brutal rape of a six-year-old child? In such cases objectivity approaches complicity.

Although the author does make a commendable attempt to explain the background of this war, he does not fully meet the promise of his subtitle, *Understanding Bosnia's War.* For this reviewer at least, "understanding" the war implies some acceptance of the methods employed in its prosecution. No military professional can accept what is happening in Bosnia.

Vulliamy concludes that the international community mistakenly identifies the Bosnian conflict as a humanitarian crisis and has therefore responded to it by sending professional soldiers to care for its victims. The author suggests that a more appropriate course of action would be to give the Bosnian government the aid and weapons it needs to defend itself and prevent the atrocities in the first place.

If the peace process does result in the creation of a smaller Bosnia accompanied by Serb or Croatian cantons, what of the hatred that is sure to follow? When war crimes are committed on such a large scale and go unpunished, the victims of those crimes are not likely to forget. Bosnia's war of inhumanity will certainly make it easier for us to understand at least one reason for what will surely be the next war in the former Yugoslavia—a war of revenge. As a portrait of the war's carnage and as a prognostication for the future, *Season in Hell* is to be recommended.

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Haass, Richard N. *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post–Cold War World*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994. 258pp. $24.95

Richard N. Haass provides an excellent, brief (156 pages of text plus notes, eight appendices, and index), and concise introduction to the history of intervention, the issues surrounding its methods, and its expected future. Haass is well qualified to address this topic. He taught at Harvard University and worked with both the State and Defense departments before serving as a senior member of the National Security Council staff in the Bush administration.

This book is highly recommended for anyone in the national security community and for students of U.S. foreign policy, given the immediacy of the issue and the likelihood that in the future we will often confront circumstances conducive to intervention.

Intervention is a more complex phenomenon than is commonly understood, and a virtue of this book is that Haass makes it understandable. He begins by reviewing the debate over intervention and recaps recent cases. He then elucidates its vocabulary, identifying fully a dozen forms of conduct ranging from deterrence and preventive measures to war. Midway within this spectrum are found those forms of intervention so recently the focus of U.S. action and public discussion: peacekeeping, peacemaking, nation-building, and humanitarian assistance. All of these are discrete activities, Haass explains, and each must be understood in order to avoid confusion of efforts and expectations.

Haass believes that no single set of precisely defined, specific, U.S. interests justifies either intervening in the affairs of another state or refusing to do so. Flexibility is crucial for responsible decision making and is essential to the formulation of a "sustainable strategy" for intervention itself. A clearly stated purpose is required, as well as a means carefully selected to meet the criteria for success. However, neither an exit date nor victory should be prerequisites for intervention; by setting such "artificial boundaries" one runs the risk of playing into the hands of adversaries. But when intervention has been decided upon, Haass calls for an early rather than late involvement, for more strength to be made available than the minimum one expects to need, and for decisive application of force rather than gradualism.

Haass argues that the U.S. must not degrade the readiness of military units that would carry out intervention or renounce the willingness to choose that option, because to do either would directly threaten U.S. interests abroad and, indirectly, threaten the quality of life at home. Potential international instability poses risks to U.S. trade and investment, "increase[s] immigration pressures, make[s] action against terrorism and narcotics-trafficking more difficult," threatens American access to needed foreign natural resources, and leads other states to build up arms. Specific threats to U.S. interests lie in the Korean peninsula and in the Persian Gulf, where the United States must remain vigilant against Iraqi or Iranian attacks upon Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or other states. The spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons vastly complicates responses to political instability across the globe. Given the potential lethality of these weapons, Haass believes that to be successful in the future the U.S. will have to consider preemptive measures ("preventive missions").

Haass believes "internal interventions"—humanitarian, nation-building, and peacemaking activities—will be common in future international relations. Decisions to intervene in this way will only add to the traditional calculation of national interests the quantification of human misery. How much starvation or egregious political repression will be enough to compel humanitarian action? Haass believes that the U.S. should retain the capability to intervene unilaterally, which is most efficient for short-term incursions. But in the more complicated peacemaking and nation-building scenarios, multinational intervention is usually best.

There is evidence that this book was hurried into publication. An occasional error of fact in recounting past interventions and (infrequent) grammatical lapses are to be noted. But it is informative and timely, given the conclusion of the U.S. and United Nations intervention in Somalia, the UN presence in Haiti, and the possibility of increased intervention in the former Yugoslavia.

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Murray, Williamson; Knox, MacGregor; and Bernstein, Alvin, eds. *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994. 656pp. $34.95

Strategy has long been understood as the balancing of ends and means by rulers and states to achieve political goals. Nations that have matched military, economic, and political strategies with their vital interests have been successful, and those that have not have suffered dire consequences. In *The Making of Strategy*, the editors, Murray, Knox, and Bernstein, seek not to examine strategic theorists as much as to analyze the strategic process. The result is a superb exposition of the means by which nations and states develop national strategies.

Graduates of the Naval War College will readily identify the themes and processes outlined in this text. Indeed the project is an outgrowth of a 1985 conference convened in Newport and of a series of lectures delivered during the Strategy and Policy sub-course of the War College's curriculum. In addition to the editors, the contributors include such luminaries as Donald Kagan, Colin S. Gray, Geoffrey Parker, and the Naval War College's own Arthur Waldron and Michael Handel. Not surprisingly, the seventeen case studies range from Thucydides' description of the Peloponnesian War to American strategy in the nuclear age.

The editors' purpose is to offer readers an introduction to the wide variety of factors that influence the development and adoption of national strategies. Focusing on how geography, history, culture, economy, and governmental systems affect strategy formulation, the editors view strategy not as an inflexible paradigm but as a process requiring constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate. A few examples illustrate their conclusion that strategy is an evolving process.

No state so epitomized the concept of a warrior-state as Rome in the third century B.C. In the words of Machiavelli, the Roman Republic was the ideal polity. Roman strategists, states co-editor Bernstein, sought to keep the Republic and the Empire at war for six centuries in order to preserve the uniqueness of the Roman state and its martial culture. Not surprisingly then, it was Rome's ability to exact military vengeance that preserved the loyalty of its allies and ensured the survival of the commonwealth. The fear of Roman retribution was particularly evident in the Punic Wars against Carthage.

William S. Maltby, in his analysis of English strategy from the Elizabethan period to the onset of the eighteenth century, examines the development of the first global strategies. Maltby argues persuasively that English strategy derived from the tension between England's naval and imperial commitments and its periodic need to intervene with land forces on the European continent. By 1713, however, Great Britain had defeated its most powerful adversary in the War of Spanish Succession and had solved its greatest internal crisis by the revolution of 1688. National wealth, built on the foundation of imperial possessions, soon generated revenue sufficient to support both maritime

and continental commitments. Thus a unified Great Britain developed a global strategy that achieved the Elizabethan dream of dominance of the seas and a military balance of power on the continent.

*The Making of Strategy* also examines the strategy-making process in the United States. Peter Maslowski states that by mid-1865 the United States had achieved the essential elements required for great power status. The Civil War demonstrated conclusively that the federal government would endure as a single entity characterized by unparalleled economic strength, abundant natural resources, and a large and enlightened population. Eliot Cohen continues the examination of factors affecting American strategies by questioning the assumption that innocence and naiveté were the hallmarks of strategic thought in the interwar period. Colin Gray then concludes that the American army is a direct reflection of the society that produces it. In short, the American way of war is a direct reflection of this nation's ethos, its institutions, and its resources.

In summary, *The Making of Strategy* is a major contribution to our understanding of the relationship between strategy and policy. This excellent book is likely to be the definitive historical study of strategy making for the current generation. Though the editors and contributors view as futile any search for prescriptive theories to guide strategists, they see the study of history as useful to identify patterns from the past. The future, however, remains elusive, and the great challenge for makers of modern strategy in war and peace is to balance the vital interests of the nations they serve with the changing conditions that affect the development of strategy.

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Weltman, John J. *World Politics and the Evolution of War.* Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1995. 263pp. $38.50

As the title implies, this work addresses geopolitical issues from a historical perspective—and for that the author deserves some credit. Given the relative brevity of the text, Weltman has achieved at least part of his objective of linking history to geopolitical policy.

As a prelude to our understanding of history's connection to military-political grand strategy, Weltman surveys theories underpinning the causes of war, suggesting that grand strategy is merely a political instrument used to achieve political ends. To advance his point, the author depends most heavily upon the writings of eighteenth-century soldier-authors Jomini and Clausewitz, notably contrasting the relatively scientific notions of Jomini (a popularly read product of French and Russian military systems) with those of Clausewitz, who somewhat more abstractly used his Prussian background to theorize about warfare, on the basis of his observations of Napoleonic successes and failures.

Weltman begins with the question of what role war might play in the post–Cold War era. For example, will we usher in the new millennium with a

period of unprecedented peace or with multipolar, nationalistic conflicts like those brewing in the Balkans?

Taking the ancient historian Thucydides as an exemplar, the author suggests that there are three fundamental causes for war. First, as advanced by Saint Augustine, human nature might prompt war, perhaps when a magnetic persona, such as Napoleon or Hitler, emerges. Second, organizational reasons might be offered for war—for instance, during the rise of certain Marxist or fascist states. Finally, as we have learned from our readings of Hobbes and Locke, war might begin because of a strategic imbalance emerging as nations scramble to protect turf in order to survive.

Weltman tells us that the French Revolution was a watershed in our understanding of warfare, for prior wars had been fought more for a cause than a state. Indeed, those who joined the Grand Armée fought as much for the flag as for the storied triad of Liberty-Equality-Fraternity.

One must conclude that since the 1860s and 1870s, when Bismarck cleverly expanded the German empire, the price for accepting battle has continued to rise with the advance of tools for increasingly horrifying destruction. Thus by the time nuclear weapons were introduced, we must remind ourselves, the abstract "theory" of Clausewitzian absolute war had become chillingly real. Therefore, Weltman suggests that strategies toward the employment of nuclear warheads take on the more concrete implications, as stated by Jomini.

Weltman races through several other theoretical watersheds in the advancement of warfare, but in closing he poses the ultimate question: Is war now obsolete as a means to achieve political goals?

We are offered the rather safe bet that limited war of a relatively small scale is likely, since the weapons are increasingly distant from the targets. We are reminded that it is one accomplishment to capture and perhaps annex a province, but quite another to win over an entire nation, not to mention a continent.

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Toner, James H. *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics.* Lexington, Ky.: The Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1995. 202pp. $25

James H. Toner is professor of military ethics at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama. In this excellent volume, he has drawn together the many threads of military ethics into a work readily accessible to military professionals, chaplains, and perhaps even undergraduates in courses that concern themselves with ethics and warfare.

Toner argues for the pivotal importance of ethics for the military professional. He surveys a number of distinct sources for this concern and reviews the sociological literature regarding the nature and function of professions—for example, Huntington's classic analysis of the military profession. This provides him with the occasion to develop a functionalist account of the place of ethics in allowing the military profession to

meet its obligations to society and to maintain coherent internal discipline. He elaborates on the oath of office and the commitments it entails, showing the place and importance of integrity and fidelity to those commitments. He analyzes the intimate connection between the unique character of military training and the inculcation of professional values. He reviews the major military codes of conduct and explores the values they teach, both explicitly and implicitly.

In addition to surveying the bulk of this more "theoretical" literature, Toner also focuses closely on contemporary practical and topical issues. He treats specific examples where disobedience of unlawful orders may be required by one's professional obligations. He deals with the conditions under which resignation from service may be the only honorable option for the military professional. He briefly but intelligently deals with such topical issues as homosexuals in the military, sexual harassment, and fraternization.

The book concludes with an extremely valuable chapter on the practical aspects of including ethics in the education of military professionals. It also lists a gold mine of teaching resources, such as films, novels, military autobiographies, and more philosophical treatments of issues in military ethics.

There are, however, important topics in the ethical use of military power that are treated cursorily, if at all. There is little classic "just war" theory in this volume. Regarding *jus ad bellum* (the ethical issues regarding recourse to military action in the first place), Toner offers very little indeed. Regarding *jus in bello* (moral conduct in war), again the book is theoretically and historically thin. There is little elaboration of the theoretical framework within which discriminating judgments about noncombatant immunity, proportionality, and discrimination in war have been worked out. The reader of Toner's book will learn nothing of the principle of double effect and its application to, for example, the selection of bombing targets.

These absences are troubling to one interested in the philosophical grounding of military ethics. On the other hand, for a book aimed primarily at a professional military audience as opposed to an academic one, these omissions are (at least arguably) strengths. By their omission, Toner does an excellent job of staying close to the discourse and culture of military professionals. Like much military training, he illustrates many of his points with concrete examples from military history and experience and minimizes the exploration of more abstract categories. In this respect, I am certain Toner's book will be more readily received and given greater credibility by a military-professional audience than it might have otherwise.

My only criticism of substance concerns the broad-brush development of what I call "the country's going to hell in a handbasket" rhetoric. Perhaps simply because I share neither Toner's fairly dismal estimate of the country's overall moral climate nor his assumption of the moral superiority of military culture,

I found the tone of these sections off-putting. At the very least, I would like to have seen a more developed and nuanced treatment of these claims.

However, if I were to recommend any single book to the busy military professional interested in some reflection on the ethical foundations of the profession, this would be it.

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Copson, Raymond W. *Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace.* Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 211pp. (No price given)

Raymond W. Copson has been a lecturer at the University of Nairobi, Kenya, and at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Since 1978 he has specialized in African affairs at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress, of which he is currently head of the Europe, Middle East, and Africa section.

He offers a neat and tidy contribution to the literature on a very unfortunate and pervasive dimension of Africa, a topic not sufficiently studied. Copson's approach is balanced, well supported with solid references, and lacks the numerous, pesky, little mistakes that pepper so many books on Africa. Regrettably, it is too short.

Copson introduces Africa's wars since 1980 with a sympathetic overview of the cost of war, presenting working data on mortality rates and such social consequences as famines, injuries to and dislocation of civilians and wildlife, violations of human rights, and the destruction of economies. His holistic presentation is a nice touch that presents the phenomenon in its true human context.

In chapter two, Copson offers a survey of eleven wars. Of these he counts five as "lesser wars" (Liberia, Namibia, Western Sahara, Chad, and Rwanda), which he discusses only briefly; there is slightly more detail, and also useful maps, on the six largest wars (Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Uganda, and Somalia). He ranks each conflict according to total casualty estimates, which is fair enough, but perhaps a system that correlates the number of casualties to the population of the respective states would have better portrayed the national damage. (Analysts generally agree that in civil wars in poor societies, 90 percent of the dead are civilians.) Following this presentation is a short but thorough list of collectively treated "related internal conflict situations." The inclusion of a table is useful, especially for classroom presentations.

The author's thesis is that although the causes for these wars were internal, the international factor contributed to raising the level of violence. (Neo-Marxists would differ, as would those who see the wars originating in colonial structures.) In his case studies, Copson devotes only short, separate paragraphs to France, Britain, and Cuba, with larger coverage of the former Soviet Union and the United States; and although the presentations are well done, still too much detail is omitted that is germane to understanding the wars.

Notwithstanding, this is a valuable section for its historical content.

The author tackles the challenging task of determining what causes Africa's wars. He states that the roots lie in "what many scholars now acknowledge to be a problem with the African state," suggesting an institutional deficiency. This approach is buttressed with a brief discourse on the widening gap between the African state and society. I would counter that the problem is human failure, and I have to point no further than to Idi Amin, Haile-Mariam Mengistu, and Sese Seko Mobutu, among others, to make my case. (However, I do realize this introduces the "chicken and egg" argument.)

The work's methodology is descriptive-historical, which is entirely appropriate. I am not encouraged with attempts to quantify such a fluid subject as war—mankind's greatest concentration of collective passion—especially Africa's bloody manifestations. However, focusing on Africa's wars since 1980 does pose a problem. A thorough review of such a complex subject would benefit from a wider perspective. After all, most of Africa's wars can be traced back to colonial machinations, and most of the current battles are recurrences of long conflicts whose origins lie in pre-independence structures.

The two concluding chapters are especially strong. They provide a useful assessment of positive attempts and proposed methods to reduce the number of Africa's wars, and although Copson sees some favorable trends, he maintains that poverty will undermine whatever progress is made through better government—a sober view.

The informed expert will find a wealth of new historical commentary in this work but will want larger elaboration of certain topics. Military advisors will find valuable records of the wars in a Third World political context but very little on competing strategies or battlefield tactics. Notwithstanding, due to its broad—albeit selective—coverage, this work would be an excellent addition to the classroom. Therein lies its greatest value.

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Wilson, Peter W. and Graham, Douglas F. *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm.* Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1994. 288pp. (No price given)

The title of this book gives the impression that this is just another book about the coming fall of the House of Saud. That is not totally inaccurate. Throughout this work the authors build up a list of indicators that point in that direction; in the end, however, Wilson and Graham hedge on their analysis. They assert in their conclusion that "since the creation of the Saudi state, obituaries of its imminent demise have been written many times. But in each case, the al-Saud survived and triumphed, a tribute to their political skills and acumen. . . . The al-Saud are by no means condemned to defeat. However, the situation calls for prompt and decisive action." The reader is left to conclude what that might be.

Both Wilson and Graham are journalists who lived and worked in Saudi Arabia. One of the book's greatest

strengths is its comprehensive coverage of the land and its people; but its real focus is on the internal threat to the House of Saud.

The first chapter describes in detail how the dynasty's founder, King Abdulaziz bin Saud, unified the diverse tribes of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Subsequent chapters deal with Saudi Arabia's political system, foreign relations, military and security forces, economy, and social issues. In each chapter the authors explain how the House of Saud today is attempting to apply the lessons learned from Abdulaziz and his successors.

Wilson and Graham identify numerous potential areas of concern. The information is insightful, perceptive, and replete with insider information. The authors appear to be comfortable dealing with the Saudi economy and providing details of its practice of foreign relations. However, in some cases, their discussion of Saudi military and security forces is dated and incomplete.

The main problem with this work is that documentation is journalistic; at times it reads like a newspaper's investigative exposé. (This may be, in part, because of the number of sensitive sources the authors indicate they are protecting.) Bold words and far-reaching analyses often overstate valid points. One concerns the House of Saud's challenge of "how to maintain its grip on power in the face of the greatest concerned domestic unrest and opposition in more than 60 years." This is a real issue, but it leads one to think that the streets of Riyadh and Jeddah are rife with protesting demonstrators. Another example concerns the Royal Family's key positions in the kingdom: "Prince Turki bin Abdulaziz . . . holds no government portfolio due to the scandals surrounding his in-laws, the al-Fassi family." The prince has held many key positions in the Kingdom throughout the years. It was his decision to retire from public service so that he could improve his economic situation. A final example is the authors' statement about the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF): "The Royal Saudi Air Force has always been the favored service in the military establishment. . . . The Royal Saudi Air Force has also been the most coup-prone service in the Kingdom." It is true that in recent years the RSAF received a larger share of the defense budget because of large expenditures on air defense systems, but both the Saudi Land Forces and Saudi National Guard enjoy more prestige than the RSAF. There was one RSAF coup attempt, and some RSAF pilots have flown to other countries in protest against Saudi policies, but I am not sure that these instances qualify the service as coup-prone. Such overstatements detract from what the authors are trying to convey.

That aside, this is a good look at Saudi Arabia's history and the Saudi Arabia of the present. In particular, Wilson and Graham do a good job of describing the Saudi-American "special relationship" that has existed for sixty years and is still misunderstood by both sides. Their explanation of the dilemma the al-Saud face while they try to balance the demands of the fundamentalists and the modernists is also insightful.

Those who are interested in the key issues that affect one of our more important allies in the Middle East should read this book.

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Quandt, William B. *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution and the Univ. of California, 1993. 612pp. $38.95

"Lessons of history are invariably drawn, but involve highly subjective judgments. Still, they serve as powerful guidelines in intrabureaucratic discussion." In these few words, William Quandt reveals his mind-set toward the problems of scholarship and government. He does not develop magic formulae with magnificent inferential leaps, nor does he leave the reader puzzled about what his judgments are on important processes, events, and ideas. Quandt strikes me as a practical scholar of the first order, who has produced a significant contribution to our diplomatic history in the Middle East.

Born the son of a teacher two weeks before Pearl Harbor, Quandt went on to graduate from Stanford University and earned his doctorate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was a staff member in the National Security Council during the October War, worked as a researcher for RAND, was a member of the political science faculty at the University of Pennsylvania, and has been a Fellow at Brookings in Washington, D.C., for a decade and a half. His published works focus on the Middle East and serve as the foundation for *Peace Process*. One of his principal works, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1977*, is among the most definitive on the period surrounding the October War of 1973.

This book is chronologically arranged and concludes with some general guidelines, including positive recommendations and cautions of pitfalls for policy makers grappling with complex problems for the first time.

Quandt makes it clear that the frequent turnover in Washington practically guarantees that American policy makers are far less experienced and educated on the issues than those in the Middle East. He cautions that it is unlikely that the U.S. will protect its interests in the Middle East very well, because of the president's lack of continuing interest and enthusiasm. The president must understand that it is important to pay close attention to the problems in the region itself, while remembering that no long-term U.S. overseas policy can succeed without domestic support—with the consequence that he must also attend to domestic affairs. Also, he must appreciate that problems of both substance and process are significant. Grand designs of substance have seldom been fulfilled in every respect, and coping with problems of process is important and less likely to generate domestic opposition. But the ideas of substance are also essential. While it is true that various parochial interests and political rivalries can skew American choices in

undesirable directions, Quandt asserts that American presidents have more power to overcome these than some of them would have believed. Most presidents have understood that fulfilling U.S. interest in maintaining the flow of oil while simultaneously assuring the survival of the state of Israel is only possible in the context of Arab-Israeli peace. It requires the continuing participation of the United States in the peace process, for the record shows that one cannot expect additional progress if those in the region are left to their own devices.

Quandt concludes on a positive note. He argues that President Clinton has better prospects for a successful policy than have many of his predecessors. Frequently in the past, the presidential paradigm placed the Middle East policy in the larger context of the bipolar superpower rivalry—much to the detriment of the peace process. The end of the Cold War and the consequent concentration on a regional concept is therefore to the good. Too, America's energy policy has improved since the October War, and Arabs and Israelis grow increasingly weary of the violence. So, perhaps there will be continued progress toward a permanent solution.

The attraction of this work is that it speaks with authority not subject to question, yielding a fairly detailed look at the Arab-Israeli problem. However, it may be more detailed than is practical for the *Naval War College Review*'s audience, whose reading list is eternally too long. The book is concentrated at the grand strategy level, and there is little with direct application for the military or campaign strategy maker. It would be most useful to the officer with a special interest in the Middle East or engaged in writing a thesis or dissertation on a related subject. *Peace Process* is a single-volume synthesis that is an excellent starting point, complete with appendices and a short bibliography. It is perhaps the most impressive survey available on American policy in the Middle East.

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Palmer, Michael A. *The War That Never Was*. Arlington, Va.: Vandamere, 1994. 358pp. $19.95

Have you ever wondered what would have occurred if the United States and Soviet Union had stood toe-to-toe, battling it out to the end? For decades, thousands of analysts made their careers grappling with this question in both Washington and Moscow. Michael Palmer brings one such conception of a global war to life, with an unusual twist—his work explicitly deals with the war that never was.

The book opens with an intriguing premise (and one that could come true). At the end of the 1990s a Russian Navy captain studying at the U.S. Naval War College undertakes a comparative analysis of Soviet and American war planning circa 1989 in collaboration with a U.S. Navy student. It leads to a massive "Global" (the annual high-level war game at the College), involving many of the world's military and political leaders. The Russian, who is not subjected to

the same publishing restrictions as the American military, signs a book contract to tell the story of that war.

Because of Palmer's background as author of *Stoddert's War*, *Origins of the Maritime Strategy*, and *Guardians of the Gulf*, and his years at the Naval Historical Center, it is not surprising that he focuses on the naval war and (remember that this is based on 1989 planning and capabilities) follows the Maritime Strategy's prescriptions for U.S. naval operations. Thus you can expect aggressive, early, and forward deployment of carriers, horizontal escalation to a global war, and a fair share of amphibious assaults. This scenario may be music to the ears of some readers, but I am waiting for the novel that ends the insubstantial debate over "coalition warfare versus maritime strategy" that so dominated the mid-1980s.

Although Palmer's account of the war game captivated me, I found a portion of the epilogue most intriguing. Through the voice of the Russian captain, Palmer argues that "the Cold War was . . . the equivalent of sea anemones fighting for a rock . . . a sort of slow-motion world war. But if it was on video, and if we could fast forward the Cold War . . . we would see it for what it really was—a very deadly conflict." And the resulting total collapse of the Soviet Union was "far worse than any of the scenarios dreamed up by your think tanks, or even the minds of your fiction writers"—a gift of insight at the end of an enjoyable read.

All in all, one cannot miss whiling away a rainy Saturday with Palmer's novel. Be warned, however. The reader will likely find points of disagreement with Palmer's scenario. I, for one, found his "war" too optimistic from the U.S. perspective. For example, Palmer has forty-four U.S. Navy amphibious ships with about fifty-thousand Marines embarked already at sea on the opening day of the war. But I cannot reject his thinking out of hand, since, when the pundits talked of massive casualties on the eve of Desert Storm, Palmer only wondered whether the U.S. had enough military police deployed to handle all the Iraqis who would surrender. Well, he turned out to be right on that one. For this one, happily we will have to rely on dueling novelists to tell us the story of the war that never was.

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Bathurst, Robert B. *Intelligence and Mirror: On Creating an Enemy*. London: Sage for the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1993. 131pp. (No price given)

Robert Bathurst is a former faculty member of the U.S. Naval War College, a well known author, and a former intelligence officer in Moscow. This book is his attempt to answer why, despite enormous investments, U.S. intelligence still hasn't got it right. He states that the intelligence community must understand the important role that culture plays when gathering intelligence, and that not until then will it improve. To make his case, the author offers examples of intelligence analysis from the Cold War.

Russia's history demonstrates its need to build fences—what is inside is known and safe, danger and the unknown lurk outside. Hence, geography plays a controlling role in Russia's strategy. In the late 1960s the Soviets feared Western naval capabilities to cross their sea borders, led by U.S. aircraft carriers. They concluded, however, that aircraft carriers were vulnerable to attack out at sea. Therefore, Bathurst explains, the 1970 *Okean* exercise was designed to influence the U.S. to stop building carriers by demonstrating the Soviet capability to destroy them in the open oceans. The response, however, was quite different from what the Soviets had intended—The U.S. built more and bigger carriers designed to stand up to the Soviets and deter war. The Soviets did not understand the centrality of the aircraft carrier to the United States Navy; instead of reducing the threat to their homeland, they had increased it.

On other occasions, however, the Soviets were more successful, deliberately manipulating data they knew was sought after by the Americans. When the commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, published writings that sounded like those of Alfred T. Mahan, the U.S. found a voice it could understand. Gorshkov's words were scoured and analyzed and cross-checked with other evidence. The Soviets learned what the West took seriously and provided it with enough data to keep legions of analysts employed.

Another example offered by Bathurst is that it appeared to the U.S. that the Soviet Navy intended to withhold the bulk of its forces and fight in "bastions" close to its homeland. The author claims that this assumption was wrong—the Soviets planned to disperse their submarines to the Northern fjords. Yet at the time, the best minds in the West believed they had cracked the Soviet "enigma" and provided good and accurate intelligence. Why did the Soviets encourage incorrect conclusions? Was it merely to deceive the West into making operational war plans to fight in areas where the Soviets did not intend to be? The consequences of their deception included the Maritime Strategy, which was a concept for war that would have brought the U.S. Navy directly off the shores of the Soviet Union. But the U.S. did not know then what it apparently knows today, that the Soviets intended to use nuclear weapons from the outset of any war. The bastion assumptions underpinning the Maritime Strategy would have been undercut, and funding for anti-Soviet programs might have ended. Did the Soviets know how their messages would be interpreted?

While most of the book is concerned with what was and still is wrong with intelligence analysis, Bathurst does offer some suggestions about how the U.S. might do better. He believes that the military is in need of foreign-area officers whose education would include the culture, geography, and ethnic loyalties of the area of their specialty—more than the rudiments of the intelligence cycle and military capabilities. He also notes that promotion in the intelligence community comes from administrative and not substantive achievement.

Where substance is addressed, the culture of intelligence encourages warnings of possible danger rather than predictions of stability. Bathurst also offers cautions about the American bias for technology, which ignores the human and especially the emotional elements of intelligence. The danger is that one day the U.S. may demonstrate its technological prowess against an unsophisticated foe who simply will not be impressed.

Although *Intelligence and Mirror* is not an easy read, it is worth the effort and the attention of the serious scholar who shares Bathurst's vision for peace.

JAMES J. TRITTEN
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Alexander, Joseph H. and Barnett, Merrill L. *Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare 1945–1991.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 292pp. $32.95

Amphibious warfare experienced a "golden age" during the Second World War when the ability to project ground forces along an enemy coastline at a point of one's choosing realized one of the greatest advantages of seapower. As Liddell Hart observed, it was allied amphibious power that compelled Hitler to remove forces from the Eastern Front and disperse them from Norway to Greece. The European theater showed that the centuries-old British practice against militarily stronger continental enemies (the "British way in warfare") was still of value in an era of air and mechanized forces.

The authors demonstrate that although in the Cold War the "golden age" was over and the period provided few examples of amphibious operations on the scale of World War II, it was not necessarily a time of stagnation. Indeed, as stated in the Navy and Marine Corps white paper ". . . From the Sea," emphasis on conducting littoral warfare in the post–Cold War era rests on the strong foundation of Cold War amphibious operations. Operational maneuver from the sea, the most recent concept development in amphibious warfare, is based upon technical and doctrinal developments that preceded the fall of communism, and cannot be understood without reference to those antecedents. The model of operational maneuver from the sea is, for the Marines, not a World War II invasion but, in fact, the Seoul-Inchon campaign of 1950.

This book was written by two Marine Corps officers who offer an informative account of amphibious operations, primarily by the U.S. but also by its allies, opponents, and others, between its "golden age" and the "new age." (It includes an excellent seventeen-page bibliography.) Alexander and Barnett demonstrate that progress has been uneven, due in large part to block obsolescence of World War II–era ships, and that obstacles now considered threats to amphibious operations, such as missiles, mines, and weapons of mass destruction, actually have been of major concern since 1945. Indeed, they attribute General Omar Bradley's 1949 statement that future amphibious operations were unlikely to the realization that an armada like that which was anchored off

Normandy would be a very tempting target for an atomic bomb.

However, Bradley's statement was overtaken by too many trends of the Cold War. First, no major Cold War amphibious operation was undertaken against an opponent armed with weapons of mass destruction, and second, amphibious planners strove to develop systems and tactics to reduce vulnerability to such weapons. The search for an "over the horizon" capability began even before Inchon. Operation theory and execution experienced incremental but continuous changes, so that the amphibious operation of 1991 had small resemblance to those of 1945. On the other hand, since the governing joint doctrinal publication on amphibious operations (Joint Publication 3-02) is mostly based on experiences of World War II, the impression persists that little is new since then.

There are some minor errors which detract from the overall value of the book. For instance, between 1945 and 1950 the World War II amphibious fleet was not gutted by sales of surplus ships to "Third World allies"—Third World allies did not exist at that time. Also, the LCVP is not a "Peter" but a "Papa" boat; the *Paul Revere*–class LPAs were converted *Mariner*-class breakbulk ships, not converted container ships; a helicopter is described as having a design speed of "one hundred knots per hour"; and there were not two U.S. divisions in the Korean battle line by the end of June 1950—Task Force Smith, an understrength 24th Infantry Division battalion with some artillery, did not enter combat until 5 July 1950. Further, it is stated that Major General Ned Almond and the Army planners of "Chromite" (the Inchon invasion) casually dismissed the Marines' protests for the bridge equipment they would need to cross the Han to take Seoul; since the Marines did cross the Han and take Seoul, the reader is left wondering how they did it. Also, one reads that Chief of Naval Operations Forrest Sherman "shifted his support against the [Inchon] operation to the argument in favor of MacArthur's bold stroke." Better editing would have Sherman "shifting his opposition to support of" Chromite.

WALTER J. JOHANSON
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Marolda, Edward, J. *By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia.* Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1994. 416pp. $43

In recent years, the Naval Historical Center has made a conscientious effort to produce historical volumes with greater popular appeal than the specialized monographs and document collections that have always been its forte. *By Sea, Air, and Land* is the epitome of this approach and, by all standards of evaluation, a great success. Combining a richly illustrated, "keep on top of the coffee table" look with solid, well written history, this book is a proud and worthy tribute to the Navy veterans of the Vietnam conflict.

Armed with over five hundred black-and-white and color photographs and useful maps and charts, this work follows the Navy involvement in

Southeast Asia both chronologically and by activity. In fact, every naval community involved is discussed or depicted—from Seabees to chaplains, from harbor pilots to pig breeders (civic action personnel). The photographs selected are both historically illustrative and representative, and as a collection they are of prize-winning quality. Likewise, the marriage between word and image is a fruitful one.

Unlike other attempts to explain the naval operations in Vietnam, the author's approach is not piecemeal. The carrier air bombing campaign, the surface gun line, the amphibious, logistics and sealift efforts, and the river war are all placed in context as a cohesive and mutually supporting whole. Quite frankly, the book is more understandable than the actual Vietnam strategy itself, and it benefits from the fact that Marolda has previously written more scholarly works on the subject. No footnotes here, but there is an excellent selected bibliography for the reader who is interested in acquiring more depth in the subject.

While much of the history presented is as upbeat as any interpretation of a lost war could possibly be, controversy is not altogether avoided. For example, the author has included mention of Vice Admiral James Stockdale's interpretation of the incident that prompted the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, i.e., that the attack did not really happen. Marolda, basing his views on ship's logs and tracking data, has long held that the reported North Vietnamese attack probably did occur.

Those of us who have heard the running Stockdale-Marolda debate (usually conducted by proxy) at historical conferences have an appreciation for the author's intellectual honesty, shown by his inclusion of the alternative interpretation. I hope that does not mean future conferences will be boring! As a side note, the Stockdale version, based on his pilot's-eye view, has frequently been backed by the former editor of the *Naval War College Review*, Bob Laske, who was an intelligence officer near the scene.

However that may be, the book's best attribute is that it is not geared to the professional historian; it is more "user friendly" than that. As the "cruise book" they never got, *By Sea, Air, and Land* would appeal to every Navy Vietnam veteran, and it is also an excellent introduction to recent naval history for their children and grandchildren. The pictures will retain anyone's interest, and the text is a great source for student term papers.

If you served as a sailor in Southeast Asia or know someone who did, *By Sea, Air, and Land* is definitely the book you want.

SAM J. TANGREDI
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Hemingway, Al. *Our War Was Different: Marine Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 189pp. $25

One could dismiss this book as a series of unrelated vignettes about the Marine Corps Combined Action Program in Vietnam, but that would be a mistake. It is a unique book: a bit of a collage, but with structure, it provides first-hand

accounts of the war by members of the combined-action Marines. A brief biography of each person interviewed is given.

Hemingway divides the book into three components: origins of the program, 1965–1967; Tet, 1968; and the wind-down, 1969–1971. He presents a brief overview of each period, followed by a series of interviews with those who served in some capacity with the Combined Action Program. Unfortunately, the author provides little information about his methodology. One gets the feeling that the interviews were the result of chance rather than scientific sampling. Nevertheless, Hemingway makes good use of the available literature, such as the official histories, supplemented with references to works by those who were there, as well as a mixture of original sources.

Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, Retired, one of the most important supporters of combined action, wrote the foreword. He convincingly makes the case that the program's emphasis on the people in the countryside stands in stark contrast to the search and destroy strategy of the larger units, formulated by General William Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

Beginning in August 1965, a squad of Marines and a Navy Corpsman were sent to the South Vietnamese Popular Forces (PF) and Regional Forces (RF) units located in the myriads of hamlets and villages surrounding various Marine bases. The concept behind the program was that by their example and discipline, the Marines would teach basic military tactics to the poorly trained militia. In return, information would be traded about the local terrain, the society, and the communist forces. In 1969 and early 1970, at the height of the program, the combined-action force consisted of four groups, twenty companies, and over two thousand Marines and corpsmen serving in 114 combined-action platoons. Considering that the Marine strength was at its highest point in 1968 (approximately 80,000 out of a total force of nearly 500,000 American troops), this was indeed a relatively small investment of men.

After reading the twenty-seven interviews, I was left with mixed impressions. To a large extent, outside the fact that all the interviewees were in one way or the other connected with the Combined Action Program, there is no unifying theme. Most of the former Marines are divided about their feelings about the Vietnamese. Some describe them as useless, undisciplined, and not to be trusted—some actually tell about armed confrontations between the PFs and the Marines. For the most part, however, most of the Marines had some sympathy for the Vietnamese rural population, and despite references to "gooks," several of the program members refer to themselves as "gook lovers." One even states that "we [Americans] were the gooks. We were foreigners in their land."

Was combined action the harbinger of a strategy that if extended nationwide might have won the war, or was it merely a futile gesture in a failed war that should never have been fought? Neither Hemingway nor his Marines can agree on an answer.

In a brief concluding section, Hemingway argues that similar units have a potential that should be considered by military planners for future U.S. low-intensity conflicts, but he does acknowledge that the Vietnam experience was very mixed—the Marines never came near to pacifying the countryside.

These oral histories are the book's core, and their ring of authenticity compensates for the author's rather lackluster analysis. Yet despite its limitations, this work has obvious value for both the military historian and the military professional.

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Anderson, Burton, F. *We Claim the Title.* Aptos, Calif.: Tracy Publishing, 1994. 428pp. $14.95

Korea, 1950 to 1953. Is it "the Forgotten War"? I think not. While not nearly as well publicized as World War II, which preceded it, or Vietnam, which followed it, the Korean War is nonetheless well represented in hundreds of books, dozens of which cover the major battles and developments of the war quite nicely. With few exceptions, however, most of those books are about grand strategy and the overall conduct of the war—precious few have managed to capture the essence of small unit actions or the stuff of war in foxholes. *We Claim the Title* does exactly that. It stands as an important contribution to the literature of the Korean War.

Korea is often cited as America's first *limited* war, at least in the modern era. It was limited geographically to the Korean Peninsula, limited in terms of American national commitment (the U.S. maintained a very cautious watch on developments in Europe during the entire conflict), and limited in the use of weapons (most notably the U.S. decision not to employ the atomic bomb). However, for the U.S. fighting man in a foxhole, and particularly the more than 103,000 who were wounded, nearly four thousand who were taken captive, the two thousand still unaccounted for, and the more than 54,000 who gave their lives, Korea was indeed a *total* war in its most brutal sense.

Anderson reconstructs that sense of brutality through the exploits of D ("Dog") Company and other small units of the 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, from March through September 1951, the second year of the war. This timeframe is notable in that it marked the end of the "war of movement" and the beginning of the "static war" of position. The armistice talks officially began in July 1951 at Kaesong and moved to Panmunjom in October, by which time it was perfectly clear to both sides that a negotiated settlement would be hammered out along the existing battle lines (more or less astride the 38th parallel, the prewar demarcation line between North and South Korea)—hence the decision to "dig in" and wait out the talks. Artillery duels, small unit actions, patrols, and some very heated battles for hills and ridges occurred during the last two years of the war, but overall, Korea became a battlefield reminiscent of World War I trench warfare. And just as in the earlier

war, Korea too would take its toll in casualties to the very end.

At his request, Anderson's family saved many of the letters he wrote home from Korea. Forty years later he would fulfill his quest to document his "rite of passage" as a combat Marine in Korea. The title of the book was inspired by the last line of the Marine Corps hymn, "We are proud to claim the title of United States Marine."

This work is as much about being a Marine as it is about the war in Korea. Early chapters chronicle a unique and emotionally powerful process—the transition from civilian to "boot" to Marine. Anderson's close ties to his boot camp experiences were reinforced during the reunion of "Platoon I-65," which he chronicles at the end of the book. The reunion, bringing together a number of individuals bonded in combat, undoubtedly added fuel to Anderson's burning desire to write this book. I believe this is a book that Anderson had to write. It is a book that other Korean vets will want to read, and it is a book that those of us who were not there *should* read.

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Legro, Jeffrey W. *Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1995. 255pp. $35

War is violence pushed to the extreme. It is a time when nation seeks to destroy nation, the destruction of the enemy is paramount, and moderation is illogical. Why is it then that warring nations cooperate and agree to refrain from using certain types of violence?

Jeffrey Legro is assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota. In this new book he presents an academic analysis of the dynamics of violence-restraint exhibited during World War II. Despite the perception of World War II as a total war, it offered remarkable examples of restraint between combatants.

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, all the major powers had strong negative views about the use of unrestricted submarine warfare, strategic bombing, and chemical warfare. However, after the war began, restraint and cooperation took some surprising forms. In spite of Hitler's desire to avoid provoking Britain, he unleashed the German campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare. Although the British could have done the same, they did not. The United States launched its own unrestricted submarine warfare campaign against the Japanese, yet the Japanese never considered doing the same. Excepting some isolated incidents, Legro claims the Germans did not use strategic bombing during the war. Yet the British, although outnumbered and more vulnerable, initiated strategic bombing against Germany as early as 1940. The restriction against the use of chemical warfare was observed by all major combatants throughout the war. Why?

In his analysis, Legro applies the three theories of cooperation—realism, institutionalism, and organizational culture—to determine which is most influential on national

decision making with respect to wartime restraint.

The realism theory of cooperation fits in nicely with the theory of chaos of nations, so loved by political scientists. It is the traditional view of national security wherein restraint is related only to a nation's perception of advantage or disadvantage; escalation or restraint of violence is balanced against the warring nation's "survival at the expense of all other objectives." Institutionalism describes wartime cooperation using the model that nations are not unitary and anarchic but rather a "collective of entities" whose behavior is shaped by such universally accepted rules and norms as treaties, protocols, and accords. But Legro believes that the third theory, organizational culture, is the driving force behind cooperation and restraint between warring nations; specifically, he identifies a nation's political and military cultures, both of which are very powerful influences on national decision making.

Legro's application of each theory of cooperation to the forms of combat used during World War II reveals, however, that all three theories played a significant role in the limitation of violence. Whatever restraint was observed was not based on benevolence toward mankind but on the pure calculation of gain or loss for each combatant.

This is an interesting work that brings to light a fascinating subject. Yet shifting motives and resources, point and counterpoint, and inadvertent escalation will always conspire to make war one of the most unpredictable phenomena known to man.

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Horne, Alistair with David Montgomery. *Monty: The Lonely Leader, 1944–1945*. New York: Harper Collins, 1994. 381pp. $25

This is one of the plethora of books published in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of the climactic year of World War II. Yet because the principal subject of the book is British, in all probability it is less likely to be read by an American audience, which would be unfortunate because Bernard Law Montgomery was one of the most important military commanders responsible for the final campaigns against Hitler's Third Reich. There are no end of insights here, into both the strategic conduct of U.S. European campaigns and British perceptions of senior American generals, in particular Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The principal author, Alistair Horne, is a first-rate British military historian and a superb writer: recall for example, *The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916* and *To Lose a Battle: France, 1940*. Horne's coauthor is General Montgomery's son David, from whom the idea for the book evolved when he decided to retrace his father's journey from Normandy to the end of the war. Their research involved visiting all twenty-eight sites that were occupied by the Field Marshal's command post between June 1944 and May 1945.

However, this book is no encomium. Horne was entirely free to express himself, and the result is a balanced treatment of a brilliant soldier, who was arrogant,

testy, enigmatic, and the proponent of some very controversial strategic concepts. Although the authors summarize Montgomery's earlier career, to include the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, the book is mainly concerned with his role as commander of the 21st Army Group in northwest Europe between 1944 and 1945.

The story line follows the well known chronology from D-Day and the fierce fighting in Normandy (OVERLORD), to the breakout and those heady August days of 1944. Then came the terrible blunders of the MARKET GARDEN attack (the bridge too far) and the dark December of the Battle of the Bulge. Less extensively covered are the last phases of the war: the battle to the Rhine and the final breakout—the *Götterdämmerung* of the Third Reich and its military forces.

The key issues of each battle were different, and it is around those issues that the book revolves, focusing on Monty's reactions to problems and his solutions. The authors' original contribution is to treat Montogomery in the context of his life style (austere) and daily contacts (warm but didactic) with his immediate staff—particularly his young liaison officers, who became his forward eyes and reported back to him in person each evening.

With regard to Monty's role as the senior ground force commander, perhaps the most interesting aspect developed here is his relationship with Eisenhower, whom he seemed to regard as a necessary evil inflicted by the Americans, who were by now, of course, the major contributor of manpower and resources to the war effort. He kept Ike and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, at a distance, which led to many misunderstandings on both sides. Though in the end the overall objectives were accomplished, couldn't it have happened sooner and with far fewer casualties? The answer is probably yes, and Ike and some of his subordinates, in particular Omar Bradley and George Patton, must share responsibility, along with Montgomery.

The issues discussed can be viewed in two categories: decision making and the strategic decisions themselves. In the process of decision making there was the perennial question of command arrangements. As it worked out, Monty was the ground force commander until Ike took over on 1 September 1944 (at which point Churchill promoted Montgomery to Field Marshal to help assuage the blow). Subsequently, during the Battle of the Bulge, Monty of necessity headed a large part of Bradley's army group and was reluctant to return it to the American general at the end of the battle.

Regarding strategic decisions there was the overriding question of Ike's "broad front," which prevailed, versus Monty's concept of the narrow thrust. This latter issue had many corollaries, such as whether the Allies' goal should include Berlin, and whether unconditional surrender was counterproductive past a certain point. One of the book's important contributions is its blend of the process of decision making with the substantive outcome of the strategic decisions themselves, followed by a balanced evaluation.

Some of the authors' judgments are:

• Monty never lost a battle . . . and never forfeited the affection of his soldiers or the respect of his officers.

• Without an Ike to weld the coalition together, and keep it together, and without a Monty to convert OVERLORD from a blueprint into reality, victory might never have been achieved.

• OVERLORD was basically Monty's plan . . . which brought about the victory in Normandy . . . and brought the allied armies to the frontier of Germany. Without the grinding battles of Monty's Anglo-Canadians, Patton would never have made his triumphant, almost painless, scamper across France.

• As for the still unresolved issue of broad front versus narrow thrust, the verdict remains unproven with the balance tilting away from Monty.

Horne and Montgomery's book is not intended to be a comprehensive biography. That was done in the 1980s by Nigel Hamilton in his special three-volume effort, which was summarized and published as *Monty* by Random House in 1994. This book is superbly written, interesting, nicely focused, and balanced. Monty was indeed, as the subtitle states, "the lonely leader." He was also one of the few Great Captains of the twentieth century.

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Browning, Robert M., Jr. *From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Tuscaloosa, Ala.: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1993. 453pp. (No price given)*

The biggest task the U.S. Navy attempted during the Civil War was to blockade the South's ports and thus halt the flow of guns, ammunition, and other supplies the Confederate armies needed to survive and fight.

Numbed by the fact that the country it served had broken into two hostile parts, at first the Navy stumbled. However, after President Lincoln proclaimed the blockade, the Navy gained in vigor and self-confidence; but it was unjustified self-confidence, because the Navy was profoundly unprepared to face the task before it. The problems were those, first, of distance—the hostile stretch from Brownsville, Texas, to the Virginia Capes was enormous; second, of logistics—each ship off an enemy port needed constantly to be replenished, repaired, and, in the new age of steam, refueled; third, of ships—eventually hundreds would prove necessary, whereas when the war opened the Navy had only dozens; and finally, of men—those that had been sufficient to man forty-odd ships were not enough for nearly fifteen times that number.

Quickly the Navy organized its main seagoing force into four separate blockading squadrons: the East and West Gulf and the North and South Atlantic. *From Cape Charles to Cape Fear* focuses on the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, whose responsibilities lay between the lower Chesapeake and North Carolina's southern border. Robert Browning, historian of the U.S. Coast Guard, describes the pivotal struggle in Hampton Roads in 1862 (which was a long drawn-out series of operations in the James River that ended only with the

war's end); the operationally incomplete campaign in the North Carolina sounds; and the attempt to close the port of Wilmington, North Carolina, to enemy traffic, which was not fully successful until the capture of Fort Fisher near the end of the war.

Browning's choice of subject is first-rate, for until now, no one had concentrated an entire book on the problems, failures, and accomplishments of any of the four blockading squadrons, and thus none have been able to dig deeply and broadly enough to explore the roots of the blockade's problems, failures, and successes.

When the war began, most of the Navy's ships were deep-draft seagoing vessels with a full suit of sails; half of them also had auxiliary steam with which to maneuver when the wind failed. As it turned out, only the steamers proved useful, but the most powerful drew too much to play a big part in the shoal-water struggle. So a whole new fleet of shallow-draft steamers had quickly to be designed and built, and until they were ready the Navy had to make do by arming small merchant steamers and harbor ferries. With such inadequate instruments of war the Navy penetrated the South's rivers and sounds. With them it also tried to carry out the blockade. Although ill suited, they drove the efficient, capacious, slow-sailing merchant vessels out of the trade with southern ports. But Rebel entrepreneurs and their British commercial allies replaced the sailing ships with slender, shallow-draft, low-freeboard, swift and handy steamers. Though able to carry only a small load, these ships had a much better chance of getting that load to its destination than did any sailing ship.

One of the most useful things that Browning does is to make plain that though the blockaders found steam to be indispensable, it was also a great weakness that the Navy was never able to overcome. The difficulty lay in the fact that the engines of those days were so inefficient and unreliable, and the engineers so inexperienced, that the small blockading ships had hardly returned to their stations from the fuel dock or the repair yard when they had to go back again for one reason or another. Thus though the squadrons would have a lot of ships, few would be on station at any one time. To stretch their endurance, blockaders often anchored; but then, of course, especially at night, they were unready to apprehend a swiftly moving blockade runner.

In bringing to the fore these long hidden issues that were central to the course of the Civil War, Browning performs a major service. But his work suffers from some problems, most of them unnecessary. The book reads like a first draft, not a finished product. Its organization, with later events described before earlier ones, is confusing. Some of the sentences are incomplete, and the author misuses words: "illusive" cannot substitute for "elusive," nor "movement" for "maneuver." The word "terrain" means one thing, "waters" means another, and "gunboat" describes neither a sloop of war nor a monitor. Big, bold statements such as that in eastern Virginia "the navy kept communications open between the army and its supply bases, made a safe movement of

troops possible, and, more importantly, made their weak positions strong," deserve support and elaboration. Other statements, such as the "*Delaware* moved to the wharf and prepared to anchor," leave one with the sense that the sea is a foreign place to the author. There are numerous maps that are clearly marked but lack many of the place-names mentioned in the text, and not one has a scale—one must guess, or seek out an atlas, to determine the distances. A good editor could have spared both the author and his publisher such embarrassments.

Still, Browning keeps getting better, and if his early chapters were as good as his last two they would have been very good indeed. Most importantly, those who have read this book will better understand the Civil War.

FRANK UHLIG, JR.
Naval War College

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Taylor, John M. *Confederate Raider: Raphael Semmes of the Alabama*. New York: Brassey's, 1994. 317pp. $24.95

John Maxwell Taylor, author of several well received biographies, has written an objective and critical biography of Raphael Semmes, the "daring," "petulant," "flinty," mustache-twisting skipper of CSS *Sumter* and CSS *Alabama*. "The most successful practitioner of the naval strategy of commerce raiding," Semmes was lionized by Southerners as "the Stonewall Jackson of the sea" and scorned by Northerners as a pirate.

Do we really need another biography of Semmes? Surprisingly, the answer is yes. Although several biographers have already written about him, their works are either stilted in style, pro-Southern in outlook, or not comprehensive.

Taylor has done a marvelous job filling in the gaps on the life of the Confederate Navy's most colorful character. Born in Maryland, Semmes pursued a dual career as a U.S. naval officer and lawyer. During the Mexican War he lost his ship, the *Somers*, in a storm. He "went south" during the Civil War because he viewed the struggle as a holy war of good against evil—the exploitative, intolerant "puritans."

The bulk of the book covers the cruises of the *Sumter* and the *Alabama*, during which Semmes personally accounted for 36 percent of the U.S. merchant ships destroyed by Confederate raiders. After the war Semmes worked as a college professor, newspaper editor, and lawyer, and became the "first citizen" of Mobile, Alabama.

Some readers might be disappointed that the book does not address broader questions, such as whether Semmes's actions had any subsequent impact on maritime law. However, Taylor does just what a biographer is supposed to do—focus on his subject. Rather than develop a thesis or central argument, Taylor concentrates on Semmes's personality and exploits and does not fall into the biographer's trap of becoming too fond of his subject. The author's writing is lively and engaging. He has a knack for using just the right anecdote to illustrate his point. For example, Semmes could be a hypocrite. His Mexican War memoir denounced commerce raiders crewed by foreigners,

yet the crew of the *Alabama* consisted almost entirely of Englishmen. Also, Semmes probably lied about having no knowledge of the *Kearsarge*'s chain armor before leading the *Alabama* into battle with the Union warship. Semmes's greatest flaws were his pride and his arrogance, but he did remarkably well with the *Alabama*'s drunken, mutinous, desertion-prone crew, whose actions reinforced his view of sailors as lazy and morally corrupt.

But several errors of fact mar Taylor's otherwise admirable book. For instance, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles was not "abysmally ignorant of naval matters" in 1861 as Taylor declares, and Captain Franklin Buchanan of the CSS *Virginia* sent two Union vessels to the bottom at Hampton Roads, belying Taylor's statement that "in defeating the *Hatteras* [Semmes] became the only Confederate captain to sink an enemy warship." In providing background for the decision to fight the *Kearsarge*, Taylor states that Semmes "knew little of the destructive potential of Winslow's eleven-inch guns." This is doubtful. The eleven-inch Dahlgren had appeared onboard U.S. Navy ships in the late 1850s and on the eve of the Civil War enjoyed a reputation in the service as the world's most powerful naval cannon. Several other such errors, a few typos, the absence of a bibliography, and the lack of a map showing the routes of Semmes's cruises also detract from the book.

These matters aside, Taylor has done a fine job. Not only does he include all the color and romance one would expect in a biography of Semmes, but he also answers the most significant questions surrounding him. The "critical factor" in Semmes's decision to fight the *Kearsarge* was his "aggressive personality." As for commerce raiding, Semmes believed that if Confederate cruisers could sufficiently damage the U.S. merchant marine, the North's shipping interest would force Lincoln to sue for peace. The fact that commerce raiding had little effect on the North's war-making potential was not only "irrelevant" but also "by no means clear" at the time. "If the war could be won by embarrassing the government in Washington," concludes Taylor, "the Confederate cruisers were every bit as successful as Jeb Stuart's cavalrymen and John Mosby's raiders."

In sum, Taylor's splendid book is the definitive biography of Raphael Semmes.

ROBERT J. SCHNELLER, JR.
Naval Historical Center

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Hebb, David Delison. *Piracy and the English Government, 1616–1642.* Studies in Naval History. Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar Press, and Brookfield, Vt.: Ashfield Publishing, 1994. 303pp. $69.95

Piracy was a major problem for England in the early seventeenth century. While some might have characterized England as a nation of pirates, it was more true to say that English merchants, particularly those trading in the Mediterranean, were victims of piracy. English ships were not the lone targets, however; piracy had become a general problem, and the major threat was from the North African states. In 1616, Algiers

had even broken out of the Mediterranean Sea and launched an attack on Santa Maria in the Azores, kidnapping hundreds of the island's inhabitants. In this early period, the Navy and the nation were not yet organized in ways that were responsive to a type of threat that has become commonplace in our modern world.

This historical study provides insight into the difficult process that the English government went through, as king, council, and ministers worked with the Navy to organize an effective response. In 1621 a naval expedition under Sir Robert Mansell sailed against Algiers, but it accomplished little except to demonstrate that such problems were not easily solved. Mansell's attempt employed a flawed strategy, lacked a well focused tactical objective, and was improperly supplied.

Problems with piracy continued to increase, and the government next tried diplomacy rather than force to achieve its object. The famous diplomat Sir Thomas Roe undertook an embassy to the Ottoman Empire, attempting to use Turkish pressure on its client states in North Africa to negotiate the release of captured Englishmen. Eventually, he was able to negotiate a temporary peace on the payment of a moderate bribe and arrange for the release of some 240 Englishmen from captivity.

In the 1630s a new threat arose when Sallee became the center of piratical activity, as it threw off whatever restraint had been in place from the Ottoman sultan and Morocco. The government in London turned once again to naval force and sent an expedition under Captain William Rainsborough. Better equipped than Mansell by virtue of a recent naval expansion, Rainsborough was completely successful, forcing the surrender of Sallee and the release of three hundred prisoners.

Hebb's fascinating account illustrates the evolutionary development of the English government as it began to refine its approach and management, linking diplomacy, naval administration, and naval operations to deal with a serious foreign policy issue. The solutions were transitory but showed marks of later, more mature development. His examination of this subject has made an interesting contribution to English naval history.

Readers of this journal will also be particularly interested in a further point that Hebb makes. Pages 107–122 constitute a detailed critique of Sir Julian Corbett's study of the Mansell expedition of 1621, presented in Corbett's two-volume study, *England in the Mediterranean* (1904). Carefully reexamining the evidence that Corbett used, Hebb determines that an important part of Corbett's conclusions was unjustified. In this specific case, Hebb shows that the pressing strategic problem that Germany presented to England at the time that Corbett wrote inadvertently shaped and colored Corbett's interpretation. "To make the past serve the present, he had first to remake the past," Hebb concludes.

Hebb's work will interest present-day readers for its resonance with recent world events. It makes an important contribution to history, not only for the new material that Hebb brings to light but also for his well founded revisionist

views and his evaluation of Corbett's historical work in one particular instance.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

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Levathes, Louise. *When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405–33.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. 252pp. $23

Between 1405 and 1433 Admiral Zheng He of China led seven trading and flag-showing voyages for the Ming emperor Zhu Di through the East Indies to India, the Persian Gulf, and the East Coast of Africa. Zheng He's fleets were truly remarkable, with as many as three hundred vessels, nearly thirty thousand men, and a four-hundred-foot-long, seven-masted flagship—nearly five times the waterline of Columbus's *Santa Maria.* (By any measure of distance and size, these voyages surpassed those of Columbus.) Yet in 1434 the entire enterprise collapsed abruptly, leaving little trace or impact. Sixty years before Columbus, China withdrew from world commerce, leaving it to the Europeans.

Louise Levathes, a former visiting scholar at Nanjing University in China, has done a timely and scholarly service in recounting Zheng He's voyages, basing her work on original manuscripts in China. The subject of which she writes so well is little known to the ordinary student of maritime affairs, grounded (as is this reviewer) in Western maritime history. As China begins again to assert itself in world trade and maritime affairs, Levathes's work is especially timely, reminding us that China is not a newcomer to the world stage.

There are two parallel themes in her book, both equally interesting. The first covers details of the seven voyages and of court life in the Ming dynasty. There existed a richness that is scarcely imaginable today. Silk, pearls, tea, wine, hardwoods, iron, spices, and herbs were carried and traded from China to Africa. Court life was elaborate, ritualized, and more brutal than the Medici at their height. Levathes describes all these with an eye for detail that would be the envy of the keenest society reporter.

The second theme, and the most important and interesting to the readers of this journal, is the economic and political significance of the voyages. Although the expeditions were a heavy draw on China's resources, the emperor supported them to demonstrate to China's neighbors near and far the power and majesty of Zhu Di's reign. Elaborate presents were exchanged with local rulers along the way, by which they acknowledged their position as vassals of the emperor in far China. Commemorative tablets were placed, many of which survive today, to testify to the reach of the emperor. Not infrequently Zheng He entered into local civil wars, placing on their thrones rulers who were thus beholden to the emperor. This was showing the flag, and presence, on a grand scale.

The most important part of Levathes's work is her analysis of why the later emperors and palace cliques so abruptly terminated these voyages and

why the voyages never led to exploration and colonization.

Deftly avoiding the swamps of sociophilosophy, Levathes paints a picture of a society so sure that it was the best that could possibly be that it felt no need of anything physical or intellectual from anyone else. The rulers of China believed that China's self-evident superiority would be manifest to all, and all would (and should) come to them with proper fealty.

To trade with the world in goods and ideas and to explore that world became an abomination to China's rulers. One hundred years after Zheng He's last voyage, the building of an oceangoing vessel in China was a beheading offense. Had it not been so, this review might have been written in Mandarin.

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Haywood, John. *Dark Age Naval Power: A Reassessment of Frankish and Anglo-Saxon Seafaring Activity*. London: Routledge, 1991. 232pp. $45

John Haywood has produced a detailed study, originally written as a dissertation for the University of Lancaster, of early seafaring, and one of considerable importance. Students of naval history, and those who teach it, usually skim over this period for lack of solid information. Haywood provides not only details of early medieval naval history in northwestern Europe but offers a thesis as well.

The book opens with a brief introduction setting forth the purposes of the book—to write a history of Germanic seafaring from the earliest recorded incident, a failed attack on the Romans on the Ems River in 12 B.C., through the age of Charlemagne in the ninth century. The author relies primarily on literary evidence, but where possible incorporates archaeological evidence. This approach differs from work on the succeeding Viking age, where scholarly concentration is primarily focused on ship finds. The results of this approach are revealed in chapters on early Germanic piracy and the raids of the Franks and Germans. Haywood argues correctly that the seakeeping ability of early medieval vessels was so limited that ship-to-ship battles were rare. Readers will be surprised, however, to discover the extent of naval activity during this period.

For those who hope to find answers to questions concerning the migrations of the Angles, Saxons, and other tribes to Britain, the volume both intrigues and challenges. Haywood argues that the Frisians (whose significance is deflated at the expense of the Franks) and other Germanic tribes employed sails on their ships. Although the Nydam and Utrecht ships as well as other early finds are discussed, none provide evidence to confirm use of the sail. The author does not provide a reconstruction of King Alfred's navy, but he does provide useful supplementary information to suggest that it proved successful against the Danes. The emperor Charlemagne (d. 814) and Louis the Pious receive praise for grasping the importance of naval power. They used it to great advantage in campaigns, especially on rivers, where ships were involved in

communications, transport, and logistics.

*Dark Age Naval Power* provides a provocative glimpse at the dawn of Germanic seafaring. These people understood the value of a navy and possessed an understanding of naval tactics and strategy that will surprise many readers.

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

*The cupola—originally the "circular observatory"—of Luce Hall, which was built for the Naval War College, in the Flemish style, in 1891–1892.*

# Recent Books

**Harahan, Joseph P. *On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1993. 256pp. (No price given)**

In 1988 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to do away with all ground-launched missiles with ranges between five hundred and 5,500 kilometers. That this was to be done with on-site inspections to verify compliance was a major breakthrough for nuclear arms control. Save in Antarctica, the Soviets had not agreed to such comprehensive inspection, and never on their territory. To carry out this task, the On-Site Inspection Agency was established. Joseph Harahan, its historian, has done an impressive job in writing the history of that unique agency's work in the Soviet Union.

The book is well illustrated and contains comprehensive appendices and treaty text, as well as records of inspection procedures and equipment. Perhaps most interesting are the descriptions of the actual on-site work done by Americans behind the "iron curtain" and by Russians living and working on defense establishments in the U.S. How the world has changed!

**Holmes, Geoffrey. *The Making of a Great Power: Late Stuart and Early Georgian Britain, 1660–1722*. New York: Longman, 1993. 506pp. (No price given)**

**Holmes, Geoffrey and Szechi, Daniel. *The Age of Oligarchy: Pre-Industrial Britain, 1722–1783*. New York: Longman, 1993. 439pp. (No price given)**

Part of a six-volume history of Britain, these books fulfill their authors' promise to meet the practical needs of both teachers and students who need an authoritative, up-to-date overview of British history. These two volumes stand alone, providing a particularly valuable portrait of late-seventeenth and eighteenth-century Britain. They are organized in an unusual but very effective manner. The main body of the text provides a broad interpretive outline, defining the main themes and developments; at various intervals, lists of dates establish a detailed framework for the interpretation. These lists, in turn, are complemented by appendices, which provide a "compendium of information": officials and their dates in office, summaries of key laws and treaties, and statistics of various types. These volumes, therefore, offer a ready reference for students, researchers, and writers. Specialists in naval, military, and foreign affairs are amply served, and the authors have skillfully linked the detailed material to the broader issues of national development. Most importantly, the books summarize the most important developments in British historiography, outlining the newest lines of

inquiry, while not forgetting the already established picture. Together, these volumes provide a valuable tool for those who would like to widen their perspectives on British history, especially the way Britain exercised its power.

**Jessup, John E. and Ketz., Louise B., eds. *Encyclopedia of the American Military: Studies of the History, Traditions, Policies, Institutions, and Roles of the Armed Forces in War and Peace.* Vols. I, II, and III. New York: Scribner, 1994. 2,255pp. $300**

This massive work, part of Scribner's American Civilization Series, is characterized more by its subtitle than its title. It is not merely a look-up reference ("Tippecanoe, Battle of," or "AN/SPG-55B"). Rather, John E. Jessup, editor in chief, has commissioned seventy major essays by leading scholars and practitioners that cover all the ground promised by the subtitle. The essays are collected under six headings, of which the first, "War in the American Experience," is introductory and interpretive. The others are "Formulation of American Military Policy," "The Roles of the Armed Forces," "The American Military in War and Peace" (containing most of the historical treatments), "Military Arts and Sciences," and "Military Practices." Notwithstanding, the set is also a convenient source of facts; the essays are compact, informative, and give extensive bibliographies; an eighty-page timeline lays out military events alongside those of general American history; and maps and an extensive index are provided. The work is valuable for scholars, students, and general readers—and indispensable for editors.

**Johnson, James M. *Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats: The Military in Georgia, 1754–1776.* Macon, Ga.: Mercer Univ. Press, 1992. 208pp. (No price given)**

This brief work, by a member (apparently) of the U.S. Military Academy faculty, will be of particular interest to reservists, and not only those of the Army. It takes up as a case study the military history of Georgia from the start of the Seven Years' War (a time when the colony was "a buffer of sorts" against the Spanish, French, and Indians) through the outbreak of the Revolution (when local forces tried to repulse what they thought was a preemptive and punitive British invasion). The narrative is informed throughout by the author's thesis that the militias of the period have been unfairly slighted by historians, that their occasional conspicuous failures to stand against regulars in pitched battles mask their vital contributions in campaigns to which they were better suited. Georgia, Johnson argues, is of particular interest in that its "military tradition," born of stark necessity, bred citizen-soldier forces fully worthy of their modern descendants. Annotated list of sources, index, period illustrations.

**LaForte, Robert S. and Marcello, Ronald E., eds. *Building the Death Railway: The Ordeal of American POWs in Burma, 1942–1945.* Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1993. 300pp. $24.95**

The twenty-two interviews in this book tell the gripping and heroic tale of the fight for survival and dignity of the American prisoners of war who were forced to help build the infamous Burma-Siam railroad for the Japanese during World War II. The Americans who were part of this forced labor, immortalized in the film *The Bridge over the River Kwai*, were soldiers from the 131st Field Artillery Regiment of the Texas National Guard, and sailors and Marines from the cruiser USS *Houston*. The interviews, excerpted from oral histories collected by the University of North Texas, span the entire period from capture in March 1942 in the fall of Java, to liberation in late 1945. This testament to the endurance, courage, and spirit of the American fighting man is both fascinating and informative. More than one out of five of the American prisoners died during the three-year ordeal. The survivors credit their salvation to a combination of the "buddy system" and the native Texan spirit. This book is well worth reading for both the student of the period and any military professional who might fall into the hands of the enemy.

**Long, David R. *"Mad Jack": The Biography of Captain John Percival, USN, 1779–1862.* Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993. 288pp. $55**

David Long has provided readers with a minutely researched study of a "hot-headed and petulant officer." Among many other long-forgotten incidents, he embarrassed the Navy and the U.S. government in his dealings with missionaries in Hawaii, and his conduct led the queen of Hawaii to think that he must be a pirate—not a naval officer. Though Percival is not among the pantheon of those we could call the "makers of American naval tradition," Long's study, nevertheless, provides valuable detail on the Navy of that day and an illustration of a crusty, sea-dog "counter-hero." Volume 136 of Greenwood's "Contributions in Military Studies" series.

Ψ

# Index of Volume XLVIII

## Articles and Essays
## I
## Author

# II
## Subject

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Ψ

# Index of Essays, Volumes XLV–XLVII

## Volume XLV

### I
### Author



### II
### Subject



## Volume XLVI

### I
### Author

## II
## Subject



## Volume XLVII
## I
## Author



## II
## Subject

**Sealift**

Bodner, Eric R. Signals and Sealift: Merchant Ship Communications Security. Winter 1994:111–6

**Shipping**

Bodner, Eric R. Signals and Sealift: Merchant Ship Communications Security. Winter 1994:111–6

**Space**

Seigel, Thomas G. The Application of Space to Military and Naval Operations. Winter 1994:117–20

**Strategy**

Hart, Jim. World Dependence on Persian Gulf Oil: Strategic Concerns and Market Reality. Spring 1994:111–7

**Warfare—Future**

Seigel, Thomas G. The Application of Space to Military and Naval Operations. Winter 1994:117–20

Ψ



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